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Introduction: The World Bank is one of the biggest external funders for 
maternal and child health in India and the world. Despite being a major actor 
in the global landscape for maternal and child health, there is no 
comprehensive analysis of the Bank’s historical involvement and influence in 
this area. This study thus documents the contributions and limitations of the 
Bank’s involvement in maternal and child health globally over the last five 
decades, and examines its influence nationally through the case study of a 
Bank-funded flagship project in India. 
Methods: I used a mixed methods research design for this study, consulting 
primary and secondary sources of data. For analysing the Bank’s historical 
involvement in maternal and child health over the last five decades, I 
consulted and analysed documents, archival records, and financial datasets 
from the World Bank, as well as relevant published literature and grey 
reports. For the case study of the Bank’s influence in maternal and child 
health at the national-level in in India, I conducted 30 key informant 
interviews, and reviewed project documents, archival records, and published 
literature. I analysed the India case study using a conceptual framework of 
donor influence developed based on theoretical and empirical literature.  
Results: Globally, the Bank contributed $24.6 billion for 484 maternal and 
child health projects in low-and-middle-income countries from 1970 to 2018, 
$1.4 billion in trust funds from 2005 to 2015, and $106 million in special 
health programmes from 1987 to 2014. The Bank solidified its role for 
maternal and child health through its cooperation with donors, UN agencies, 
and NGOs, to form partnerships and global health initiatives. The Bank’s 
conceptualisation of maternal and child health has evolved from being purely 
instrumental to now being considered for its intrinsic value albeit along with 
the economic case of improving productivity and economic growth by saving 
lives of women and children. Over the years, the Bank has moved from 
employing a selective programmatic approach towards a more 
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comprehensive agenda as demonstrated by the increase in its lending for 
projects on health systems strengthening and multi-sectoral issues.  
This study also found a shift in the Bank’s focus on public sector provision of 
maternal and child health services from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, to its 
promotion of private sector involvement, and its current support of public-
private partnerships. The limitations of the Bank’s involvement in this health 
area primarily revolved around its promotion of privatisation and the reduced 
role of the state in financing and service provision, which undermined the 
access, availability and quality of health services for women and children, 
especially from socio-economically vulnerable communities. 
In India, the Bank used a range of resources and mechanisms to exert its 
influence over the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to achieve six policy 
outcomes for maternal and child health viz. target-free policy for family 
planning, priority for reproductive and maternal health, decentralised 
planning, financial monitoring system, strengthened procurement system, 
and increased domestic financing. Contextual issues including political, 
economic, social, and organisational factors shaped the India-Bank 
interactions and subsequently, the process of donor influence. Ultimately, 
despite the influence of the Bank, the sustainability of the policy outcomes 
lies within the remit of the domestic agency.  
Conclusion: In order to be more responsive in this area, leaders within the 
Bank will need to consider reforms: such as framing maternal and child as a 
basic human right with intrinsic value, aligning its financing with countries that 
have the highest burden of maternal and child mortality, supporting countries 
with sustainable strategies for domestic resource mobilisation, increasing its 
support for health systems strengthening, and most importantly, including 
local voices and perspectives to inform its programmes. 
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Lay summary 
India is one of the fastest growing economies and still it accounts for 17% 
and 20% of maternal and child deaths in the world. The World Bank, an 
international financial institution, is the largest external funder for maternal 
and child health in India and the world. Yet there is no comprehensive 
analysis of the Bank’s involvement and influence in maternal and child 
health, globally or in India. I used a mixed methods approach by consulting 
primary sources of data such as archival records, key informant interviews, 
and financial datasets, and secondary sources including published articles 
and grey literature reports. First, I analysed the Bank’s policies, programmes 
and financial flows from 1970 to 2018, to document its historical involvement 
in maternal and child health, and analyse its contributions and limitations. 
Second, I examined the influence of the Bank in maternal and child health at 
the country level in India, through the case study of the Bank-funded 
Reproductive and Child Health project.    
The Bank contributed to maternal and child health through its financial 
resources (lending $24.6 billion for country projects from 1970 to 2018); 
partnerships (Taskforce for Child Survival and Safe Motherhood Initiative) 
and global health initiatives (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and Global Financing 
Facility); and through its knowledge products (World Development Report). 
The Bank’s approach for maternal and child health has moved from being 
selective (focusing on specific issues and interventions) to comprehensive 
(funding health systems strengthening and multi-sectoral issues). Over the 
years, it has also shifted its focus from public sector provision for maternal 
and child health services to current espousal of public-private partnerships. In 
India, the Bank used its resources and mechanisms to its exert its influence 
over the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to achieve six policy 
outcomes for maternal and child health. This study thus offers a conceptual 
framework and methodological roadmap to examine external donor influence 
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Chapter 1 Why study the World Bank’s influence in 
maternal and child health? 
 
1.1 Background 
Since 1990, the global maternal mortality rate has dropped by 45%, from 385 deaths 
per 100000 live births to 211 deaths (MMEIG, 2019). Similarly, under-five child and 
infant mortality halved in this same period, falling from 65 to 29 deaths and 91 to 39 
deaths per 1000 live births (UNICEF, 2019) (see figure 1.1). This major decline in 
maternal and child mortality can be partly attributed to political priority, mobilised civil 
society, and increased development assistance for health generated by the 
Millennium Development Goals adopted in the year 2000 and the recent Sustainable 
Development Goals of 2015 (Cha, 2017). Both these global declarations placed 
maternal and child health on the political agenda of governments as well as bilateral 
and multilateral aid organisations, private philanthropic organisations, and public-
private partnerships (Marten, 2018; Smith and Shiffman, 2016; Shiffman and 
Sultana, 2013; Hafner and Shiffman, 2013). 
Figure 1.1: Global estimates of maternal, infant and child mortality from 1990 to 2018 (Source: 






Despite these gains, each day around 810 women and 15,000 infants die from 
causes related to pregnancy, child birth, and postnatal conditions (UNICEF, 2019; 
WHO, 2019). Haemorrhage alone leads to over a quarter of all maternal deaths; 
hypertensive disorders, sepsis, and complications of abortion account for another 
third; many of these deaths can be avoided with timely antenatal and emergency 
obstetric care (Graham et al., 2016). Similarly, the most common causes of child 
deaths – pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria – are preventable (WHO, 2017). Nearly 
99% of the maternal and child deaths occur in low-and-middle-income countries 
(LMICS), with the highest burden in the Sub-Saharan African region (MMEG, 2019). 
India alone accounts for 17% and 20% of all maternal and child deaths worldwide 
(MMEIG, 2019; UNICEF 2019). Despite investments and major programmes by the 
government of India, (Vora et al., 2009) the pace of declines in fertility, maternal, 
infant and child mortality in the country has been slow and has fallen short of 
national and international targets (Paul et al., 2011). India continues to record a high 
burden of maternal and child mortality: each year, the country reports 989000 child 
deaths – nearly the population of Stockholm – and almost 45000 maternal deaths 
(UNICEF 2019; MMEIG, 2019).  
The World Bank, an international financial institution, has been the largest external 
financial contributor for maternal and child health (MCH) projects in India (World 
Bank, 2019a; Ministry of Finance 2008). The Bank is also, arguably, an important 
player in the global landscape for MCH. Since its first ever loan of $2 million for a 
health project in Jamaica in 1970, the Bank has been lending for MCH indirectly 
through family planning and nutrition projects, and directly through its health services 
programmes in LMICS (Prah Ruger, 2005). Between 2003 and 2013, the 
International Development Association– the Bank’s lending arm for developing 
countries – was among the top ten donors for MCH, contributing $565 million in the 
year 2013 (Grollman et al., 2017). Over the last five decades, the Bank disbursed 
financial resources for 484 MCH projects in 106 countries (Fernandes and Chen, 
2019).  
Despite the Bank's being a major actor for MCH in India and the world, no 





the organisation's historical involvement and influence in this area. A wide range of 
scholars, including historians, political scientists, and anthropologists have studied 
the history of the Bank as an institution, with little attention to its role in global health 
specifically (Woods 2006; Mallaby 2004; Nelson 1995). Kapur and colleagues (1997) 
have written an authoritative, two-volume history on the World Bank; however, this 
extensive work does not contain any chapters relating to health. A few scholars have 
also critically analysed the Bank’s role in perpetuating health inequities through 
structural adjustment programmes (Birne, 2009; Breman and Shelton, 2006) and 
have commented on its involvement in disease control campaigns in South Asia 
(Bhattacharya and Dasgupta, 2009).  
I conducted a formative scoping review of published articles and grey literature 
reports on the World Bank and MCH and found that none of the publications have 
analysed the Bank’s historical involvement in MCH globally or in India, over the last 
five decades. First, I conducted searches through six online, global health databases 
including PubMed, Scopus, ASSIA, IBBS, Global Health, and Web of Science, using 
the search terms ‘World Bank’ AND ‘reproductive OR maternal OR child’. I carefully 
reviewed the abstracts of the results from the search to identify any article that 
provided an assessment of the Bank’s role and influence in MCH over five decades. 
I found that a third of all articles made a cursory reference to Bank funding or Bank-
produced data on health indicators (Nuhu et al., 2018; Ng et al., 2015; Pinzón-
Rondón et al., 2015). These were followed by studies tracking the development 
assistance for health with mentions of the Bank’s lending (Pitt et al., 2018; Grollman 
et al., 2017), and publications describing events developed or sponsored by the 
Bank (Henderson et al., 1988; Mahler 1987). A handful of articles provided 
independent evaluations of Bank-funded, country-level projects on population, MCH, 
and nutrition (Coburn et al., 2016; Chimhutu et al., 2015; Baird et al., 2011).  
A similar search within grey literature from publically accessible, online databases of 
the Bank and other relevant organisations, found three types of reports. First, reports 
published by the Bank, which described the implementation of its funded MCH 
projects and evaluated performance against planned objectives (World Bank, 2005). 
Second, documents authored by the Bank in collaboration with other development 





regional and country-level and offered evidence-based reviews of impactful 
interventions or ‘best buys’ to achieve improved health outcomes (World Bank, 2016; 
WHO 2015; Claeson et al., 2000). The third type of documents reviewed and 
discussed the Bank’s work in individual sectors – including health, population, safe 
motherhood and child survival – over specific periods of time (Amparo Gordillo-Tobar 
2017; Robinson et al., 2007; Fair 2002). However, none of these reports offered a 
historical analysis of the Bank’s involvement in MCH over time. 
Therefore, through this dissertation, I seek to trace the World Bank’s historical 
involvement in MCH over the last five decades, since it first began investing in the 
health sector in the 1970s, and explore its contributions and limitations of its 
involvement. More importantly, in doing so, I aim to examine its influence in this 
area. The concept of influence broadly refers to the ability of an actor to be a 
compelling force on the behavior of another actor (Cox and Jacobson, 1973). In this 
dissertation, I define influence as the Bank’s ability as an external donor to direct the 
decisions of national health policymakers for the area of MCH. For anyone interested 
in improving MCH in today’s rapidly changing political climate and the development 
aid environment, studying the Bank’s role in this area matters because of its 
considerable financial contribution at the global level and its pervasive influence on 
donors and borrowing countries.  
A history of the Bank’s involvement in MCH can help to answer several important 
questions: How does this institution justify its investments in this area, how does it 
frame its policies and practice, what have been the triggers for prioritisation and 
investment in selected regions, what kind of financing mechanisms have been 
promoted, how is a Bank-funded project designed and implemented at the country-
level, how does the Bank influence donors and borrower governments and how is it 
in turn shaped by them, and what are the contributions and limitations of the Bank’s 
involvement in this area. A historical analysis of the role of the World Bank can cast 
fresh light on how an economic institution conceptualised MCH, and influenced the 
ways in which national governments implement health policies and programmes for 





While the aforementioned historical analysis is much needed within global health 
scholarship, for the purposes of a doctoral research project it would be difficult if not 
impossible to examine every MCH-related programme or activity funded or 
implemented by the Bank. This caveat calls for a two-tiered approach to study the 
Bank’s role and influence in MCH. First, at the global-level, I will analyse the Bank’s 
programmes and overall financial contributions for MCH over time and construct a 
historical timeline of the Bank’s involvement in this area. Second, at the national-
level, I will examine the Bank’s influence over domestic policy makers through the 
case study of a Bank-funded MCH project in India viz. the Reproductive and Child 
Health (RCH) project. India offers a particularly interesting case for this doctoral 
study because of its longstanding relationship with the Bank. The country has been 
the largest recipient of Bank funds for health projects including MCH (World Bank, 
2020), and also has one of the largest burden of maternal and child mortality in the 
world, with 32,000 maternal and 8,82,000 child deaths recorded in 2019 (MMEIG, 
2019; UNICEF 2019). Furthermore, the RCH project serves as a worthy case for 
analysis, as it was one of the first major national-level MCH programmes in India, 
and the Bank being a lead donor with the overall contribution of $641 million, worked 
closely with the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in implementing the 
project across all states in the country for fifteen years. More importantly, the RCH 
project promoted a paradigm shift from the existing demographic, target-based 
family planning focus to a reproductive approach based on the needs of the woman. 
Thus, through this two-tiered approach, the study will construct a comprehensive 
picture of the Bank’s historical involvement in MCH at the global-level, and provide a 
detailed case study of its influence in this area at the country-level in India.  
This chapter begins with an orientation to the World Bank, where I outline its 
structure, mechanisms for governance and financing, services, and its role in global 
health and MCH. Next, I define the concept of MCH, describe its critical components 
including evidence-based interventions and the global financing landscape for this 
area. The chapter proceeds with an orientation to the relationship between India and 
the Bank and the Bank-funded RCH project. Next, I outline the aims, questions, and 
contributions of this dissertation. I conclude with an overview of the remainder of the 





1.2 The World Bank  
 
Structure 
The World Bank was established in 1944 as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, with the goal of reconstructing Europe after World 
War II. Since then, the Bank has evolved into a leading development institution 
aimed at poverty alleviation and economic growth. The World Bank Group comprises 
five agencies: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Association 
(IDA), International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (World Bank, 2019b) (Figure 1.2). 
IBRD is the Bank’s original lending arm, providing loans, guarantees, risk 
management products, and advisory services to governments of middle-income and 
creditworthy low-income countries.  
Figure 1.2: Five agencies of the World Bank Group (Source: GoC, 2007) 
 
The IFC, founded in 1956, lends to private companies and financial institutions in 
developing countries. In 1960, IDA was set up to provide credits (concessional loans 
with zero or low interest charge) and grants to governments of the poorest countries. 
The ICSID was established in 1966 for the settlement of international investment 
disputes by conciliation, arbitration or fact-finding. Finally, in 1988, the MIGA was 
created to serve as a multilateral political risk insurance provider to promote foreign 





For this dissertation, I will only analyse the role of the World Bank in maternal and 
child health i.e. IBRD and IDA. Further on, I will use the word ‘Bank’ to refer to the 
World Bank. 
Governance 
The Bank is made of 189 member countries or shareholders represented by a Board 
of Governors that meets once a year. Each member country has one representative, 
who could be a minister of finance or development, on the Board of Governors. The 
Board of Executive Directors handles policy decisions and loan approvals. This 
board comprises five representatives of the largest shareholders in the bank — 
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States — and 19 
representatives of the remaining countries after they have been grouped into 
constituencies along geographical lines. Chaired by the World Bank Group 
President, the Board of Executive Directors meet twice a week to oversee policy and 
financial decisions. Loan approvals are passed by a majority decision, with each 
country’s voting power being proportional to the size of its economy (World Bank, 
2018c).  
 
Figure 1.3: Governance structure of the World Bank (Source: Adapted from World Bank 2019c 






The United States wields 17% of the vote, effectively giving it the power of veto to 
any changes in the Bank's capital base and articles of agreement, which requires 
85% of the vote. The G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, and United States) control 45% of the votes (Clinton and Sridhar, 2017). 
The World Bank operates day-to-day under the leadership and direction of the 
President, managing directors and senior management staff, and the vice presidents 
in charge of the regional units and networks as illustrated in the figure 1.3.  
The regional units are supported by global practices i.e. 14 groups with Bank experts 
that work on technical development areas. Six vice presidents head the regions — 
Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. The regional teams 
execute projects under the four networks and are supported by global practices 
which include health, nutrition and population, agriculture, education, finance, 
environment, poverty, transport, water, and jobs and developments (World Bank, 
2019d). For this dissertation, I will specifically focus on the Bank’s maternal and child 
health-related efforts executed through its global practice of the Health, Nutrition and 
Population (HNP) unit. 
Financing mechanisms 
Unlike other UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Bank 
both raises funds on global capital markets and receives funds from its member 
states (Clinton and Sridhar, 2017). The IBRD raises most of its funds by issuing AAA 
bonds sold on the global capital markets; it is also funded by the capital contributions 
from its 189 members and the income generated from its interest bearing loans and 
investment portfolio (World Bank, 2019e). AAA is the highest possible rating that 
may be assigned to an issuer's bonds by any of the major credit rating agencies.  
IDA is funded largely by replenishments or contributions from the governments of its 
richer member countries made every three years, with additional funds from IBRD's 
and IFC’s income and from borrowers' repayments of earlier IDA credits (IDA, 2019). 
Although the Bank calls for the replenishments, they are overseen by donors (e.g. 
United States, United Kingdom, and Japan) and not the Bank or IDA recipients 





Figure 1.4: Financing sources and products of the IBRD and the IDA (Source: The author has 




Over the last five decades, the Bank has grown rapidly to provide financial 
leadership in the development sector, from a modest start with four loans totalling 
$497 million in 1947 to 302 commitments worth $60 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 
2015). The Bank provides financing for development projects to LMICS through 
several products (World Bank, 2019f). Through the IBRD, the Bank primarily offers 
loans to middle-income and credit worthy low-income countries, while IDA gives 
credits (concessional loans) and grants to poor countries.  
 
The Bank uses three major channels to provide financing to LMICS. First, it provides 
investment project-based lending, wherein countries are offered loans, credits or 
grants from IBRD or IDA, to implement a specifically designed project with planned 
objectives and outcomes. Second, the Bank offers development policy financing or 
budgetary support wherein it directly transfers financial resources into the recipient-
country government’s treasury for a specific sector such as health or education – or 
for unearmarked, general budget support. Third and more recently, trust funds have 
become an increasingly used channel by the Bank to fund development activities. 
Trust funds essentially refer to resources contributed voluntarily from donors and 





projects and activities, particularly for global health (Winters and Sridhar, 2017). 
Apart from providing financial lending, the Bank deploys others services including its 
substantial research and knowledge outputs, economic analyses, technical 
assistance, and policy advice to borrowing countries, all of which have become as 
important as its financial role (Kirk, 2010; Prah-Ruger, 2005).  
 
Changing role in global health 
The Bank established its footing in global health by lending and offering technical 
assistance to LMICS through its Population Projects Department in 1970, which was 
reorganised to the Population, Health and Nutrition Department in 1979, and finally 
renamed to its current form of the Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) sector 
(HNP, 2000). Led by President Robert McNamara, the Bank funded country-level 
projects for population control and nutrition in the 1970s (Fair, 2008). This initial 
lending for population was primarily demographic in nature (World Bank, 1972), 
while the nutrition projects aimed to address human development; both these efforts 
were targeted at eventually improving productivity and economic growth in countries. 
Through these early projects on population and nutrition, the Bank funded health 
services that directly and indirectly affected the health of mothers and children in 
LMICS.  
The Bank’s HNP started funding stand-alone health projects in 1981. Within five 
years, the Bank became the largest lender for health projects in LMICS, moving from 
$13 million in 1981 to $404 million in 1986 (Measham, 1986). In this decade, the 
Bank solidified its commitment for MCH through two global partnerships with UN 
agencies and private foundations viz. the Taskforce for Child Survival and the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative (TFGH, 2018; Herz and Measham, 1987). In 1988, the Bank 
set up its first freestanding lending project to tackle AIDS, in Zaire, followed by a 
disbursement of $500 million in loans and credits to eight freestanding projects to 
support national AIDS control programmes in the next ten years. Though not huge, 
this represented the largest amounts of money spent in the fight against AIDS in that 
decade (World Bank, 2005). Although the Bank increased its cooperation and 
lending for health in the 1980s, it also simultaneously implemented structural 





market-based reforms including deregulation, privatisation, budget cuts in social 
sectors including health and education, introducing user fees for health care, and 
withdrawing subsidies. Over time, these structural reforms have been associated 
with poor health outcomes, debt crises and social injustice in poor countries (Breman 
and Shelton, 2006). 
In the 1993, the Bank published its ‘World Development Report: Investing in Health’, 
which became a milestone as, for the first time; the Bank had applied its intellectual 
power in its flagship annual report to define appropriate policies for health and to 
urge for increased investments in this sector, thereby giving it greater exposure, 
legitimacy and influence in the global health arena (World Bank, 1993). This report 
popularised the use of disability-adjusted life years or DALYs, a metric used to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of health interventions. This publication was also 
controversial as it recommended private sector delivery of health care and user fees 
as a means for financing delivery, reflecting its allegiance to structural adjustment 
and market-based policies (Clift, 2013).  
From 2000 onwards, the Bank has become increasingly involved in global health 
initiatives. While a general definition of a global health initiative is still subject to 
discussion (Biesma et al., 2009), I use the description by Cruz and McPake (2011), 
who define it as a model for financing and implementing health programmes in 
various countries and in different regions of the world that supported by multilateral 
or a bilateral donor; alternatively, they can also be established as a public-private 
partnership. The prime examples of Bank-led global health initiatives include Gavi, 
the Vaccine Alliance (set up in 2000), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (2002), the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (2007), and the Global 
Financing Facility (2015). Both GAVI and the Global Fund follow the trust fund 
model, where the Bank acts as a trustee or supports project implementation using 
financial resources contributed voluntarily from donors and held separately from its 
core budget (Clinton and Sridhar, 2017). While GAVI works to improve vaccine 
coverage in LMICS, the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and the Global 
Financing Facility are two of the more recent examples of Bank trust funds, aimed at 
improving reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health in high-





Since its first ever loan for a health project in Jamaica in 1970 to the present, the 
Bank has become one of the largest external funders of global health, committing 
more than $1 billion annually in lending to improve health, nutrition, and population in 
LMICS (IHME, 2019; Prah-Ruger 2005). In 2018, the Bank contributed $2.3 billion 
for global health, constituting 6.7% of the total development assistance for health 
(DAH) ($38.9 billion) that year (IHME, 2019). From 1970 to 2018, the Bank financed 
a total of 1,608 health projects, committing an overall $51 billion over time (World 
Bank, 2019a).  
The Bank has gradually challenged the normative authority of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and displaced it as the major player in global health; this shift 
can be attributed to five key reasons. First, the Bank’s lending supersedes the 
budget of the WHO, and it magnifies its contributions with matching funds from 
borrower governments and partner donors (see figure 1.5). For instance, in the year 
2013, Bank financing for health from its HNP core budget and its trust funds 
surpassed WHO’s combined budget (core and voluntary) (Sridhar et al., 2017). 
Second, due to its financial clout, the Bank has direct access to policy makers in 
Ministries of Planning and Financing in borrowing countries to advocate its agenda 
and when necessary, leverage health sector reforms. By contrast, WHO’s influence 
as a specialised health agency is largely confined to the Ministries of Health (Buse 
and Gwin, 1998).  







Third, the Bank has legitimised its intellectual leadership by producing broadly 
accepted concepts such as human capital, DALYs, and cost-effectiveness, and 
wide-ranging research and economic analyses (Tichenor and Sridhar, 2019). Fourth, 
the Bank cooperates closely with other global health organisations, initiatives and 
actors, best demonstrated by its involvement in founding the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. Finally, the Bank has a 
powerful network of people who move in and out of the bank to positions in ministries 
of finance and health in-country (Sridhar et al., 2017; Kirk, 2010).    
The Bank has significantly raised the profile of health on domestic policy agendas, 
and injected needed financial resources into the sector (Buse and Gwin, 1998). 
However, its efforts have, in many cases, been driven by its focus on return on 
investment and productivity (Sridhar et al., 2017), which go against the premise of 
health as a human right and as such should be accessible and available to all. 
Studying the Bank’s role in MCH can therefore offer a deeper understanding of how 
this institution works in this area, what drives its involvement, and how it influences 
policies and programmes in the borrowing countries.  
 
1.3 Maternal and child health 
 
Defining maternal and child health 
Mortality reduction remains a primary goal for maternal and child health; however, 
mortality only represents the tip of the iceberg. For every woman who dies of 
pregnancy-related causes, 20 or 30 others experience acute or chronic morbidity or 
illness, often with permanent conditions that undermine their normal functioning 
(Graham et al., 2016). Likewise, pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria not only kill 
newborns and infants, but are also responsible for high rates of morbidity that can 
impair growth and development and have long-lasting effects on children (WHO and 
UNICEF, 2010). Malnutrition is another major cause of child morbidity, with alarming 
rates of infants and young children globally suffering from stunting, wasting and more 
recently obesity. Maternal and child health thus goes beyond mortality. It covers 
several life stages of women and infants, and entails their wellbeing as much as the 





WHO defines maternal health as ‘the health of women before and during pregnancy, 
at childbirth and during the postpartum period’, and child health as ‘the health of 
children at birth, neonatal, infant and under-5 years’ (WHO, 2017). In this 
dissertation, I include the ‘reproductive’ phase and define MCH as the health of 
women and children in the spectrum of life stages ranging from reproductive age, 
pregnancy, birth, post-partum, neonatal, infant and under-5 period of a child’s life. I 
employ this broader definition for two reasons. First, a woman’s reproductive health 
is a vital indicator of her health in the later stages of pregnancy and childbirth and 
post-partum period (Black et al., 2016). Second, this life stage approach is useful for 
understanding connections over time as health events at one stage influence health 
at a later stage across the life span and influence the next generation through the life 
cycle. Maternal and child health thus encompasses health care dimensions of 
reproductive health, family planning, prenatal, natal, and postnatal care in order to 
reduce morbidity and mortality (WHO, 2018).  
 
Financing landscape 
Four initiatives have attempted to estimate the total external financing for MCH over 
time, with the most prominent one being the Institute of Health Metrics and 
Evaluation (IHME) (see figure 1.6). First, as per IHME estimates, MCH received 
most (42%) of the development assistance for health (DAH) between 1990 and 2018 
(IHME, 2019). Funding for this area totalled $186 billion over the 28-year period, with 
the U.S, private philanthropy including Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the 
UK being the top three donors. In 2017 alone, MCH received $12.5 billion, up by 2% 
from the previous year, and representing nearly 32% of the total DAH across all 
health areas.  
 
Second, the Countdown to 2030 estimated a rise in donor disbursements for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) from $4 billion in 2003 to 
$13 billion in 2013, totalling $91 billion over this period (Pitt et al., 2018). Third, the 
Muskoka initiative launched at the G8 Summit in Muskoka, Canada in 2010 as a 
mutually agreed approach for G8 countries to monitor their own financial support for 
MDGs 4 and 5 of reducing maternal and child mortality, reported total funding of 





Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System provides a total 
estimate of $9 billion in RMNCH funding from 2010 to 2015. Despite the differences 
in the RMNCH aid flows owing to the differences in estimating methods, time 
periods, and the availability of donor financial reporting data, these figures establish 
the significant priority that MCH receives in terms of funding at the global level. 
Figure 1.6: Development assistance for health across focus area from 1990 to 2016 (Source: 
Pitt et al., 2018)  
 
Historically, funding for RMNCH spiked in 1994. This was also the year when the 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo pushed national 
governments and development agencies to commit politically and financially towards 
a more need-based response to reproductive health as compared to the target-
based population control approach (UN, 1994). Even bigger increases in RMNCH 
funding have occurred since the year 2000, following the political priority raised by 
the Millennium Development Goals, and the injection of resources by the 
proliferation of new global health actors such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and partnerships including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance and the Global Financing Facility. Over the last ten 
years, the Bank has become one of the biggest channels for MCH funding, 





While researchers and data producing organisations and initiatives have 
documented total MCH aid flows over time, and a few have also captured the Bank’s 
contribution to this area over certain time periods, there is a gap in the knowledge in 
terms of the Bank’s overall financial flows for this area over the last five decades. 
This dissertation also tasks itself with documenting the Bank’s total financial 
commitments and disbursements to MCH over time and unpacking key trends to 
discuss the Bank’s role in the global financing landscape for this health area.   
 
1.4 India and the Reproductive and Child Health Project 
I chose India for the country case study to explore the influence of the World Bank in 
MCH at the national level for four reasons. First, India is the Bank’s oldest client. 
India’s relationship with the Bank goes back to the institution’s inception in 1944. 
India was among the 17 original participants of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, 
which conceived the idea of the IBRD. In fact, it was the Indian delegation, which first 
suggested the name IBRD. The Bank set up its first country office in India in 1957 
and has maintained a continuous presence in India since then, longer than in any 
other country (World Bank, 1957).  
Second, India is the Bank’s biggest client. Bank lending to India began in 1949. 
Starting with a commitment of $700 million in the first decade of its lending, Bank 
commitments for projects in the country have dramatically risen over time, peaking at 
$31 billion between 2001-2010 (see figure 1.7). As of 2019, the country’s cumulative 
borrowing stood at around $113 billion in combined assistance from the IBRD and 
IDA for 708 projects (World Bank, 2019g). India is also the largest recipient of Bank 
lending for health and MCH projects. Since 1972, the Bank’s HNP sector has 
committed $9.7 billion in financial assistance for 64 health projects in the country, 
forming nearly ten percent of the overall Bank financial assistance for the country.  
Finally, while its maternal and child mortality rates have been on the decline, India 
continues to have one of the largest burdens of maternal and child deaths in the 
world. The Bank has been involved in family planning and nutrition projects in the 
country since the 1970s, and also funded two of India’s major national-level 






I chose the RCH project as a worthy case for analysis for the following reasons. 
First, financially, the RCH project was one of the biggest MCH projects for the Bank 
as well as the Government of India. With a total financial contribution of $641 million, 
it was the Bank’s largest MCH project in India and second largest in the world, after 
the Provincial Maternal Child Health Sector Adjustment Loan in Argentina, which 
received $750 million from 2003 to 2007 (World Bank, 2019). The RCH project was 
implemented in two phases i.e. 1997 to 2004 and 2006 to 2012; and it witnessed a 
changing donor environment across these two phases. In the first phase of this 
project, the Bank disbursed 84% of the total project cost of $309 million, while in the 
second phase; the Government of India took the lead by contributing nearly half of 
the total cost of $2.2 billion. The second phase also ushered in new donors, such as 
the Department for International Development (DFID) and United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA). This project thus offers a unique opportunity to examine the Bank’s 
influence under different financing circumstances. 
Second, the RCH project promoted a shift in the way MCH services were delivered 
in the country. It actioned India’s decision to comply with the provisions from the 
International Conference for Population and Development, and switched the focus 
from a vertical, target-based approach through family planning and immunisation 
programmes, to a more needs-based reproductive and child approach. The project 
also introduced a package of essential MCH services including services for 
reproductive tract infections and sexually transmitted diseases, emergency obstetric 
care, and medical termination of pregnancy (World Bank, 1996; Measham and 
Heaver, 1996). An analysis of the RCH project can determine the Bank’s role in the 
design and implementation of these policy and programmatic shifts in the country 
and also explore the current status of these changes within the Indian health system.  
Third, the RCH project was a national-level programme i.e. it was implemented 
across all the states in India unlike other Bank-funded health projects that are 
implemented in selected states. In India, the health system operates at three broad 
administrative levels viz. central (national), state (province), and district (local). The 
national scale of the RCH project thus allows for an in-depth examination of the 





potential to understand how the Bank works at the three administrative levels and 
what the extent of its influence is at each level.   
Finally, when we look at the Bank’s performance rating of the RCH project, 
documents reveal an ‘unsatisfactory’ rating for the first phase, moving to a 
‘moderately satisfactory’ rating for the second phase. In 2005, former Bank President 
Paul Wolfowitz suspended a major loan for the RCH project in response to 
allegations of fraud and corruption in the procurement process (Mallaby, 2006). 
Despite the controversy around corruption and not achieving the expected planned 
health outcomes in the first phase, this project was funded for a second phase with a 
six-fold increase in project costs as well as financial support from new donors. These 
developments through the course of the project offers a chance to explore the 
relationship between the Bank and the Government of India under challenging 
conditions.   
 
1.5 Research aims, questions and contributions 
In light of the gap in the literature, I aim to make a novel research contribution by 
exploring and examining the influence of the World Bank in the area of maternal and 
child health over a period of five decades.  
I do so by first describing and discussing the Bank’s historical involvement in MCH 
from when it first started lending for health projects in 1970 to 2018. This component 
represents the task of tracing the Bank’s policies, programmes and its overall 
financial assistance for MCH, understanding the key actors and events, exploring the 
development of ideas, and discussing international cooperation, all of which will aid 
in constructing a timeline of the Bank’s involvement in this area and how it 
conceptualised MCH and justified its efforts over time. A synthesis and critical 
interpretation of the evolution of the Bank’s involvement in MCH sets the stage for 
the next component of this study. At this second level, I examine the process in 
which the Bank influences MCH at the country-level, in India, through the case of a 
national-level flagship programme – the RCH project, implemented over a period of 





Thus, in trying to understand the World Bank’s involvement and influence in MCH, 
this dissertation answers the following research questions: 
1. What can be said about the role of the World Bank in MCH over the last five 
decades, in terms of its financial investments, knowledge, technical 
assistance, and cooperation? 
2. What interests drove the Bank’s involvement in MCH over time? 
3. How has the Bank conceptualised MCH over time? 
4. What can be said about the Bank’s influence in MCH in India through its 
involvement in the RCH project? 
I unpack the objectives of the study below:   
 I trace the Bank’s major policies and initiatives for MCH across five distinct 
phases starting in 1960 to 2018.  
 I track the Bank’s overall financial flows for MCH projects in low-and-middle-
income countries from 1970 to 2018. An analysis of the Bank’s policies and its 
financial flows for MCH will help explain the drivers and justifications for its 
involvement in this area and how it conceptualised MCH over time. 
 For the case study of India, I first describe the India-Bank relationship from 
the 1940s to the present to set the context for analysing the RCH project. I 
then describe the process of the design and implementation of the RCH 
project and discuss the Bank’s role in the same. Finally, I use a conceptual 
framework of donor influence to examine the process and the degree of the 
Bank’s influence in MCH in the country. 
This study adopts a historical perspective as, globally, it looks at the Bank’s efforts in 
MCH over a period of five decades, and nationally, in India, it examines a project that 
ran for more than a decade. The historical context is critical since I am not only 
interested in the policy decisions, but also want to understand their genesis and 
long-term ramifications. A cross-sectional approach would not provide that 
understanding. A historical approach is thus useful because, policies do not 
crystallise at a particular point in the decision process but evolve, through complex 
interactions among various interest groups (Gorden et al., 1993). Such an approach 





problems, and enables us to think critically about the role of contextual factors that 
have shaped policy and health outcomes over time.  
Through this study, I aim to make empirical, conceptual, and methodological 
contributions to the health policy literature in LMICS including the works of Gill Walt 
(Walt, 2008, 1994), Lucy Gilson (Gilson et al., 2011; Erasmus and Gilson, 2008) and 
Jeremy Shiffman (Shiffman and Ved, 2008). Empirically, this study will, to the best of 
my knowledge, present the first extensive analysis of the Bank’s involvement in MCH 
at a global level as well as in a country setting. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
while scholars have studied the World Bank as an international financial institution, 
there has been very little focus on its role in health over time. The Bank’s collective 
efforts in MCH in particular have not been analysed. This study thus uses multiple 
sources of data (as detailed in the chapter three - Methods) to provide a critical 
account of the Bank’s influence through its contributions and limitations for MCH 
over five decades.     
I propose to develop a conceptual framework of donor influence from the existing 
health policy literature and then empirically test this framework using the country 
case study of India and the RCH project. Several studies have highlighted the 
problems that can arise from a dominant donor influence in the health policy 
processes of LMICS, including overshadowing of national health priorities, 
overlooking strengths and absorptive capacities of national health systems, and their 
ability to sustain progress after the funding ends (Travis et al., 2002; Ollila 2005; 
Khan and Coker, 2014). External donor influence can also raise challenges in terms 
of accountability and ownership over policy and programmes (Okuonzi and Macrae, 
1995).  
While scholars have raised concerns about the influence of donors over health 
systems in LMICS (Khan and Coker 2014; Biesma et al., 2009; Shiffman 2008; 
Yamey 2002), to date only limited work has explored the process of donor influence 
and the implications of power imbalances at different stages of the policy process in 
aid-recipient countries (Khan et al., 2016; Chima and Homedes 2015; Hanefeld 
2010; Spicer et al. 2010; Okuonzi and Macrae 1995). Moreover, to the best of my 
knowledge there has been no published study, which has explicitly presented a 





tested it in a country setting. Understanding multiple stakeholders including national 
policy actors, experiences of donor influence, and what mechanisms underpin the 
relationships of LMIC institutions with donors, is crucial to strengthening national 
ownership of health policies. Hence, this doctoral study develops such a conceptual 
framework of donor influence, which can be applied in other LMIC settings to 
improve our understanding of the donor-recipient country relationship and enable 
effective governance, national ownership, and policy and programme 
implementation.   
Methodologically, I aim to provide a roadmap to study an international institution’s 
role in a health area at the global level, and specifically examine the process and 
degree of its influence at the national level. This study uses a mixed methods 
research design including both quantitative and qualitative data sources (as detailed 
in the chapter three - Methods). In doing so, it therefore presents a systematic 
approach to designing research, collecting and critically analysing data on donor 
influence, which can aid health policy scholars to conduct similar research in LMICS. 
Additionally, this study also adds to the growing literature on how to do health policy 
analysis (Walt, 2008; Erasmus and Gilson, 2008).  
 
1.6 Overview of the dissertation 
This dissertation contains nine chapters. The remainder of the dissertation is 
organised in the following manner. Chapter Two presents a scoping review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on external donor influence at the institutional 
level in a country setting. This review acts as a starting point for understanding the 
concept of donor influence, exploring its application in health policy analysis in LMIC 
settings, and identifying the components to develop a conceptual framework for this 
study.  
Chapter Three explains the methods used for this study. It begins with the 
ontological and epistemological approaches adopted, followed by the rationale and 
description of the mixed-methods research design. The chapter then systematically 
describes each research method in detail, discusses my positionality within the 
study, and the ethical dimensions of studying powerful actors and the process of 





Chapter Four will explore the origins and evolution of the Bank’s work in MCH. In 
doing so, it discusses the Bank’s MCH policies and programmatic approaches over 
the last five decades, within the broader context of major global health trends and 
events. This chapter will also identify key actors, events, and ideological trends that 
determined the Bank’s conceptualisation of MCH and its investments in this area. 
Chapter Five tracks the Bank’s financial flows through its core budget and extra-
budgetary funds from 1970 to 2018, and situates it within the larger environment of 
development assistance over time. It will unpack key financial trends to discuss the 
Bank’s role in MCH at the global level and its changing programmatic and financing 
approaches.  
Chapters Six to Eight examine the Bank’s efforts in MCH in India. Chapter Six will 
describe the India-Bank relationship vis-à-vis the health sector and MCH from the 
1940s to the present, thereby establishing the background for understanding and 
analysing the RCH project. Chapter Seven traces the process of the two phases of 
the RCH project. By using multiple sources of data such as archival records, project 
documents, financial datasets, and qualitative interviews, this chapter reconstructs 
the timeline of events in the project design and implementation, discusses 
interactions and underlying dynamics between Bank and national actors and other 
relevant partners. Chapter Eight uses the conceptual framework of donor influence 
to analyse the RCH project and examines the process, including the resources and 
mechanisms, used by the Bank to influence the Indian Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare for MCH-related policy outcomes. Furthermore, this chapter also presents a 
novel scale to ascertain the degree of the Bank’s influence and a sustainability index 
for each of the MCH-related outcomes.   
Chapter Nine summarises the key findings from this study and discusses its 
implications. It discusses the applicability of the framework of donor influence in 
other LMIC settings. Finally, the chapter describes the contributions of this thesis 
and outlines futures areas for research, concluding with reflections on the Bank’s 





Chapter 2 Conceptual framework of donor 
influence in health policy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I set out to examine the World Bank’s influence in maternal and child 
health over the last five decades, since its foray in the health sector in 1970s. While 
studying the influence of an international institution like the Bank at the global level 
can be difficult, I decided to specifically examine the Bank’s influence at the country 
level in India. In this chapter, I review the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
for any theories or frameworks on donor influence in health policy. The aim is to use 
such a framework to analyse the data from the case study of the Reproductive and 
Child Health (RCH) Project in India, and uncover the process of the Bank’s influence 
in maternal and child health at the country level.   
This chapter has four parts. In the first part, I define the concept of donor influence 
and discuss the way in which I use it in the thesis. In part two, I describe a theoretical 
framework for public policy i.e., Walt and Gilson’s policy triangle framework (1994), 
which can be used to guide this analysis. In the third part, I briefly describe the 
relevant empirical studies on donor influence at the institutional level in low-and-
middle-income countries (LMICS) receiving aid or technical support from external 
organisations. In part four, I bring together the insights from the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature and present a conceptual framework of donor influence, 
which I will use to analyse of the case study of the RCH project.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is a novel conceptual framework that draws from 
both theoretical and applied health policy literature in LMICS, and offers a potential 
roadmap to study the process in which an external donor can exert its influence over 
a domestic agency at the country level, to achieve health policy outcomes. I 
conclude this chapter by discussing how this framework will be used to analyse the 





2.2  The concept of donor influence 
The term ‘influence' broadly refers to the ability of an actor to be a compelling force 
on the behaviour of another actor (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, pg.25). Influence, as a 
concept, has been studied in several fields. Social psychologists define influence as 
intentional and unintentional efforts to change another person's beliefs, attitudes, or 
behavior (Gass, 2015; Turner, 1991). Unlike persuasion, which is typically intentional 
and requires some degree of awareness on the part of the target, influence may be 
inadvertent or accidental (Cialdini, 1984). The field of organisational and 
management studies discuss intra and inter organisational influence that is 
understood as the capacity of an organisation to affect the behaviour of its own staff 
and other organisations, respectively (Pfeffer, 2017; Kipnis et al., 1980).  
 
Scholars within the field of international relations (Hast, 2016; Holsti, 1964; Singer, 
1963) have viewed influence as being instrumental, and as a means to an end, and 
implies a base of capabilities that an actor uses or mobilises to use in their efforts to 
influence the behaviour of another actor. In global health policy literature, 
researchers have discussed influence as the ability of bilateral or multilateral 
organisations to direct the decisions or priorities of national health policymakers 
(Khan et al., 2018; Wickramasinghe et al., 2018; Harmer et al., 2013). While these 
are just a few of the ways in which influence is understood and do not represent all 
the possible conceptions of this concept, these do serve as a starting point to draw 
from and define the concept of donor influence for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
For this thesis, I adopt the Khan et al’s (2018) definition of donor influence as the 
ability of an external organisation to shape or direct the priorities or decisions of 
policy makers in a domestic organisation at the country level, to achieve certain 
goals. Essentially, donor influence is inter-organisational in that it infers a 
relationship between actors in the donor organisation and the domestic organisation. 
Donor influence is also instrumental, which means that it results in the attainment of 
certain outcomes, which could be defined by either of the two organisations or even 
external actors. Moreover, the ability to influence implies the capacities of a donor 





in a domestic organisation to achieve certain policy, programmatic or health 
outcomes.  
 
2.3 Theoretical literature 
In my reading of theoretical literature on how health policy emerges and unfolds in 
LMICS, I identified Walt and Gilson's policy analysis triangle framework (1994), and 
found this to be relevant to understand donor influence within this process. Gill and 
Wilson developed the policy triangle framework specifically for health, although its 
relevance extends beyond this sector. They noted that health policy research 
focused largely on the content of policy, neglecting actors, context and processes. 
Their policy triangle framework is grounded in a political economy perspective, and 
considers how all four of these elements interact to shape policy-making (see figure 
2.1). These four factors cannot be considered and analysed separately. Actors are 
influenced (as individuals or members of groups or organisations) by the context 
within which they live and work; context is affected by many factors such as 
instability or ideology, by history and culture; and the process of policy making – how 
issues get on to the policy agendas, and how they fare once there – is affected by 
actors, their position in power structures, their own values and expectations. The 
content of policy reflects some or all of these dimensions (Buse et al., 2005, pg.9). 
 
Figure 2.1: Policy triangle framework (Walt and Gilson, 1994) 
 
 
The health policy analysis triangle has subsequently been widely used to understand 
multiple policy experiences in multiple LMIC settings, with applications that 





analyses (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). This framework has also been widely applied 
in in other sectors such as food, energy and environment policy. Etiaba et al (2015) 
used the policy triangle framework to study the role of contextual factors, actors and 
the policy process in the development of the national oral health policy and possible 
reasons why this current approved policy succeeded. The policy triangle offers a 
clear roadmap to identify any content (i.e., policy changes) for maternal and child 
health in India and examine the context, actors, and process, and in doing so, to 
explore the influence of the Bank. However, I wanted to unpack the component of 
the process within which the Bank exerts its influence. Hence, I consulted the 
empirical literature for fill this gap.    
 
2.4 Empirical literature 
I conducted a scoping review of published peer-reviewed articles using search terms 
of ‘donor influence’ and ‘health’ in six online global health databases including 
ASSIA, IBBS, Global Health, PubMed, Medline, Scopus, and Web of Science. I 
found 35 articles that described empirical studies on an aspect of health policy in a 
LMIC and contained the term ‘donor influence’. I carefully reviewed these articles 
and found that authors examined how a health policy was prioritised (agenda 
setting), formulated, and implemented, as well as broader processes of policy 
change. Studies discussed the various stages of the health policy process such as 
priority setting (Fischer and Larson, 2016; Colebrander et al., 2014), policy 
formulation (Gautier and Ridde, 2017) resource allocation (Asante et al., 2009), and 
policy implementation (Sieleunou et al., 2014; Dodd and Olive, 2011; Ozvaris, 2004; 
Buse 1999) in LMICS. While the authors examined or studied in part, the role and 
influence of a donor over national policy makers or stakeholders (such as non-
governmental organisations and research institutes) at the country level, none of the 
articles explicitly presented a conceptual framework of donor influence.  
I deductively analysed these articles using the four components of the policy triangle 
framework i.e., content (policy change), context, actors, and process. I then 
inductively identified two additional themes under the component of process viz. 
resources and mechanisms. Resources refer to any objects of value, while 





donor organisations (Pawson and Tilly, 1997). I used this analysis of the empirical 
studies to develop a conceptual framework of the process of donor influence over a 
domestic agency to achieve certain policy outcomes, as described in the following 
segment. 
While this conceptual framework helped to identify the components of the donor 
influence process, it also raises the question about the concept of power and where 
it lies within this process. Power is often defined synonymously as influence, in terms 
of it being the ability of one actor to shape the thinking or actions of another actor 
(Moon, 2020). Based on my reading of the literature on the concept of power (Moon, 
2020; Dahl, 2005; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Lukes 2004; Foucault 1979) and the 
empirical studies that form the base for the conceptual framework, I understand 
power as an actor’s use of resources or the act of not using these, to shape another 
actor’s actions with respect to policy decisions. Influence, then is broader concept 
that encompasses power (i.e. use of resources) and mechanisms, to achieve the 
goals of policy decisions and actions. 
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
This conceptual framework describes the process in which a donor organisation 
exerts its influence over a domestic organisation in a country, to achieve certain 
outcomes i.e., health policy changes (see figure 2.2). This process of influence is 
implemented by actors within each organisation. The donor and domestic 
organisations are shaped by contextual factors at the country level. The donor’s 
influence implies its capabilities to shape or direct the priorities or decisions of policy 
makers in a domestic organisation. These capabilities include resources and 
mechanisms that actors in a donor organisation use in this process of influence over 
policy makers in the domestic organisation. Gill et al (2004) argued in their analysis 
of policy transfer of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted disease policies from 
international to national levels that this health policy transfer is a long adaptive 
process, made up of several iterative loops. They showed how research and clinical 
practices developed in one or more countries are adopted, adapted, and taken up by 
international organizations which then mobilize support for particular policies, 
market, and promote them. Although the components in the conceptual framework 





the policy influence is a dynamic process and that while donors can influence this 
process, they can also be influenced in turn by domestic actors and the contextual 




As Walt (1994) argued politics is at the heart of health policy making. The influence 
of the political situation and politicians in the country, is substantial, especially in the 
policy agenda setting process, as illustrated by studies conducted in Bangladesh 
(Buse 1999), Pakistan (Husain et al., 2007), Niger (Dalglish et al., 2015), and 
Uganda (Colebrander et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual framework of donor influence in health policy    
 
 
Owing to unstable politics in Bangladesh, donors questioned the legitimacy of 
successive administrations with respect to accountability, and this in turn accounted 
for the low levels of trust placed by donors in the government, predisposing them to 
exercise great caution in the aid relationship (Buse 1999). In Uganda, the influential 
political executive cited the formal prioritization of election promises over established 
programmes in the annual health budget as an example of political rather than 





as the ideology of the leading political party, change in government, and election 
year; historical events; social unrest; and international agendas either serve as a 




National economic growth, economic crises, austerity measures, and financial 
constraints, tend to affect national policy-makers’ decisions to accept the influence of 
donors, particularly through financial resources. National stakeholders in Pakistan 
did not consider HIV to be the top health priority in the country, yet major external 
donor funding for the program was accepted as a political decision to improve the 
exchange reserves for social and economic benefit (Husain et al., 2007). Similarly, in 
Turkey, owing to limited government budget from the 1970s to 1990s, the Ministry of 
Health relied entirely on the support of USAID for procuring contraceptive products 
and asked other international agencies for financial support for its reproductive 
health programmes (Ozvaris et al., 2004). 
 
Organisational factors 
Facilitating factors and barriers at the organisational level can also shape the 
interactions between the donors and the domestic agencies. When studying the role 
of the World Bank in Bangladesh, Buse (1999) found that when the strategic, 
administrative and implementation capacity of governments is perceived by donors 
as being weak or inadequate, it affects their confidence in the government and 
serves to legitimise their greater role in the policy process. In Uganda, donors 
considered the planning and coordination role of the Ministry of Health as weak, and 
therefore, proceeded to interact directly with the technical programmes and units at 
the local levels bypassing central government (Jeppsson, 2002). Governance issues 
such as corruption in recipient governments is another organisational factor that 
often raises questions about government accountability and affects donor perception 
and confidence (Buse, 1999). Donaldson (2002) found that despite certain 
organisational characteristics of bureaucratic civil service in India displayed through 
as delayed processes and regular transfers, a few civil servants stepped up and 





reproductive health policy. In their analysis of the development of integrated 
community case management for childhood illness policy in Kenya, Juma et al 
(2015) found that bureaucratic considerations among government officials around 
community health workers dispensing antibiotics seemed to be a factor slowing the 
policy development.   
 
ACTORS 
Ideally, state governments are expected to lead and control the health policy process 
in their country, and determine what goes into a policy and how it gets financed and 
implemented. However, studies have commonly pointed out the involvement and 
influence of external actors other than policy makers in the national government, 
including bilateral agencies such as USAID (United States Agency for International 
Development) or SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency); 
multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank or African Development Bank; global 
health partnerships such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria; private corporations including pharmaceutical companies, philanthropic 
foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
and international non-governmental organisations such as PATH and Médecins 
Sans Frontières.  
 
OUTCOMES 
Policy outcomes can be defined by actors in the donor or the domestic organisation 
or by external actors or organisation. Studies have examined policy outcomes such 
as agenda setting (Fischer et al., 2016), policy formulation (Gautier and Ridde, 
2017), policy implementation (Foller, 2013), resource allocation (Husain et al., 2007), 
resource management (Walt et al., 1999), aid coordination (Buse 1999), aid 
effectiveness (Dodd and Olive, 2011). These outcomes are finally aimed at achieving 













The promise of aid through budget support, grants, and loans, allowed international 
donors to shape governments’ priorities, institutions, and policies (Fischer et al., 
2016; Bowen et al., 2014; Colebrander et al., 2014; Asante and Zwi, 2009; Buse and 
Gwin, 1998; Zaidi, 1994). In Ghana, international donors used financial support as 
leverage to determine what got on the agenda and in the maternal fee exemption 
policy (Koduah et al., 2014). In Afghanistan, USAID, World Bank, European 
Commission and United Nations agencies funded the Basic Package of Health 
Services, a national health policy. In doing so, the donors were able to influence the 
components of this policy (Haidari et al., 2014). Sieleunou et al (2017) found that a 
readily available loan of US$25 million from the World Bank served as a catalyst for 
placing a performance based financing project on the national agenda in Cameroon. 
In countries that are heavily dependent on donors for their health sector budget, 
health programmes designed and financed by national governments, may still be 
vulnerable to the influence of donor priorities (Mutero et al., 2014; Sridhar and 
Gómez 2010; Gomez, 2007).  
 
Providing financial resources can also create a cycle through which donor influence 
gets exerted over national health policy, and the implementation of this policy makes 
additional funding possible. Barrett and Tsui (1999) analysed USAID’s funding of 
population activities in 114 less developed countries over 20 years and concluded 
that adopting a population policy increased the likelihood of a country receiving 
international aid and the amount received. However, financial resources do not 
always offer donors with the expected influence and leverage. In their study on aid 
effectiveness in Viet Nam, Dodd and Olive (2011) found that donors provided 
resources directly to the government in return for access to and influence over 
strategic policy discussions. However, this arrangement did not function as planned 









Donors use knowledge-based resources to make convincing arguments and 
legitimise health issues, thereby moving governments towards their desired policy 
agenda setting (Jardali et al., 2014; Ulikpan et al., 2014; Buse and Gwin, 1998). 
Donors have been perceived to have greater proficiency than national agencies in 
conducting research and using data to develop strong policies and plans (Khan et 
al., 2018). This intellectual expertise indicates influence gained through the ability to 
produce, interpret and disseminate knowledge and information to policy actors (akin 
to what Shiffman has termed ‘epistemic power’ in global health agenda setting) 
(Shiffman, 2014). Robert and Ridde (2013) discuss how donors use information 
politics, which is the capacity to quickly mobilise politically relevant information and 
use it in interactions with relevant national policy makers.  
 
Nabyonga-Orem et al. (2014) reported the generation and use by donors of a variety 
of evidence to “push” the user fee exemption policy in Uganda. Storeng et al. (2017) 
wrote about how the Malawi office of INGO Ipas used DFID funding to work with the 
Ministry of Health’s reproductive health unit to disseminate the public health 
evidence upon which the government could interpret the benefits and consequences 
of legal change. Dalglish et al. (2015) found that in Niger, international donors 
packaged and delivered scientific arguments in support of integrated community 
case management (a policy to provide basic care for poor rural children sick with 
malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia) to national policymakers, whose input was 
limited mainly to operational decisions. Similarly, Khan et al. (2018) reported that 
donors’ ability to produce, interpret and disseminate knowledge gave them a major 
advantage in influencing health policy decisions in Cambodia and Pakistan.  
 
Technical  
Donors provide technical assistance to recipient countries, in the form of consultants, 
training and research. These resources are usually aimed at facilitating policy or 
project implementation and strengthening local capacity. In many cases, 
international consultants are brought in to lead and train national teams, promoting 
donor influence through their own legitimacy and authority. Ozvaris et al. (2004) 





assistance to the Ministry of Health for implementing the national reproductive health 
policy. Sridhar (2009) offers the example of the World Bank, noting that some 
recipient governments choose not to take the technical assistance, as more than half 
of the committed funds are spent on international consultants or training workshops 
that may not necessarily have a tangible benefit.   
 
Networks  
Donors often use their networks and bring other bilateral and multilateral donor 
agencies on board, to align efforts towards a common agenda in recipient countries. 
Through their networks, donors can use leverage politics, which is the ability to solicit 
more powerful stakeholders to influence policy decision-making (Robert and Ridde, 
2013). Apart from offering financial resources through credits (loans) and grants, the 
World Bank is also able to bring in matching funds from client governments as well 
as co-financing from other donors, thus tripling or quadrupling the funds to the 
programmes it supports (Buse and Gwin, 1998). Global health partnerships such as 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI Vaccine 





Donors use policy dialogue i.e., they engage policy makers from the national and 
state government, representatives from other international donor agencies, and other 
relevant national stakeholders, and have iterative discussions about a health 
problem and work towards a concrete outcome (Fischer et al., 2016; Walt et al., 
1999; Buse 1999). Policy dialogue can take the form of personal contact, 
consultative meetings, events, workshops, secondments, seminars and subsidised 
consultancies. Policy dialogue has increasingly become a common mechanism for 
donors like the World Bank and DFID, to present its arguments backed by evidence, 
and build a strong case for financing a particular health area (Watson and Pierce, 







Access to ministries other than health 
Donors gain influence over the health sector through their access to other 
government sectors, which serves as an intersectoral leverage (Lin and Gibson, 
2003). Godlee (1994) wrote about the declining influence of the WHO over member 
states, and argued that while the WHO has country offices within the national 
ministries of health, its representatives have no direct contact with other more 
powerful departments whose policies impact on health, such as education, 
employment, home affairs, and finance. The World Bank on the other hand, is often 
perceived by other donors (and also by recipient government) to hold more sway 
with the government, especially with their access to senior decision makers in 
ministries of planning and finance in recipient administrations with the political clout 
to champion the agenda, and access to large-scale resources to finance—and, when 
necessary, leverage reform (Walt et al., 1999; Buse and Gwin, 1998).  
 
Khan et al. (2018) found that donors used their influence over national and 
international trade and tourism to influence domestic health priorities. In Pakistan, 
public and private stakeholders felt that the threat of travel and trade restrictions 
introduced by international organisations if polio was not controlled was important in 
placing polio high on the national agenda. Similarly, policy actors in Cambodia 
reported that the way donors and UN agencies portrayed the country globally 
mattered because it has a direct impact on international reputation and tourism, 
therefore, making high-level national policy makers pay attention to donor priorities.  
 
Local Intermediaries 
Studied have reported that donors work with local intermediaries – or ‘brokers’– to 
secure partnerships with like-minded individuals in government and civil society, to 
translate global health goals into terms more likely to be acceptable at the local level 
(Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Watkins & Swidler, 2013). Storeng et al. (2019) found that, in 
Malawi, the DFID-funded INGO Ipas identified ‘like-minded’ individuals including 
commissioners from across the ministries of health and justice, tribal leaders, as well 
as religious councils, to form a Special Law Commission to review the abortion law, 
which went on to become an influential mechanism for bringing a previously taboo 





Donors also fund NGOs and civil society actors, and employ them as channels to 
influence health policy in countries. Working through local NGOs, can allow donors 
access into local communities, bypassing government procedures and pathways 
(Schurmann and Mahmud, 2009). Local NGOs that work with the health ministry are 
often seen as part of the government and not the donor; such advantages that can 
help donor influence, especially in sensitive health areas such as reproductive health 
and abortion (Storeng et al., 2019). Donors fund NGOs and CSOs for service 
delivery roles, and can influence their work in recipient countries by governing the 
programme agenda through their funding constraints, regulations and capacity 
development choices (Williamson and Rodd, 2016; Dyke et al., 2014).  
 
Framing of health issues 
This mechanism refers to the way in which a health issue is conceptualised and 
presented to national stakeholders. Frames provide the cognitive means of making 
sense of the social world, but discordance among them forms the basis of policy 
contestation (Koon et al., 2016). Reich (1995) wrote about symbolic politics that 
affected the international health policy agenda through the capacity of individuals 
and organisations to use images and language as symbols that can create and quell 
issues, and discussed the case of UNICEF, wherein the imagery of child health and 
the strong language of ‘child survival’ was employed with great success for social 
mobilization and fund raising at the global level. Storeng et al. (2019) reported the 
INGO’s use of terms like ‘pandemic’ to describe abortion in Malawi, and gain traction 
for reproductive health policy within national networks. Framing is similar to the 
concept of policy image (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), i.e., the way in which a 
given problem and set of solutions are conceptualised. One image may predominate 
over a long period of time, but may be challenged at particular moments as new 
understandings of the problem and alternatives come to the fore.  
 
Financing arrangements 
Donors can exert their influence over domestic organisations through the use of 
financial arrangements such as negative sanctions such as conditionalities attached 
to lending (Okuonzi and Macrae, 1995) and earmarking budgetary support 





Ghana, international donors influenced resource allocation not just because they 
contributed substantially to the health budget, but also through certain financial 
arrangements such as earmarking funds for specific health priorities in selected 
districts.  
 
Donors use negative sanctions such as suspension of funds, or more, likely, not 
meeting pledged funds. Buse and Gwin (1998) found that in Bangladesh, the World 
Bank used negative sanctions such as withholding further credit for health activities 
due to the lack of government progress in addressing sectoral inefficiencies. These 
funds were released only after the Ministry of Health drew up a strategy document in 
consultation with the Bank and other donors, and committed to a sector-wide 
approach in line with the Bank’s recommendation. Donors also use inducement or 
positive sanctions such as additional resources or certain perks. Donaldson (2002) 
reported that the World Bank used an additional loan as an incentive to induce the 
Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to accept and formulate its 




Aid coordination is another mechanism through which donors can dominate health 
policy discussions in recipient countries (Gilson et al., 2012; Brown et al., 1998; 
Okuonzi and Macrae, 1995). In Bangladesh, the World Bank formed an alliance with 
bilateral and multilateral donors in the country and led a donor consortium, through 
which it exerted its influence over the adoption of a sector-wide approach (Buse 
1999; Buse and Gwin 1998). Donor coordination can also be problematic, as 
demonstrated in Tanzania, where tensions emerged between two groups of donors, 
with each preferring different financing modalities for the national health policy, 
thereby delaying the policy formulation (Chimhutu et al., 2015). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have thus presented a novel conceptual framework for studying the 
process of donor influence over a domestic agency to achieve health policy 





studies on health policy analysis in LMICS. This framework has several components. 
First, there are actors from within the donor organisation and the domestic agency at 
the country level. Actors from external agencies could also shape this process of 
donor influence. Second, actors from the donor organisation and domestic agency 
work with each other to achieve certain change i.e., policy outcomes for a health 
area. Based on the literature, I found that donors use financial, knowledge, technical, 
and network-based resources and a range of mechanisms to exert their influence 
over the domestic agency. Furthermore, several contextual factors at the country 
level also shape this process of donor influence. I will use this conceptual framework 
to guide the analysis of the data from the Bank-funded Reproductive and Child 
Health project in India. In doing so, I will examine the Bank’s influence in maternal 


















Chapter 3 Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present an overview of the methods used for this research study. I 
aim to study the World Bank’s involvement and influence in maternal and child health 
at a global level as well as at the country level in India. Given the scope of an 
international institution such as the World Bank and the complex nature of the 
research questions, I decided to use a mixed methods research design, consulting 
multiple sources of data, to ensure depth and breadth of understanding and 
corroboration (Johnson et al., 2007). First, I briefly reflect on the paradigm that 
guides the mixed methods research design. This is followed by a description of the 
methods of data collection and the approach for analysing the data. Then, I discuss 
the ethical considerations and reflect on my positionality. I conclude by outlining the 
strengths and limitations of this study.  
 
3.2 Paradigm and Research Design 
Fishman writes that ‘‘all knowledge is knowledge from some point of view’’ (Fishman, 
1978, p. 531). This notion is particularly important in a doctoral research study, as 
the point of view or paradigm reflects the researchers’ epistemological understanding 
of the world, and directs the research efforts. Kuhn (1962, p.23) describes a 
paradigm as an “accepted model or pattern”, as an organizing structure, a deeper 
philosophical position relating to the nature of social phenomena and social 
structures. Morgan (2007) goes further to review four versions of the paradigm 
concept: paradigm as a world view, paradigm known as an epistemological stance, 
paradigm as shared beliefs among members of a specialty area, and paradigm as 
model examples of how research is done in a given field.  
 
This doctoral study recognises the importance of a paradigm, and conceptualises it 
as beliefs and practices that influence how researchers select their questions and 
methods they use to study them. It views a paradigm as a roadmap that can help the 
researcher align their choices with their values (Shannon-Baker, 2016). For this 





importance on the research question, and emphasises communication and shared 
meaning-making in order to create practical solutions to social problems (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2003). The pragmatic researcher is able to maintain subjectivity in their 
reflections on research and objectivity in data collection and analysis (Morgan, 
2007). Pragmatism, accepts, philosophically, that there are singular and multiple 
realities that are open to empirical inquiry and orients itself toward solving practical 
problems in the real world (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, pp. 20-28; Rorty, 1999). 
This paradigm promotes an underlying belief in complementarity, that is, qualitative 
and quantitative approaches can be combined in order to complement their inherent 
advantages and disadvantages. Thus, most pragmatic researchers often use a 
mixed-methods approach, by using quantitative methods to measure some aspects 
of the phenomenon in question and qualitative methods for others (Feilzer, 2010). 
The most important question for the pragmatic approach, is whether the research 
has helped “to find out what [the researcher] want[s] to know” (Hanson, 2008, p. 
109). 
 
This pragmatic epistemological stance thus guides my choice of using a mixed 
methods research design for this study. Mixed-methods research is an approach that 
draws from primary and secondary sources of data and can integrate quantitative 
and qualitative methods, data collection and analysis in a single study or a program 
of enquiry (Creswell, 2003). A mixed methods approach is best suited for this 
doctoral study for several reasons. First, the research questions in this study 
necessitate an objective enquiry as well as an interpretive analysis. For example, in 
trying to answer the research question around the World Bank’s contributions and 
limitations in maternal and child health in terms of its financial investments, technical 
assistance, and cooperation, I outline two objectives. I, first, trace the Bank’s policies 
and programmes for this health area over five decades, which requires an 
interpretive analysis; then, I track the Bank’s financial flows to estimate its financial 
contributions to this area over time, which demands an objective enquiry. Second, a 
mixed methods approach offers the scope for complementarity, in that, it seeks 
elaboration and clarification of findings from one method such as document review 
with the findings from another method such as interviews (Greene et al., 1989). 





data, thereby offering a context to better understand the quantitative findings 
(Bryman, 2006). For instance, a qualitative analysis of the Bank’s policies and 
programmes for maternal and child health will provide a context to better understand 
its financial flows for this area. Fourth, this approach helps to fill any gaps emerging 
from one source of data and corroborate findings from across multiple sources of 
data, thereby facilitating triangulation of the findings (Greene, 2007). Finally, mixed 
methods research offers credibility, as by using multiple sources of data, this 
approach reduces the chance that interpretation of the data will be misleading and 
enhances the integrity of the findings (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).   
 
Within this overarching mixed-methods research design, I also employed a case 
study component to answer the research question around the World Bank’s 
influence in maternal and child health at the country level in India. This case study 
examines the Bank-funded Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) Project. A case 
study approach primarily investigates the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in a research 
study (Yin, 2009), which makes it relevant for this doctoral research, as I am 
interested in understanding the how and why of the Bank’s influence in maternal and 
child health in India. This case study uses multiple sources of data to trace the 
design and implementation of the RCH project, examine the relationships among 
actors and agencies, and corroborate events in the timeline of the project (Gilson, 
2011; Thomas, 1998). I use the conceptual framework of donor influence, as 
developed from the theoretical and empirical literature (described in Chapter Two), to 
analyse the data on the RCH project. In doing so, this case study thus explores the 
concept of donor influence, the process in which the Bank exerts its influence at the 
country level, and the extent of this influence. 
 
3.3 Sources of data 
I consulted primary and secondary sources of data for this study including (i) 
published articles, (ii) grey literature reports, (iii) archival records, (iv) financial 
datasets, (v) interviews. In table 3.1, I list each of the nine chapters of this thesis, 
and outline the corresponding objectives of each chapter as well as the source of 
data used. In the following segments, for each source, I will describe the method of 
data collection and the approach for analysis.  
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3.3.1 Published articles 
I conducted a literature review of published peer-reviewed articles for three 
components of this study. The first component was a review of the empirical 
literature on donor influence over health policy, which enabled me to develop 
a conceptual framework for data analysis and interpretation (as described in 
Chapter Two). The second component was a review of articles on the World 
Bank and reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH). The 
third component was a review of articles on the World Bank and the 
Reproductive and Child Health Project in India. I conducted a search using 
the following search terms in eight global health databases including ASSIA, 
IBBS, Global Health, PubMed, Medline, Scopus, Web of Science, and 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global. 
 
Search terms: 
Search component 1: Donor influence over health policy  
1. ‘influence’ AND ‘donor’ AND ‘health’ 
2. ‘influence’ AND ‘World Bank’ AND ‘health’ 
 
Search component 2: World Bank and RMNCH 
1. ‘World Bank’ AND [‘reproductive’ OR ‘maternal’ OR ‘newborn’ OR 
‘child’] 
2. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘population’ 
3. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘safe motherhood’ 
4. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘child survival’ 
 
Search component 3: World Bank and Reproductive and Child Health Project 
1. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘India’ AND ‘health’ 
2. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘India’ AND ‘population’ 
3. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘India’ AND [‘reproductive’ OR ‘maternal’ OR 
‘newborn’ OR ‘child’] 
4. ‘World Bank’ AND ‘Reproductive and Child Health Project’ 
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Abstracts of any article that contained any of the above listed search terms in 
the title and or abstract, was in English language, and was peer-reviewed, 
was included in the first round of analysis. Each abstract was reviewed, and if 
found relevant, the complete article was downloaded and saved in a separate 
folder. All duplicate articles were manually removed. The shortlisted articles 
were keyword searched for relevant text, and only those articles with relevant 
text for each of the search components was included in the final review. 
Reference lists of shortlisted articles were also reviewed for any additional 
articles. The review of published scientific literature found a total of 165 
relevant articles that were included in my analysis.  
 
3.3.2 Grey literature  
I reviewed relevant grey literature documents such as annual reports, 
strategy reports, working papers, policy briefs, and factsheets from the World 
Bank ‘documents and reports’ database, its Independent Evaluation Group 
repository, relevant websites of the Government of India and international 
and national stakeholder organisations, and Google Scholar. Essentially, I 
reviewed any document that described or examined the World Bank’s role in 
RMNCH at the global level or at the country level in India, and included in my 
analysis, those documents that were relevant to the research questions. The 
search strategy and inclusion criteria similar to that of published scientific 
literature review, was used to identify grey literature reports. A total of 40 
relevant documents were saved for thematic analysis. 
3.3.3 Archival records 
Relevant historical documents held at the Archives of the World Bank 
(Washington, D.C), were reviewed and analysed. I consulted the World Bank 
Archives staff via email correspondence with a request to visit the Archives 
and review relevant documents. I shared a list with the Archives staff of the 
search terms emerging from the published and grey literature review, 
including ‘Reproductive’, ‘Maternal’, ‘Newborn’, ‘Child’, ‘Reproductive and 
Child Health Project’, ‘India’, ‘Safe Motherhood’, was given to the Archives 
staff, to review and prepare a list of available archived documents. On 
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receiving a list of available archived documents from the World Bank staff, I 
reviewed, identified and requested for access to relevant documents. Once 
the Bank Archives staff confirmed access for the requested documents, I 
sought an appointment to visit the Archives. While at the World Bank 
Archives, I reviewed a total of 120 archived folders containing documents 
such as aide memoires, correspondence memos, and research and strategy 
reports. Each document was carefully reviewed, and if found relevant, a 
photograph was taken for further analysis. A total of 62 archival documents 
were finally shortlisted to be included in my analysis (see Appendix 1). 
 
Each shortlisted archival document was carefully read, and relevant 
information was extracted and included in an excel sheet. Each shortlisted 
archival document was treated as an independent case. For each case, 
information such as identification details (such as document number and 
date), type of document (such as aide memoire, strategy report, and 
correspondence memos), category (such as reproductive health or 
population control), key actors (sender and receiver of document), and key 
points, were extracted into the sheet. ‘Key points’, included any text on 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH), such policy, 
strategy, programme, financing, evaluation or any other relevant topic under 
this area.  
The archival records essentially provided information about two areas. First, 
archives described the World Bank’s day-to-day involvement and key actors 
in its initiatives for maternal and child health in the 1980s viz. the Special 
Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human 
Reproduction, the Taskforce for Child Survival and the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative. Second, relevant archival records also provided information on the 
Bank’s role (through its global and country office staff) in the initiation, design 
and implementation of the first phase of the Reproductive and Child Health 
project in India. I carefully reviewed these information and used these in the 
next step of analysis for chapters four (Bank’s policies and programmes for 
maternal and child health), seven and eight (RCH case study). 
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3.3.4 Financial datasets 
I consulted five types of financial data for this study: (i) Development 
assistance for health for RMNCH from 1990 to 2018 sourced from the 
Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), (ii) World Bank’s financial 
flows through country-level RMNCH projects from 1970 to 2018, (iii) World 
Bank’s financial flows through regional and global-level special health 
programmes for RMNCH, (iv) World Bank’s financial flows through its 
RMNCH-related trust funds from 2005 to 2011, and (v) World Bank’s financial 
flows for IDA, IBRD and Health from 1970 to 2018. These financial data have 
been analysed and presented in Chapter Five (i.e., tracking the Bank’s 
financial flows for RMNCH).    
 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
Development assistance for health (DAH) has been defined as 'financial and 
in-kind contributions made by channels of development assistance – that is, 
by institutions whose primary purpose is providing development assistance to 
improve health in developing countries’ (IHME, 2011). I analysed financial 
data from IHME for two reasons. First, I sought to document the global 
financing landscape for RMNCH, including the Bank and other major donors. 
Second, I wanted to compare the DAH from IHME with similar financial data 
from the World Bank, and comment on the level of congruence between 
these two sources.  
I downloaded the publically accessible DAH dataset from the IHME website 
(IHME, 2019b). This dataset provided financial disbursements from donors 
for a range of health areas including RMNCH, from 1990 to 2018. First, I 
extracted all the financial information for the area of RMNCH into a separate 
excel sheet, and analysed the data for key trends including overall 
disbursements, major donors, major recipients by geographic region and 
country, and financial disbursement by programmatic areas. Second, I 
extracted financial information for RMNCH that was channelled through the 
World Bank into another excel sheet, and analysed the data for similar trends 
as above.  
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WORLD BANK 
The World Bank finances its RMNCH work from its core budget and its extra-
budgetary funds. From its core budget, the Bank finances RMNCH activities 
in two ways: (i) country-level projects through credits (concessional loans) 
and grants, and (ii) regional and global-level special health programmes 
through grants. From its extra-budgetary funds, the Bank channels grants 
through trust funds.  
 
Country-level projects 
The World Bank lists all of its country-level RMNCH projects on two of its 
publically available databases: (i) project operations database1 and (ii) 
development topics database2. Both these databases were searched for 
RMNCH projects from January, 1970 to December, 2018. First, the project 
operations database was consulted, and a total of 320 projects under the two 
relevant themes of ‘population and reproductive health’ and ‘child health’ 
were identified. Second, the development topics database was consulted, 
and a total of 400 projects under the relevant theme of RMNCH were 
identified. The lists of projects identified from both the databases were cross-
checked and duplicates were excluded. A total of 484 Bank-funded RMNCH 
projects were included for data analysis. The final list of selected RMNCH 
projects consists of two types of projects i.e. Active (ongoing projects) and 
Closed (completed projects). For all the closed RMNCH projects, the 
Implementation Completion Results Report was downloaded from the World 
Bank website to obtain financial and programmatic information for each 
project, and saved in a separate folder for analysis at a later stage. In the 
case of all the active projects, the project agreement document was 
downloaded and saved.  
 
                                            
1 World Bank Projects and Operations Database available here: 
https://projects.worldbank.org/ 
2 World Bank Development Topics Database available here: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/reproductivematernalchildhealth 
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I developed a coding questionnaire in Excel (see Appendix 2), which included 
variables such as project identification details, duration, total project costs, 
financial commitment and disbursement, Bank fees and interest rates, 
repayment by borrower governments, co-financing amounts by development 
partners, project objectives and themes, and project performance ratings.  
The coding questionnaire was first tested on ten projects, to check for 
feasibility and to include any additional variables. In this step, each project 
document was an independent case, and information from this document 
was extracted to answer each variable in the questionnaire. Each project was 
classified into a programmatic theme, based on the project objectives. In the 
case, where a project had multiple objectives which were relevant for 
different categories, the theme with the greatest emphasis was used for 
categorisation. All the variables with financial data were quantitatively 
analysed by running frequencies and means on Excel. All the variables with 
descriptive data were categorised in meaningful codes, and represented in 
meaningful graphs and charts. I engaged the support of a researcher, Adriel 
Chen - a fourth-year medical student from the Edinburgh Medical School, for 
this component of data collection on country-level projects. This was a 
voluntary, non-financial arrangement, and Adriel Chen used this work as part 
of his annual research project. I designed the data collection and analysis 
plan, and the data coding tool, while Adriel Chen downloaded reports for 484 
Bank-funded RMNCH projects, extracted relevant data, and coded it into the 
coding questionnaire. I conducted the data analysis for this component.  
 
Special health programmes 
Since 1980, the Bank started funding the Special Grants Programme, 
releasing grants for health and development activities at the regional and 
global level. This programme was consolidated in 1998 under the 
Development Grant Facility. First, I reviewed relevant archival records to 
obtain financial flows for the Special Grants Programmes that were specific 
to RMNCH activities (De Ferranti, 1996). Second, I extracted RMNCH-related 
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financial data from the Development Grant Facility report from 1998 to 2014 
(as information was not available after this year) (World Bank, 2014).  
I analysed the total financial contributions for RMNCH activities through this 
channel for each year from 1987 to 2014 and reported the key trends.  
 
Trust Funds 
The World Bank channels these voluntary trust funds in three ways. First, 
there are trust funds financed by IBRD and IDA. These funds are either 
implemented by the World Bank or a recipient such as a country’s Ministry of 
Health or a non-governmental organisation. Second, financial intermediary 
funds, which are more flexible and complex financing mechanisms that 
support global or regional partnerships, including the African Programme for 
Onchocerciasis Control, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. In the case of this type of trust 
funds, the Bank either plays the role of a trustee, managing resources from 
other donor agencies, or it can also act as a major donor itself. The third type 
of trust funds is financed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and 
provides advisory services to businesses and governments, aimed at 
promoting private sector investments in developing countries (Winters and 
Sridhar, 2017).  
 
The first step involved identifying and downloading the two publically 
available World Bank excel datasets for all the three aforementioned types of 
trust funds. The first excel dataset titled ‘Paid In Contributions to 
IBRD/IDA/IFC Trust Funds based on FY of Receipt’ (available here), 
contained financial information for 11446 trust funds financed by IBRD, IDA 
and IFC, as recorded from 2005 to 2015. The second excel dataset titled 
‘Financial Intermediary Funds Commitments’ (available here), contained 
financial information for 17589 Financial Intermediary Funds, as recorded 
from 1991 to 2013. The second step involved classifying health from non-
health trust funds, by carefully reviewing trust fund titles and consulting 
additional sources such as the World Bank trust fund directory as required.  
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The third step entailed categorising the health trust funds by a thematic area 
including (i) health systems strengthening (ii) avian and human influenza (iii) 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (iv) neglected tropical diseases (v) 
reproductive, maternal and child health (vi) tobacco (vii) health promotion and 
(viii) non-allocable. In the fourth step, I scanned the health trust funds from (i) 
IBRD/IDA (ii) IFC and (iii) FIFs, to identify trust funds categorised under the 
‘maternal and child health’ (MCH) theme. A total of 36 MCH trust funds were 
identified in the first (IBRD/IDA) dataset, while the financial intermediary 
funds dataset had one MCH trust fund. The IFC dataset contained no MCH 
trust funds. Finally, I conducted a descriptive analysis of all the 37 MCH-
related trust funds, presenting key trends on total financial contributions, 
major donors, and programmatic areas.  
Steps one to three i.e., downloading trust fund datasets, identifying health 
trust funds, and categorising health trust funds into thematic areas, were 
executed by Janelle Winters, a doctoral researcher affiliated with the Global 
Health Governance Programme at the University of Edinburgh, working on a 
larger Wellcome Trust-funded project that this doctoral study is also part of. 
Janelle Winters was assisted in data management by Iona Frost and Shu-
Han Chen, graduate students, who conducted this work as part of their 
dissertation research for a Master’s in Public Health degree at the University 
of Edinburgh. Informed consent was gained from the aforementioned 
researchers to use the raw data from steps one to three.  
 
Overall Bank lending for IDA, IBRD and Health 
I extracted the Bank’s overall financial disbursement for IDA, IBRD and its 
Health Sector (Health, Nutrition and Population) from 1970 to 2018 from its 
annual reports for the same period. I compared the Bank’s financial flows for 
RMNCH from the above sources and compared this with the Bank’s total 
lending for health sector and its overall lending (IDA and IBRD) from 1970 to 
2018, to get a sense of the proportion of the Bank’s overall and health sector 
lending that was allocated to RMNCH. 
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3.3.5 In-depth interviews 
I used purposive sampling to select the key informants for the in-depth 
interviews. The sampling framework was based on the need to select the 
most productive participants to answer the research question around the 
Bank’s influence over MCH in India. I decided to select informants from the 
World Bank, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) and any 
donor agencies in the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) project, as well 
as external actors such as academics and womens health advocates who 
were very involved in the RCH project and also featured in the literature. I 
identified the majority of the key informants from the peer-reviewed and grey 
literature and the archives as well as through snowballing, where few 
informants led me to other potential participants.    
 
I conducted in-depth interviews with a purposively selected sample of 30 key 
informants in two settings i.e., Washington D.C in the U.S. and New Delhi in 
India. Washington D.C is home to the World Bank Group Headquarters. The 
World Bank Country Office and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
(MoHFW) are based in its capital city of New Delhi. I identified former staff, 
who were closely involved in the design and implementation of the 
Reproductive and Child Health Project (RCH), and current staff, that were 
working on existing RMNCH projects in India. These interviews served two 
purposes: First, they provided rich data on the process of the design and 
implementation of the RCH project and the existing situation of RMNCH in 
the country after the closure of the project. Second, and more importantly, 
these interviews helped to fill in any information gaps that emerged after the 
review of archival records and the published and grey literature. In serving 
these two purposes, the interview data also guided the overall research 
question of exploring and examining the process and degree of the Bank’s 
influence in India.   
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Informants from the World Bank were of two types. First, there were 
informants that had worked at the Bank headquarters in Washington D.C., 
and would visit the Bank’s country office in New Delhi as part of their bi-
annual missions for the RCH. This group of informants held the position of 
senior health specialists, and either worked in the capacity of a country team 
leader or a regional director of health for the South Asia region. Second, 
there were informants, senior health specialists, who were stationed at the 
Bank’s country office in New Delhi. Within these two groups, I identified a 
total of eight former and current staff members.  
 
I interviewed three types of informants from the MoHFW, all of whom had 
either worked closely on the RCH or were working on existing RMNCH 
projects. First, there were informants who were Indian Administrative 
Services officers that had served as secretaries of the MoHFW at the central 
government level. This is the second highest position in the national health 
ministry after the health minister. Second, there were informants, health 
specialists that had served as directors of the maternal and child health 
department at the central government and state government level. Third, 
there were informants from National Health Systems Resource Centre 
(NHSRC), a central government funded unit that provides technical 
assistance to the MoHFW, and had worked on components of the RCH 
project.  
 
Apart from the World Bank, UNFPA and DFID were the other donor agencies 
that financed the second phase of the RCH project. I approached former and 
current staff from both of these international agencies to get a 
comprehensive picture. I got approvals for interviews from three informants 
from UNFPA (one former and two current staff); however, I was not able to 
gain interviews from potential informants from DFID. Apart from the World 
Bank and the MoHFW, I also interviewed four informants, academics and 
womens health advocates, who were closely involved in the discussions 
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average. I transcribed the recorded audiotapes of all the interviews in 
English. Additionally, I also made notes after the completion of each 
interview, which formed part of the interview data. After the transcription, I 
familiarised myself with the text by carefully reading the interview transcripts 
and notes multiple times and noting my impressions. I used the conceptual 
framework of donor influence (developed in Chapter two) to deductively 
analyse the interview data and organise the findings into categories defined 
in the framework. The categories along with supporting quotes were checked 
again and to ensure robustness of interpretation. These findings have been 
presented in Chapters six to eight (India case study).  
 
3.4 Triangulation of findings  
I followed the process of triangulation for this study i.e., integrating findings 
from quantitative and qualitative methods (Cathain et al., 2010). For each 
chapter, based on the research objective and the overarching question, I 
ensured triangulation, by first listing the findings from each data source on 
the same page and considering where findings from each component agreed 
(convergence), offered complementary information on the same issue 
(complementarity), or appeared to contradict each other (discrepancy or 
dissonance) (Farmer et al., 2006; Foster 1997). This study also recognises 
that explicitly looking for disagreements between findings from different 
methods is an important part of this process. Disagreement is not a sign that 
something is wrong with a study. Any apparent “inter-method discrepancy” 
was explored to gain a better understanding of the research question 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986). I found that drawing from a combination of 
sources such as documents, archival records and interviews offered more 
complementarity and helped me to construct a comprehensive narrative. All 
the combined findings and any new emerging themes were then organised 
meaningfully under each chapter.  
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3.5 Ethical considerations 
The primary documentary sources (e.g. archival records, project reports, 
financial datasets, and published literature) are all publicly available and 
hence there were no ethical concerns associated with their procurement and 
analysis. Even with regards to the qualitative research component, this study 
raises no special ethical issues. Standard practices of ethics approval, 
informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, and appropriate 
data storage were employed. These are described in detail below: 
 
Ethics approval 
I applied for a formal ethical review at the Usher Research Ethics Group at 
the Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics of the 
University of Edinburgh. This application consisted of (i) Self-Audit Checklist 
for Level 1 Ethical Review, (ii) Level 2/3 form, (iii) Research study protocol, 
(iv) Participant information sheet, (v) Consent form for participants, (vi) 
Interview schedule. I was granted ethics approval in October 2017, after 
which I began contacting potential informants for interviews.  
 
Informed consent 
Prior to the interview, I shared with every participant an information sheet that 
clearly explained the aims of the study, interview procedure, and how the 
findings will be used. This sheet contained the email address of a senior staff 
at the University of Edinburgh, in case participants wish for further 
information or have a complaint regarding the researcher’s conduct. I 
explained the voluntary nature of participation by informing the participant 
that they were free to withdraw from the research at any time without giving a 
reason; likewise, it was clear that the potential participant had the right to 
refuse participation, or to later withdraw from the study at any point, if that 
was their wish. In terms of confidentiality, I discussed with each participant, 
the level of anonymisation required, and how they would be referred to in 
project outputs. I also gained consent for audio recording of interview from all 
the informants. Before the interview commenced, I discussed the consent 
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form with the participant, and upon the satisfaction of the latter with said 
form, both the researcher and the participant signed two copies of it, one for 
the participant and the other for the researcher’s records. In the case of a 
telephonic or Skype interview, the researcher emailed the consent form to 




After the conduct of interviews, I downloaded and electronically stored all the 
interview data files including audio files, transcripts, notes and any raw data, 
in a private folder on the University of Edinburgh server, which was password 
protected. I kept paper copies of all data files securely in a locked cabinet in 
my office in the Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and 
Informatics. I maintained consent forms separately from the data files, and 
stored these in another secure cabinet in my office at the Usher Institute. To 
maintain anonymity, I gave an identification code for interview data for each 
informant instead of their name and personal details. On passing the doctoral 
research programme, I will shred all paper copies of the data files. I will also 
delete all the electronic transcript files in the private folder. I will transfer all 
the electronic data files in the private folder in my University server to a 
private folder in my Supervisor’s password protected University server, for 
five years from the completion date of the PhD programme for the purpose of 
any further publications. All the electronic files will then be deleted from the 
researcher’s University server. After the five-year period following PhD 




One of the issues facing health policy analysts is their positionality or in other 
words, how they are viewed or ‘situated’ as researchers, their institutional 
base, perceived legitimacy, and prior involvement in policy communities 
(Walt et al., 2008). A researcher’s positionality is critical to their ability to 
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access the policy environment and conduct meaningful research, especially 
in policy analyses that require engaging with policy elites (Shiffman, 2007). 
Keeping this aspect in mind, I think it is important to reflect on my situation as 
an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ during this research study, and how it impact my 
analysis.  
 
My previous work experience as a health researcher and programme 
manager on maternal and child health projects across four states in India, 
gave me an ‘insider’ status as I was routinely exposed to the debates and 
challenges around this area and was familiar with the organisational 
structures of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). This 
experience helped me appreciate the maternal and child health situation in 
India and enter the research study with an informed perspective. I was also 
able to use the contacts I had developed from my previous work experience, 
to identify potential informants within the MoHFW. Furthermore, my doctoral 
research was based in the University of Edinburgh and was part of a larger 
research project funded by the Wellcome Trust. This association with an 
international university and a global research charity like the Wellcome Trust 
enhanced my credibility and helped me gain access more easily, particularly 
to my informants in India, as I was perceived as being an independent 
researcher. Since I was part of a larger research project that studied the 
World Bank, I benefited from the initial contacts established by senior team 
members. Although, I did find it challenging to make contact and gain 
interviews with some Bank staff.  
 
Finally, as a social sciences researcher, I also had an ‘outsider’ status as 
many of my informants were experts, in that they were either medical doctors 
or development specialists. Although, I felt that being an outsider in this 
respect actually prompted me to ask a lot of general questions that helped 
me understand the issues better. Furthermore, several of my informants were 
senior in age and professional position, and viewed me as a young student 
58   
and a non-expert, which I conceived as a benefit, as they were candid and 
more willing to have in-depth conversations.  
 
3.7 Strengths and limitations 
This study has four main strengths. First, it is among the very few (if not the 
first) to explore the World Bank's involvement and influence in maternal and 
child health (MCH) over time. Studies have examined and evaluated the 
Bank's involvement in MCH projects in different countries over specific 
periods of time (Coburn et al., 2016; Chimhutu et al., 2015; Baird et al., 
2008). However, I intend to contribute to the literature on the World Bank and 
global health, by documenting the contributions and limitations of the Bank's 
involvement in MCH at the global level over a period of five decades, and by 
exploring the process of its influence in this area at the country level in India.  
Second, the case study of the RCH project in India allowed me to capture 
multiple perspectives including those of domestic policy makers and 
government officials, donor agency representatives, and academics and civil 
society stakeholders, which helped to explore the context and complexities 
within which donor-recipient relationships work, thus allowing me to provide 
an in-depth account of the process of World Bank's influence in a high-
burden, aid-recipient country.  
 
Third, by using a mixed methods approach, I offset the weaknesses of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods and draw on the strengths of 
both (Bryman 2006). While studying the World Bank over a period of time, it 
was of great help to consult multiple sources of data, as some sources 
helped to fill the information gaps that existed in others, thereby helping me 
to document a more comprehensive account. Relying on multiple data 
sources also enhanced the credibility of the findings. Finally, I contribute to 
the scholarship in the field of health policy analysis by presenting a 
conceptual framework of donor influence in health policy at the country level. 
The application of this framework in the case of India and resulting findings, 
thus provide a roadmap for health policy researchers to explore and examine 
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the process of external donor influence in similar settings.   
 
This study also has certain limitations. The decision to focus on one actor 
within the complex system for maternal and child health was made on 
pragmatic grounds. Given the duration of the doctoral research project, it was 
feasible to focus on the World Bank as it allowed for an in-depth analysis of 
the institution’s evolving position on maternal and child health, and the 
justifications for the same. However, this approach could have also 
introduced potential biases such as an over attribution of influence to the 
Bank compared to the other agencies involved in this area. Another limitation 
is the lack of investigation of what the other actors in this area did and why, 
and how this would have affected the Bank’s role. I attempted to address 
these limitations by carefully reviewing the data and discussing the role of the 
Bank vis-à-vis other actors, and verifying the claims of the Bank’s role 
through triangulation of multiple data sources. Furthermore, as I attest in 
Chapter 8, this thesis can at best appraise the likely contribution of the World 
Bank and rather than attribution.  
 
I used the World Bank Archives as one of my sources for primary data. While 
it was a useful source for historical information on the Bank’s involvement in 
MCH initiatives in the 1980s, particularly around key actors and justifications 
for certain policy decisions, this method did have its limitations. These 
archives are not searchable on any online platform; the World Bank archivist 
had to physically plough through hard copies of documents based on the 
search terms provided by me. Archived folders have titles with a limited 
description which further complicates the search and retrieval process, in the 
sense that one may not really know what information is in the file merely 
based on its title Moreover, I spent two weeks (fulltime) in the archives based 
on my available funding for international travel, accommodation and 
maintenance; which limited my ability to consult any additional archival 
records. The Bank's internal access to information policy restricts disclosure 
of certain types of files such as those containing financial information. Finally, 
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the Bank archives also have a 20-year restriction policy, as a result of which I 
was not able to access any files that were archived in the past 20 years. This 
restriction policy implied that I could not access any of the Bank documents 
for the second phase of the RCH project in India, which ran from 2005 to 
2012. Altogether, these internal policies and procedures may have restricted 
my access to obtaining all the possible relevant archival documents for my 
research. A question that emerges from the aforementioned limitations 
around the archival research is whether it is an effective method for future 
researchers to study international institutions such as the World Bank in 
particular. The answer really depends on the context of the researcher. If the 
researcher is able to spend more time at the archives based on their location 
and funding, and has the ability to scour through an extensive list of archival 
records over a period of a couple of months at the least, it can definitely be a 
fruitful methods for uncovering data for their research questions.      
 
Access was also a limitation in the case of financial datasets for Bank trust 
funds. Similarly, in terms of secondary data, I may have missed out on 
certain articles and reports that may not have been published in English or 
available on online databases and search platforms. However, the use of 
multiple sources of data has helped to fill these gaps.  
 
Another limitation could have been the choice of informants for the qualitative 
interviews. This purposive sampling created a natural limitation in who 
participated in this study. Though, I tried my best to identify relevant 
stakeholders from the archival documents and literature, and also verified 
these potential names through snowballing technique, used as I conducted 
interviews. Qualitative interviewing also has an inherent bias, wherein 
informants may have the proclivity to say what is expected to be heard 
irrespective of whether or not these represented their actual views or 
intentions. I attempted to address this bias to an extent, by providing 
complete information about the research aims and implications and my 
affiliation, and by building rapport to encourage real accounts. I interviewed 
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former retired officials and, in this case of respondents, memory (or lack of it) 
could have affected some of their responses. In this case, I sent the interview 
questions well in advance of the actual interview allowing the informants’ time 
to recollect and jot down their thoughts. Finally, I verified the findings from the 
interviews by triangulating these with other sources, thereby helping to 
enhance its integrity.  
 
Researcher subjectivity is a prime feature of this mixed methods study. While 
this subjectivity could be a potential bias emerging from reliance on the 
researcher as the primary instrument of data collection and analysis (Guba 
and Lincoln 1981), this could also be viewed as a strength, as this method 
does not attempt to eliminate what cannot be discounted. It acknowledges all 
the factors involved and helps to provide a comprehensive picture. Finally, 
this study enables an in-depth case of a Bank-funded project in India. While 
the findings from this case study cannot be generalised to all the other 
countries where the Bank operates, it would be interesting to examine 
whether the results found in this study would be applicable in other aid-
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Chapter 4 Tracing the World Bank’s policies 
and programmes for maternal and 
child health from 1960 to 2019 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the origins of the World Bank’s work in maternal and 
child health (MCH) and trace its involvement in this area at the global level 
over five decades, from 1960 to 2019. I analyse the Bank’s policies and 
programmes related to maternal and child health in this period. In doing so, I 
include in my analysis external events and actors as the Bank does not 
function in a silo; rather, it operates within a dynamic and ever-changing 
political environment, crowded with multiple actors at the global, regional and 
local level. I categorise the Bank’s efforts into five phases and in each phase 
it has adopted a different and distinct approach towards its work in maternal 
and child health. Although, the Bank was first involved in maternal and child 
health indirectly through its lending for population control and nutrition 
projects in the 1970s, I begin the first phase from 1960 to offer a context for 
its entry into this area.  
This chapter relies on three sources of data including (i) MCH-related 
documents published by the World Bank (such as health policy papers, 
health sector review, and strategy reports), (ii) Archival records from the 
World Bank Archives based in Washington D.C, including correspondence 
memos, project proposals, minutes of meetings, research and strategy 
reports, (iii) Published scientific and grey literature that reported any aspect 
of the Bank’s work in MCH. Through this analysis, I identified major maternal 
and child health-related policies, programmes and partnerships led or 
supported by the Bank during each of the five phases of its involvement. In 
this chapter, I thus attempt to answer two key questions: (i) how has the 
World Bank conceptualised MCH over time; and (ii) what has been the 
Bank’s programmes and financing approach for MCH. 
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4.2 Phase 1: The expansion of the population control 
movement (1960 – 1968) 
The global population control movement flourished in the 1960s, driven by 
the United States (U.S.) population control establishment, which consisted of 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), private 
foundations including the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and 
Milbank Foundation, and international non-governmental organisations like 
the International Planned Parenthood Federation and Population Council 
(Conelly, 2005; Hartmann, 1981). The World Bank became a part of this 
establishment in the late 1960s (Kapur et al. 1997), and in the subsequent 
years, it forayed into maternal and child health through its population control 
projects. 
 
The U.S. began releasing federal grants for family planning programmes in 
the country as early as 1964 (Bailey, 2012). In his second State of the Union 
Address on January 4, 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson stated: “I will 
seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world 
population and the growing scarcity in world resources” (United States 
Senate, 1965, pg. 10). In the wake of this address, USAID launched its first 
population and family planning program in 1965. In the same year, at an 
event to mark the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN), President 
Johnson remarked, “less than five dollars invested in population control is 
worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth”, further endorsing the 
population control agenda at an international level (UN, 1965). While Whaley-
Eager (2017) showed how the U.S. propagated the norm of population 
control as the best way to expedite development in the “third world” until the 
1970s, Wilmoth and Ball (1992) argued that the U.S. government’s 
accelerated interest in regulating the population size of developing countries 
could have been linked to a particular anxiety that rapidly growing, poor 
countries in Asia would serve as fertile ground for communist revolutions. 
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Throughout the 1960s, international events promoted political priority and 
financial investments towards population control programmes in the world: 
developing countries established national family planning policies, the 
Second World Population Conference focused on fertility as part of 
development planning policy, the International Conference on Human Rights 
passed a resolution declaring family planning as a human right, and the 
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA, now the UN 
Population Fund) began its operations (Sinding, 2007). By 1968, the Ford 
Foundation had funded $100 million through its population work in three 
areas in developing countries: research and training in reproductive biology; 
the establishment and/or expansion of university population studies centers 
in the United States; and assistance to population programs (Harkavy et al., 
1968).  
 
In 1968, Paul Ehrlich, a biologist from Stanford University, published the book 
titled “The Population Bomb” that predicted imminent population explosion 
and ensuing disaster (Ehrlich, 1968). This book equated overpopulation to a 
ticking bomb and asserted the many dangers of population growth including 
the starvation of millions of people and war; it was meant to raise the alarm 
on an urgent crisis, and was promoted as such by the U.S. population-control 
movement (Orleans-Reed, 2008). Ehrlich advocated for population control 
programmes that placed the good of the whole society over the needs or 
desires of the individual. He urged the U.S to intervene for the “plight of the 
less fortunate fellows on Earth” in order to help the Westerners to survive.  
 
Ehrlich and the U.S population control establishment drew from Neo-
Malthusian ideology that overpopulation was putting pressure on the 
resources for the current and future generations, and hence it needed to be 
urgently controlled (Hoff, 2018; Connelly, 2005). Since the late 1700s, 
Thomas Malthus, a British clergyman-turned-economist and one of the 
earliest advocates of population control, wrote that, unless restrained by 
“preventive checks” (abstinence, delayed marriage, and restricting marriage 
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against persons suffering poverty or perceived as defective) and “positive 
checks” (which lead to premature death such as disease, starvation and 
war), human populations would double every twenty-five years (Malthus, 
1798).  
 
Neo-Malthusian or modern day proponents of population control reinterpreted 
this Malthusian logic, selectively applying it only to the poor majority in the 
developing countries, and in some cases, to ethnic minorities in developed 
countries (Hartmann, 1981). Thus, in this Neo-Malthusian agenda, women 
from poor communities in developing countries and from ethnic groups in 
developed countries became the target of global population control efforts, 
and sterilisation served as the dominant birth control method promoted 
through these programmes (Hvistendahl, 2005; Hartmann, 1981).  
 
The World Bank thus entered the stage within this historical context of 
concerns over population. However, before its active involvement in 1968, 
the Bank undertook two initiatives in this phase, which demonstrated its 
limited stance on population control. First, in 1958, driven by the growing 
debate by development economists, the Bank financed a landmark study on 
the economic impact of demographic trends in India (Coale and Hoover, 
1958), concluding that India, as well as other low-income countries, would 
realize "immediate economic advantages" from a reduction in fertility. While 
some Bank officials agreed with Coale and Hoover's conclusion, in general, 
they did not see a role for the Bank itself in helping to limit population growth 
(Kapur et al., 1997). Second, in 1967 and early 1968, under the presidency of 
George Woods, information on population trends and policies began to be 
included in all country economic reports; even more significantly, borrowers' 
population policies were to be regarded as one indication of their 
commitment to economic growth (Woods, 1968; World Bank, 1968). 
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4.3 Phase 2: Population control and nutrition as a 
gateway to maternal and child health (1968 – 
1979)  
 
Population control – 1968 
It was not until 1968 when Robert McNamara became President that the 
World Bank assumed an active role in the population field, primarily by the 
means of financing population projects. In April of 1968, soon after his 
election as the fifth President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara 
addressed his first Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors and made an 
announcement that would preoccupy him for the coming years. He argued 
that the "rapid growth of population is one of the greatest barriers to 
economic growth and social wellbeing of the people of our member states", 
urging the World Bank to take on new initiatives to address this crisis (Lewis 
et al., 1991; Maddux, 1981). This was a time when there was an overall 
weariness in developed countries over foreign assistance and the World 
Bank had not yet started lending for the social or health sector (Crane and 
Finkle, 1981).  
 
McNamara’s enthusiasm and approach for promoting population control can 
be better understood by reflecting on his life before the World Bank. In 1940, 
after graduating with an MBA and working for PriceWaterhouse, McNamara 
became (at 24 years old) the youngest and highest paid associate professor 
at the Harvard Business School. Soon after, he served in the U.S Office of 
Statistical Control during the World War II, with one of his major 
responsibilities being the analysis of U.S bombers’ efficiency and 
effectiveness. In 1945, Henry Ford II hired ten World War II veterans known 
as the “whiz kids” including McNamara, to reform his money-losing 
company’s chaotic administration through modern planning, organization, 
and management control systems. By the end of his career with Ford, 
McNamara left as the first President of the Motor Company from outside the 
Ford family (Zaleznik, 2005). He continued to remain associated as the 
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trustee of the Ford Foundation, an organisation that was firmly established in 
the global population control movement (Teltsch, 1982). Note that the Ford 
Foundation was one of the major proponents and financiers of population 
control activities in developing countries (Harkavy, 1995). In 1961, 
McNamara was appointed the U.S Secretary of Defense, where he was 
credited with ushering in systems analysis, and often times austere cost-
cutting measures for the management of the vast military establishment 
(Rosenzweig, 2010). Over time, he became an influential member in the 
Johnson Administration. McNamara’s deep interest in population control thus 
seems to have stemmed from his roles with the Ford Foundation and the 
U.S. government and the Ford Foundation (Harkavy, 1995; Crane and Finkle, 
1981), and at the World Bank, he approached this issue with his 
characteristic management lens and his strive for maximizing efficiency 
(Kapur et al., 1997).  
In 1970, McNamara established the Population Projects Department in the 
World Bank and approved the first loan of $2 million for family planning in 
Jamaica (World Bank, 1970), marking the Bank’s indirect foray into lending 
for health. This first population loan financed the expansion of Kingston’s 
principal maternity hospital and construction of 10 rural maternity centres. 
Similarly, the early population loans given to Tunisia, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, predominantly focused on “hardware projects” that constructed 
urban maternity hospitals and developed postpartum programmes as 
channels for recruiting family planning acceptors (World Bank, 1975).   
While McNamara kept pushing the population control agenda, senior leaders 
and development economists did not consider this area bankable enough for 
the Bank to engage in a sufficiently significant way (Kapur et al., 1997). 
Senior health staff therefore reasoned that population growth thwarted efforts 
to increase per capita income and raise living standards and fertility reduction 
would help to correct this (World Bank, 1972), thereby justifying population 
projects by quantifying the economic benefits of its lending in this sector. The 
Bank financed family planning programmes that were implemented 
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independently or integrated into existing maternal and child health service 
delivery in borrower countries. Additionally, these projects mainstreamed 
family planning through other sectoral programmes. For instance, in 1978, 
the Bank made a population loan to Malaysia, which supported the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s efforts to provide family planning information in conjunction 
with its activities to raise the socioeconomic status of women in rural areas 
through vocational training (World Bank, 1989).  
 
Nutrition – 1971 
By 1971, McNamara turned his attention to nutrition after being influenced by 
the work of prominent American nutritionist, Alan Berg (Sridhar, 2007). In 
January 1972, the Bank released a report titled ‘Possible Bank Actions on 
Malnutrition Problems’ that led to the establishment of a Nutrition unit within 
the Population Projects Department, which was then renamed as the 
Population and Nutrition Projects Department (Fair, 2008). McNamara hired 
Alan Berg to lead this department (Kapur et al., 1997). In 1973, Berg 
published ‘The Nutrition Factor’ where he advocated three major benefits of 
investing in child nutrition – (i) savings on medical costs through reduced 
demand for curative medical services (ii) reduced productivity losses caused 
by the debility of the labour force (iii) extension of productive working years 
(Berg, 1973). In line with the arguments made by Berg, the Bank released a 
policy paper recommending a more active role for itself in nutrition and 
rationalised its lending by linking nutrition with improved productivity and 
economic growth, thereby illustrating its capacity for return on investment 
(World Bank, 1973).  
 
In 1976, the Bank eventually approved its first loan worth $19 million for 
nutrition to Brazil followed by another major loan to India in 1980 under the 
Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project (Fair, 2008). For the Bank’s 
specialists, hunger—in line with neoconservative attitudes—was perceived 
as a matter of individual choice and not an outcome of structural factors as 
well. Behavioural change through the nutrition-related education for the 
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mother, dietary supplementation and growth monitoring of the child was the 
response to undernutrition (Sridhar, 2007; World Bank, 2006). Pre-school 
children were the primary beneficiaries of Bank-funded nutrition projects as 
improving their nutrition and investing in their human capital would have the 
strongest impact on productivity. A woman was targeted during the nine 
months of pregnancy and six months of lactation due to her role as a mother 
or future mother of a healthy member of the workforce. Her nutritional status 
was valued instrumentally, not intrinsically. Targeting lactating mothers 
ensured a healthy infant for the first six months and breastfeeding, which had 
contraceptive effects, thus fulfilling dual goals of child nutrition and fertility 
reduction (Philips and Sanghvi, 1996). Furthermore, nutrition was also an 
uncontroversial way of addressing family planning, as community health 
workers who spoke to mothers about nutrition could also approach the topic 
of family planning (Berg, 1973).  
 
Health Sector Policy – 1975 
In 1975, the Bank published its first health sector policy paper where it made 
a link between improvements in health conditions and economic progress 
(World Bank, 1975). While this paper appreciated the positive health 
consequences of Bank-funded projects, it maintained that the Bank would not 
lend directly for health projects due to the concerns over the feasibility of low-
cost health care systems, the lack of governments’ political will to institute 
significant reforms, and questions related to the Bank’s role in the sector 
(Stout et al., 1997). While this policy paper did not directly discuss maternal 
and child health, cursory references were made to maternal and child 
mortality within the context of fertility reduction and integrating family 
planning and maternal and child health services. In 1979, the Population and 
Nutrition Projects Department was renamed the Population, Health, and 
Nutrition Department (Fair, 2008). 
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4.4 Phase 3: Major partnerships for maternal and 
child health (1980 – 1989) 
 
Health Sector Policy – 1980 
The Bank started lending directly for stand-alone health projects following a 
new policy it adopted in 1980 (World Bank, 1980). During the fiscal years of 
1981 to 1986, total Bank lending for health reached $1 billion for 35 projects, 
making it one of the largest lenders for health projects in LMICS (Measham, 
1986). This new health sector policy identified maternal and child health care 
as one of the first areas for lending. Maternal and child health care included 
family planning, prenatal care, screening for difficulties in delivery, safe 
delivery, neonatal care and immunization. 
 
Special Programme of Research, Development and Research 
Training in Human Reproduction – 1984 
The Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training 
in Human Reproduction (HRP) was set up within the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 1972, and funded mainly by European donors and the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to conduct and promote research 
on human reproduction, with a particular emphasis on developing countries 
(Diczfalusy, 1986). While the World Bank got involved with the HRP in an 
advisory role right from its establishment, in 1984, it started co-sponsoring 
this programme along with UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO, marking the 
Bank’s first major global collaboration for maternal and health (Nassim, 
1991).  
 
The Bank’s interest and financial support in the HRP resulted from its heavy 
involvement in population projects as well as a concern over the adverse 
changes in the challenging financial, political, and legal environment of 
reproductive research in the 1980s (Nassim, 1991). Correspondence memos 
between senior Bank health specialists showed their apprehension over the 
declined global funding for contraceptive research and development 
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(amounting to a 20% reduction in real terms between 1975 and 1983), which 
mainly resulted from the industry withdrawal from the field due to product 
liability concerns, and dissatisfaction with the restrictive and prolonged 
regulatory approval process (World Bank, 1986a). Furthermore, Bank staff 
also raised concerns about the leadership of the WHO, led by Director 
General Halfdan Mahler at the time, and its inadequate ability to attract the 
required financial support from governments in low-and-middle-income 
(LMICS) and donors, as well as the dominance of European donors (World 
Bank, 1986b). Financial involvement in the HRP thus gave the Bank greater 
control in the research agenda setting, management direction and 
programmatic decisions. The Bank continues to remain a co-sponsor of the 
HRP with an annual contribution of $2 million representing 10% of the 
programme’s total funding (Nassim, 1991). Over time, Bank involvement 
strengthened the HRP's links with governments, facilitated its access to 
ministries outside the health sector and helped to sustain donor commitments 
(Benagiano, 2012).  
 
Task Force for Child Survival – 1984 
In 1984, the Bank entered another major partnership with the WHO, UNICEF, 
Rockefeller Foundation and UNDP, and co-sponsored the Task Force for 
Child Survival, which aimed to raise immunisation coverage in developing 
countries (Foege, 2018). Three major events raised international attention for 
child immunisation and set the stage for the formation of this taskforce. First, 
in 1977, WHO launched the Expanded Immunisation Programme, aimed at 
making immunisation against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, poliomyelitis, 
measles, and tuberculosis available to every child in the world by 1990 (Keja 
et al., 1988). Second, in 1982, James Grant, the Executive Director of 
UNICEF, launched the ‘Child Survival and Development Revolution’ in his 
annual State of the World’s Children Report (UNICEF, 1982), presenting a 
selective package of four interventions to avert child deaths from preventable 
causes, including Growth monitoring, Oral rehydration, Breastfeeding and 
Immunization also known as the GOBI strategy. Third, in 1983, Robert 
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McNamara and Jonas Salk (creator of the inactivated polio vaccine – IPV) 
created the International Committee to Protect the World’s Children, in 
association with Leopold Senghor (former president of Senegal) and H.F. van 
den Hoven (Vice-Chairman of Unilever Ltd) (World Bank, 1984a).  
 
While this international committee viewed immunisation as a step towards 
building primary health care, McNamara consistently underscored the 
resulting reductions in child mortality as a contribution to alleviate 
demographic pressures. McNamara and Salk sought the endorsement of 
WHO and UNICEF. Despite the existing institutional rivalry between UNICEF 
and WHO around their respective vertical (GOBI package) and horizontal 
(primary health care championed at Alma-Ata) approaches to achieving 
health, the two organisations saw the benefits of becoming part of the 
initiative owing to the political momentum it created and the potential for 
increased financial resources for each of their immunisation efforts (World 
Bank 1984b; WHO, 1983).  
The Rockefeller Foundation and UNDP joined this initial group of actors 
including the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF, and formed the Taskforce for 
Child Survival in 1984 (World Bank, 1984b). The task force was led by Dr. 
William Foege, an American epidemiologist credited with the successful 
campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s (WHO, 2008), and had its 
Secretariat based at Emory University. This inter-agency partnership 
generated political priority for immunisation; raised financial resources 
implemented through WHO and UNICEF’s immunisation programmes; and 
responded to requests from LMICS by facilitating responses of various 
international agencies. While the task force initially began its work in 
Colombia, Senegal and India, it now coordinates child health-related efforts 
in 154 countries, and has been renamed Task Force for Global Health (Task 
Force for Global Health, 2019; World Bank, 1985a).  
The Bank played the primarily role of a financier, by contributing 10% of the 
annual budget of the Task Force, as compared to UNICEF that funded nearly 
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50% of the initiative; offered inputs in the form of economic analyses, 
budgeting, evaluations, secondments of its own economists and co-
sponsoring short-term consultants to work with ministries of health in 
programme countries (World Bank, 1984c,d,e). Bank leadership and senior 
health specialists viewed the task force as a mechanism to increase the 
Bank’s visibility and credibility as a development agency and as an entry 
point to deliver other priority child health interventions including family 
planning (World Bank, 1985a). 
 
Safe Motherhood Initiative - 1987 
In 1987, the World Bank along with WHO and UNFPA co-sponsored an 
international conference in Nairobi, where it launched the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative, which would go on to become the Bank’s first major global 
partnership for maternal health (Mahler, 1987). Storeng (2010) argued that 
the creation of the Safe Motherhood Initiative was part of a broader effort to 
revive political commitment for the primary health care approach or the 
‘health for all’ agenda as against the rising support for vertical and selective 
approaches.  
 
In 1978, WHO and UNICEF convened the Alma-Ata conference on primary 
health care where member states affirmed health for all through a 
comprehensive agenda that recommended shifting resources from hospitals 
to primary health centres, building a cadre of mid-level health providers and 
community health workers to replace the shortage of clinical doctors, and to 
ensure a strong referral system wherein secondary and tertiary hospitals and 
facilities supported primary health centres (Cueto, 2004; WHO and UNICEF, 
1978). Soon after the Alma-Ata declaration, Walsh and Warren (1979), both 
representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, published an article in the 
New England Journal of Medicine, that promoted ‘selective primary health 
care’ for developing countries with limited financial resources, an approach 
that funded a small number of measurable and cost-effective interventions, 
which targeted the biggest sources of mortality and morbidity. In the same 
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year, the World Bank and Rockefeller Foundation convened a conference in 
Bellagio, Italy, that legitimised this concept of ‘selective primary health care’ 
(Cueto, 2004).  
 
By the mid-1980s, maternal health was neglected as a result of the turn 
towards selective approaches and investments in specific child health 
interventions, triggering an international response. Rosenfield and Maine 
(1985) wrote an influential article in the Lancet that compellingly described 
the lack of attention to maternal health over child health and discussed how 
maternal mortality urgently required investments in the health system and 
could not be tackled through selective and single bullet approaches such as 
those used for improving child health.  
Furthermore, in the same year, WHO’s first inter-regional meeting on 
maternal mortality reduction announcing that a half million women died 
annually of pregnancy-related complications sounded the much-needed 
alarm to the magnitude of this problem (WHO 1990). Two Bank specialists, 
Barbara Herz (Former Division Chief, Women in Development) and Anthony 
Measham (Former Division Chief, HNP) took keen interest in these 
international debates around the neglect of maternal health, and led the 
discussions for an inter-agency-supported conference on galvanising political 
support and financial commitment for reducing maternal mortality. The result 
was the Nairobi conference of 1987 which launched the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative (Measham, 2018).  
Herz and Measham were the main authors of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative’s policy (Herz and Measham, 1987). This policy recommended a 
combined preventive and therapeutic approach whereby pregnant women 
and mothers would receive health care in a three-tiered system – family 
planning and prenatal care at the village level, delivery at the maternity 
centre or district level hospital and obstetric emergencies referred to specially 
equipped facilities. The policy also recommended that primary level 
interventions be delivered by community-based health workers including 
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traditional birth attendants (TBA). Involving TBAs was based on the 
assumption that they would be supported by formally accredited and 
adequately staffed biomedical health care providers at higher levels of care.  
Note that around this time, while Bank staff including Bank President 
supported seemingly vertical initiatives such as the Task Force for Child 
Survival, certain other Bank specialists also led the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative, which as Storeng (2010) argued, was framed as an ethical, 
development, and social justice imperative that challenged the existing 
disease-specific, vertical and neoliberal bias in international health. A closer 
reading of the Initiative’s policy document (Herz and Measham, 1987) 
demonstrated the instrumental value that continued to be assigned to 
maternal health. It described maternal mortality as impacting the family 
through the loss of someone to care for, nourish and raise children, and 
contribute to the household income, and affecting the economy through the 
loss of women’s productivity. Safe Motherhood was thus an economic and 
social investment rather than being an intrinsic need in itself.  
The Nairobi conference resulted in the setting up of an Inter-Agency Group 
for the implementation of the Initiative, consisting of representatives from 
WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, the Bank and international NGOs (Storeng, 
2010). A series of international, regional and national Safe Motherhood 
Conferences followed (Starrs, 1997). Bank-funded safe motherhood projects 
increased from 10 in 1987 to 150 across 29 countries in 1999, with an annual 
commitment of $385 million between 1992 and 1999—30% of total bank 
HNP lending (World Bank, 1999).  
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes – 1980s 
This decade also witnessed the rise of the Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in response to the debt crisis in developing countries 
(Abbasi, 1999). Each year during 1980-1986, there were 48 countries with 
adjustment lending from the Bank - a number that had risen to 59 by 1988 
(Kapur et al., 1997). SAPs included a range of fiscal and policy measures, 
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such as cuts in consumption and public spending to reduce inflation and 
public debt - including cuts in the health and social sector spending; a greater 
involvement for private industry in all sectors; decentralisation; and a lower 
profile for central governments. These conditionalities had to be implemented 
by borrowing country governments to avail further Bank loans (Di et al. 2007; 
Segall 2003; Navarro 1998; McPake 1993).   
 
Alongside SAPs, the Bank (along with the WHO and some bilateral donors) 
promoted health sector reforms in low-income countries during the 1980s to 
mid-1990s (Standing, 2002). A 1985 Bank publication stated that “the 
conventional and still growing faith that healthcare should be totally paid for 
and administered by government needs to be vigorously challenged” (de 
Ferranti, 1985). This influential paper thus recommended cost recovery to 
finance health care, along with risk-sharing instruments ranging from formal 
insurance to community-based cooperatives, public-private mix for financing 
and providing health services, and structuring subsidies and their incentives. 
Another Bank paper in 1987 promoted fee payment for health services, 
privatisation of large parts of health services and introduction of private 
insurance programmes, as well as decentralisation of the management of 
health care (World Bank, 1987). 
Several studies linked SAPs with a detrimental impact on maternal and child 
health outcomes by undermining access to quality and affordable healthcare 
through user fees and cuts in public spending, as well as by adversely 
affecting social determinants of health, such as income and food availability 
(Thomson et al., 2017; Ridde, 2008; Breman and Shelton, 2006; Abbasi, 
1999). Towards the end of this decade, internal Bank reviews acknowledged 
the negative health outcomes of SAPs and the need to identify ways for 
borrower countries to protect the poor and vulnerable during adjustment 
periods (Elbadawi et al., 1992; McCleary, 1990).  
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4.5 Phase 4: Institutionalisation of a selective 
approach for maternal and child health (1990 – 
1999) 
 
Child Vaccine Initiative - 1990 
In 1990, the Bank co-sponsored another partnership for child health i.e. the 
Child Vaccine Initiative, along with WHO (as the lead agency), UNICEF, 
UNDP, and the Rockefeller Foundation. While the task force for child survival 
focused on generating demand for immunisation in developing countries, the 
Child Vaccine Initiative worked on the supply side, by coordinating between 
the UN agencies, governments, and the public and private pharmaceutical 
industry for setting priorities for global vaccine development and delivery, and 
organising efforts to produce efficient and effective vaccines (Muraskin, 2002; 
Cadell, 1997). This Initiative received a total annual grant of $2.5 million from 
all the agencies, to conduct its work through task forces that examined 
strategic, logistic, and policy issues relevant to the industrial development 
and introduction of child vaccines (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on 
the Children's Vaccine Initiative, 1993).  
By the mid-1990s, this Initiative was absorbed into WHO, and increasingly 
faced competition with the agency’s own Global Programme for Vaccines 
and Immunization. Being housed in Geneva, the Initiative received technical 
direction from WHO, disproportionate to other donors (Muraskin, 1998). 
While the pharmaceutical industry had agreed to deliver a temperature-stable 
polio vaccine, the Initiative later declined this proposal that it had originally 
requested, primarily due to fears within the WHO and UNICEF around the 
lack of community acceptance of such a vaccine (Cadell, 1997). 
Furthermore, tensions between the industry and WHO increased due to 
ideological differences owing to the agency’s position of vaccines as a public 
right versus the industry’s profit motive (Muraskin, 2002).  
Bigger developments were to follow. In 1997, at a meeting held at the 
Bellagio Centre, Seth Berkeley (then the acting director of the health division 
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of the Rockefeller Foundation) suggested to Jacques-Francoise Martin (chief 
proponent of the Child Vaccine Initiative and former CEO of leading 
pharmaceutical companies - Pasteur-Merieux, Chiron, and Biocene) greater 
industry involvement as a way to address the weakening of the Initiative 
(Muraskin, 2002). These discussions stirred Martin to draft a paper, which 
proposed reinvention of the initiative with strong leadership, focused targets, 
new sponsors for raising adequate financial resources and greater industry 
involvement (Martin, 1997). Martin took this paper to WHO, UNICEF, UNDP 
and the Rockefeller Foundation; while WHO was unhappy with the plan as 
the leadership felt that it would take over its own programmes, no concrete 
outcomes emerged from discussions with the other partners (Muraskin, 
2002). Finally, Martin approached Richard Feacham (then the Director of 
HNP) with this proposal, who responded positively, and organised a high-
level summit led by the former Bank President James Wolfensohn in 
Washington D.C in 1998. This meeting, attended by the heads of UN 
agencies, industry representatives and international health leaders, signalled 
the Bank’s ultimate commitment for child health. By leveraging technical 
support from UN agencies, partnering with the private sector for vaccine 
development, and offering tiered financial resources and vaccines to 
developing countries, the Bank positioned immunisation as a national 
economic investment (Glassman and Temin, 2016).  
Another inter-agency meeting was held in Bellagio in 1999, where the 
majority of the actors including the Bank, recommended a public-private 
partnership for vaccines and immunisation under a strengthened Child 
Vaccine Initiative (Muraskin, 2002). However, at this meeting itself, WHO 
announced that it was going to dismantle the Child Vaccine Initiative after 
eight years of its functioning (Gavaghan, 1999); senior WHO leaders justified 
this action by labelling the existing Initiative as superfluous (World Bank, 
1999). The death of the Child Vaccine Initiative was followed up by a new 
global alliance for immunisation in 1999 when the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation’s Children’s Vaccine Program offered a seed grant of $750 
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million to this existing inter-agency group to launch GAVI, the Vaccine 
Alliance (Glassman and Temin, 2016). 
World Development Report – 1993 
In 1990, the Bank commissioned Chris Murray, Alan Lopez and Dean 
Jamison to conduct the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study which was 
aimed to be “a comparative, comprehensive, and detailed study of health 
loss worldwide to provide the basis for objective assessments about the 
probable benefits of applying packages of interventions” (Murray and Lopez, 
2017). While Murray and Lopez worked at WHO, Dean Jamison was a senior 
health economist at the Bank. The team’s work culminated in the publication 
of the 1993 World Development Report (WDR) (World Bank, 1993a).  
This WDR was influential as it urged governments and the international 
development community to invest in health and also introduced the DALYs or 
Disability Adjusted Life Years, a metric developed by the GBD team to 
quantify morbidity over time and assess the cost-effectiveness of health 
interventions (Tichenor and Sridhar, 2019; Prah-Ruger, 2005). However, this 
report continued to promote user fees and an increased role for the private 
sector in health care (Clift, 2013).  
 
The WDR drew heavily from another influential Bank publication – ‘Disease 
Control Priorities for Developing Countries’ (DCP-I), which promoted highly 
cost-effective interventions to be included in every country’s essential clinical 
package (World Bank, 1993b). The WDR and the DCP-I were influential for 
maternal and child health as four out of five sets of the recommended 
intervention packages were for women of reproductive age (prenatal and 
delivery care, family planning, case management of sexually transmitted 
diseases) and children under the age of five (management of the sick child 
covering diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, immunisation and nutrition). 
Through the WDR, the Bank reinforced priority setting through the use of 
DALYs and cost-effective interventions, thereby institutionalising the selective 
approach to health care. The report also encouraged governments that could 
not afford comprehensive public health services to provide a minimum 
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package of low-cost, selective or “basic” public health services, 
supplemented by a package of “essential clinical services,” leaving “non-
essential services” to the private sector (World Bank, 1993a, pg. 6). 
 
International Conference for Population and Development – 
1994 
In 1994, the Bank endorsed the Cairo consensus that came out of the 
International Conference on Population and Development (Robinson and 
Ross, 2007). This consensus recommended governments to drop the 
existing demographic and family planning targets and provide comprehensive 
reproductive health care based on individual choice and reproductive rights, 
which included family planning; safe pregnancy and delivery services; 
abortion where legal; prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted 
infections; information and counseling on sexuality; and elimination of 
harmful practices against women (such as genital cutting and forced 
marriage) (UN, 1994). This conference was a highly political event in that 
there was an unprecedented involvement of women’s groups and NGOs in 
formulating national policy statements; initial opposition by the Vatican 
followed by their partial agreement to the Consensus with formal reservations 
around artificial contraception and abortion; and the U.S. support of abortion 
as a reproductive right for women (McIntosh and Finkle, 1995; Cohen and 
Richards, 1994). Amidst this highly charged political environment, the Bank’s 
endorsement of the Cairo Consensus meant that it supported the transition 
from a demographic motivation for population programmes towards individual 
choice and reproductive rights.  
However, critics argued that this shift was more of a semantic declaration as 
the population control establishment including the Bank, realised that the 
demographic goal of reducing fertility could not be attained without taking into 
account women’s ability to make decisions regarding reproduction and 
fertility, and hence the change in language from population control to 
reproductive health could have been a rebranding of reducing fertility 
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(Hartmann, 2016; Rao, 2004). This gap in rhetoric and practice was 
confirmed by the Bank’s own 1999 health sector report, which stated that a 
Bank-funded reproductive and child health project in India “offered practical 
ways to promote family planning without emphasising on sterilisation targets” 
(World Bank, 1999, pg. 3).  
 
Safe Motherhood 2.0 – 1997 
Despite the momentum created by the International Conference on 
Population and Development in 1994, the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
struggled in its implementation (Maine and Rosenfield, 1999; Weil and 
Fernandez, 1999). Most of the Safe Motherhood programmes, including 
those funded by the Bank, focused exclusively on low-technology and largely 
preventive actions at the community-level, including antenatal screening for 
high-risk pregnancies and training traditional birth attendants (AbouZahr, 
2003; Campbell, 2001), gradually reducing the Initiative to the selective and 
vertical approach that it had originally denounced (Storeng, 2010). 
 
Storeng (2010) argued that the Safe Motherhood Initiative failed to find an 
institutional home due to the differing ideological and implementation 
approaches to maternal health of different agencies, which could explain its 
weak implementation. While WHO emphasised a comprehensive agenda of 
strengthening health systems, other agencies defined safe motherhood 
differently, focusing on specific activities including antenatal care, family 
planning, training of traditional birth attendants, immunisation, and child 
nutrition. Additionally, macro-level factors such as the economic crisis and 
Bank-led structural adjustment programmes meant that governments had to 
endure cuts in the health sector budget affecting the nature of maternal 
health programmes (Breman and Shelton, 2006). While governments pushed 
for investments in hospitals and donors had a bias for community based 
care, the first referral level in between, where attention was needed and 
recommended by the SMI, was neglected and squeezed out of health 
budgets (Task Force on Child Health and Maternal Health, 2005).    
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As a response to the dismal performance of the Safe Motherhood Initiative, 
the Inter-Agency Group including the Bank, convened a technical 
consultation in 1997 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, that brought together safe 
motherhood specialists, programme planners and decision-makers from 
international and national agencies (AbouZahr, 200). While in 1987, maternal 
mortality was framed as a social problem, in the 1997, it was 
reconceptualised as a public health issue and a medical challenge. Saving 
women’s lives, rather than improving women’s health and social status more 
broadly, were redefined as the Initiative’s ultimate outcomes (Weil and 
Fernandez, 1999). The Inter-Agency Group promoted skilled birth attendants 
and emergency obstetric care as essential interventions for reducing 
maternal mortality, and in doing so, it clearly departed from its previous 
emphasis on the inter-related nature of health and social policies, and 
focused on a set of recommendations that appeared much more selective 
than comprehensive in nature (AbouZahr, 2003). Storeng (2010) reasoned 
that emergency obstetric care or EmOC as the 1997 consultation called it, 
was essentially a reformulation of the original set of recommendations from 
1987, only this time around it was presented as a research-driven policy 
solution giving it more credibility. However, even a selective intervention like 
EmOC would need investments for a strengthened health system. 
 
4.6 Phase 5: Proliferation of global health initiatives 
(2000 – 2019) 
 
GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance – 2000 
In 2000, the Bank facilitated the creation of GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, 
alongside other international partners through its lead involvement in the 
Children’s Vaccine Initiative towards the end of the previous decade (IEG 
2014). GAVI is a public-private partnership aimed at increasing access to 
child immunisation in poor countries (IEG, 2014). This alliance supports 
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recipient countries through four phases over a period of five years, starting 
with initial self-financing where the country pays $0.20 per vaccine dose 
while GAVI supports the rest of the cost, to the final phase where the country 
gradually takes over from GAVI and fully finances its immunisation efforts 
(Kallenberg and Cornejo, 2015). GAVI does not have a presence at the 
country level and relies heavily on its partners like WHO for technical 
guidelines, planning and evaluation, and UNICEF, for procuring vaccines and 
delivering it on-ground in the recipient country. As of 2018, GAVI has 
reached over 700 million children and prevented more than 10 million future 
deaths in the process (GAVI, 2019). 
 
The Bank holds a permanent seat on the GAVI Board that establishes all 
policies, oversees operations, and monitors implementation. However, since 
2008, GAVI evolved from an informal alliance to a corporate entity, and now, 
the three founding UN partners—UNICEF, WHO, and the World Bank—are 
represented by three votes on a 28 vote corporate Board (World Bank, 
2014). Moreover, the Bank acts as a trustee and manages the GAVI funds 
for immunisation programmes (World Bank, 2011). Essentially, it supports 
the operations of two major financial mechanisms that generate funds for 
GAVI viz. the International Financing Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) and 
Advanced Market Commitment (AMC). The IFFIm takes bilateral donor 
pledges and converts them into usable cash resources by selling vaccine 
bonds in the capital markets. Through the AMC, donors commit to purchase 
pneumococcal vaccines at a price that covers development costs and 
provides some profits for the drugs’ manufacturers with the provision that 
they are distributed only in LMICS, to preserve the relatively higher prices in 
the higher-income countries. The Bank also takes on the financial risk 
associated with donor default. Finally, since GAVI does not have an in-
country presence, the Bank acts as its development partner in some of the 
programme countries (IEG, 2014).  
GAVI’s vertical focus on immunisation more than its involvement with the 
private sector, has been its major criticism over the years (Clinton and 
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Sridhar, 2017; Garrett, 2007). GAVI tried to respond to this criticism by 
financing health systems strengthening efforts as well. However, Storeng 
(2014) and Marchal et al. (2009) argued that Gavi’s support for this area 
could have been an exercise in public relations to quell its critiques and 
appease its ‘systems-oriented’ donors such as Norway and the UK, as most 
of its notion of health systems strengthening was narrow in that it only 
strengthened components needed to achieve immunisation goals.  
Over time, the Bank has become apprehensive about GAVI’s vertical 
approach, accelerating the introduction of new and sometimes costly 
vaccines in low-income countries, the changing influence of the founding 
partners, and the growing autonomy of the GAVI Secretariat after its 2008 
governance reform (IEG, 2014). Despite this strain and caution, the Bank 
continues to support this alliance, mostly in the way of financial policy and 
management. Indeed, Gavi foresees a larger role for the Bank in the future in 
the form of supporting governments with domestic vaccine financing upon 
graduating from Gavi support (IEG, 2014). 
 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health - 2005 
In 2005, the Safe Motherhood Initiative merged with two global child health 
initiatives viz. the Healthy Newborn Partnership (based at Save the Children 
USA) and the Child Survival Partnership (hosted by UNICEF in New York) to 
form the ‘Partnership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health’ (PMNCH, 2009). 
Entering this grand alliance was seen as a survival strategy for the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative amidst the rising proliferation of global health initiatives, 
the competition for donor priority and funding for child health (Storeng, 2010; 
Shiffman and Smith, 2007). The Partnership contributed through knowledge 
building, advocacy and enabling accountability in LMICS to reduce maternal 
and child mortality. Furthermore, its ‘continuum of care’ policy that linked care 
from pregnancy through birth, newborn and child and, in place, the various 
levels of home, community, and health facilities, was endorsed by the WHO 
and widely accepted in national government policies (WHO, 2011). Over the 
years, however, the Partnership struggled to find a formidable position in the 
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increasingly competitive global health landscape, owing to unequal power 
relationships illustrated by skewed representation of developing country and 
local actors in its governance mechanisms; donors’ continued focus on child 
health and vertical, short-term solutions; limited commitment to integration; 
and different interpretations of the ‘continuum of care’ (Storeng, 2010).  
 
The Bank continues to support the Partnership as a funder and holds a 
permanent seat on its Board (PMNCH, 2019). It plays a similar role in 
UNFPA’s Trust Fund for maternal and child health, set up in 2008. In the 
same year, the Bank also joined the H6 partnership along with UNFPA, 
UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, and UNAIDS, to support maternal and child 
health activities in 27 high-burden countries (H6 Partnership, 2019). While 
the Bank started out primarily as a funder and key governing member of 
these global health initiatives, it soon employed these experiences to 
establish its own global initiatives for maternal and child health. In 2007, the 
Bank first launched the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and a few 
years later in 2015, it set up the Global Financing Facility. 
 
Health Results Innovation Trust Fund - 2007 
In 2007, the Bank launched the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund to 
finance and evaluate interventions for reproductive, maternal, neonatal and 
child health (RMNCH) in high-burden countries. This Fund introduced the 
‘results-based financing’ mechanism, wherein health providers are paid on 
achieving planned goals for RMNCH. The governments of Norway and UK 
have committed $575 million into this Fund, which is disbursed as grants 
along with IDA credits to high-burden countries (World Bank, 2007). As of 
2019, the Fund has supported RMNCH programmes in 28 countries and 
conducted 24 impact evaluations and eight mixed methods evaluations. 
Through these 28 projects, the HRITF has released a total of $1271 million in 
IDA credit and $313 million in grants, setting a ratio of 1:4 for credit and grant 
disbursement (Tanner, 2019). 
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A little more than a decade after its establishment, the Fund has had a 
substantial impact on how governments and aid agencies think and talk 
about health care financing, and the term ‘results-based financing’ or RBF is 
now well-established in the policy language (Bauhoff and Glassman, 2017). 
Indeed, the Bank has used several strategies to diffuse the RBF mechanism 
in the health policy environment. First, it funds impact evaluations that 
provide robust evidence and offers credibility and even legitimacy to this 
mechanism. Second, it organises annual dissemination workshops for RBF 
champions from recipient countries and provides educational resources 
including online courses and toolkits (World Bank, 2019a; Paul et al., 2018). 
Finally, the Bank has included this mechanism in its other global health 
initiatives such as the Global Fund and the Global Financing Facility (World 
Bank, 2019a). More importantly, it has converted this mechanism into an 
official financing instrument called ‘Program-for-Results’ (PforR) used in 99 
active projects totalling $40.3 billion of financing (World Bank, 2019b). 
 
Does RBF work in achieving its planned goals for maternal and child health? 
The Bank’s own evaluation has shown that, overall, the evidence base is 
narrow, in that while in many projects, RBF has improved quality and 
availability of medical supplies and equipments, it has increased service 
coverage only in a few projects, and none of these improvements have led to 
the planned maternal and child health outcomes. Negative effects of this 
mechanism included difficulty in communicating the RBF structure to health 
workers and low health worker morale on non-payment (Kandpal, 2016). 
Furthermore, the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group raised concerns 
about the lack of effectiveness of the RBF model and stated that Bank had 
made decisions to scale up regardless of weak, inconclusive or incomplete 
pilot results (World Bank, 2014).  
External evaluations have been more critical, calling RBF projects expensive 
(Anthony et al., 2017; Nonkani et al., 2016; Borghi et al., 2015), uncertain 
and ineffective (Paul et l., 2018; Wiysonge et al., 2017), and stating that they 
have negatively affected health worker morale (Alonge et al., 2017). 
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Moreover, critics have argued that RBF programmes are donor-driven and 
may weaken health systems (Paul et al., 2018; Valters and Whitty, 2017). It 
seems, then, that RBF programmes can have big opportunity costs in terms 
of a complex management and implementation of payment reforms and 
results verification system, without producing sustainable results. Although it 
presents itself as a comprehensive approach, critics have also argued that 
RBF programmes under this Fund have monopolised attention and focused 
policy dialogue on short-term, selective interventions while diverting attention 
from broader process reforms such as human resource management; 
transparency in use of financial resources; accountability; performance of 
public financial management; and integration of programmes into national 
health programming (Paul et al, 2018; Fox et al., 2014; WHO, 2011). The 
Bank’s recent strategy reports (World Bank, 2018, 2017) have admitted the 
need for more research to assess the effectiveness of the RBF and to study 
how RBF interacts with the health system, thereby acknowledging the 
significance of structural determinants in the performance of this mechanism. 
Notwithstanding the uncertain results from the evaluations of the Health 
Results Innovation Trust Fund, the Bank launched the Global Financing 
Facility, another trust fund that promotes the RBF mechanism.  
 
Global Financing Facility - 2015 
In 2015, the Bank launched the Global Financing Facility (GFF), a multi-
donor trust fund for supporting programmes in reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, child, adolescent health and nutrition (RMNCAH-N) across 62 high-
burden countries (World Bank, 2015). Through the Global Financing Facility, 
the Bank emphasises on saving the lives of women and children and helping 
countries achieve economic growth (GFF, 2019). 
 
I reviewed publically available GFF documents and related peer-reviewed 
articles and summarised the key attributes of this Bank-funded trust fund as 
well as its advantages and potential concerns (Fernandes and Sridhar, 
2017). I found that, similar to the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund, the 
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GFF seeks financial resources from donors which go into a trust fund; grants 
from this fund are then matched with IDA or IBRD credits and offered to 
countries that are willing to invest these resources for RMNCAH-N. Apart 
from offering credits and grants, the GFF also works with governments to 
raise domestic financing, brings donors working in a country together to align 
their financial resources, and enlists private sector money (World Bank, 
2015). As of June 30, 2019, contributions to the GFF Trust Fund total 
US$992.8 million, of which $629 million is committed for 33 projects in 27 
countries and is combined with an additional $4.8 billion IDA/IBRD (World 
Bank, 2019).  
 
The governance of the GFF gives substantial decision-making authority to 
the Bank and the donors. At the heart of the GFF is an investors group, 
which mobilises financing, and within this group is the trust fund committee 
that decides which countries and projects are funded. The investors group 
consists of bilateral donors (7), UN agencies (4), global health initiatives (3), 
organisations representing private sector (3) and civil society (3), recipient 
countries (3) and private foundations (2) (GFF, 2019). However, the trust 
fund committee is composed only of those donors that contribute to the GFF 
Trust Fund (World Bank, 2015).Compared to its predecessor, the GFF does 
have advantages (Fernandes and Sridhar, 2017). It finances interventions 
across the RMNCAH-N continuum thereby benefiting women and children 
across each life stage. As a senior Bank health specialist recounted, “It is 
difficult to raise funds for strengthening health systems as it does not have a 
face. But RMNCAH-N does have a visual. It elicits an image of a 
malnourished woman and her crying child. This visual gets attention and 
helps to raise resources” (Konstermans, 2018). Furthermore, by specifically 
including adolescents, who have previously been overlooked, the GFF can 
tackle preventable and treatable sexual and reproductive health problems, 
resulting in health gains for this group in later years. The GFF also moves 
beyond interventions in service delivery, and finances other health system 
components across its country projects including human resources, 
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information systems (through civil registration and vital statistics and disease 
surveillance systems), governance (through support in reforms and fiduciary 
management) and essential medical products and technologies (through 
support in pharmaceutical reforms and procurement of medicines and 
equipments).  
Moreover, the GFF also finances multi-sectoral interventions (secondary 
education, water and sanitation, gender-based violence, social protection) 
which can aid the upstream determinants of health and lead to improvements 
in population health. Finally, the GFF has reported an increase in domestic 
resources mobilisation for maternal and child health in some of its 
programme countries: Cameroon has committed to raising its health budget 
allocation to primary health care from 8% to 22% by 2020; Liberia is planning 
to raise money for health through alcohol taxes; while Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone and Senegal are planning to raise domestic resources through sin 
taxes on tobacco products (World Bank, 2018).  
A recent publication in the BMJ (co-authored by staff from the World Bank, 
Gates Foundation and private sector consultants) estimated that raising $2.6 
billion for the GFF Trust Fund, by 2030, would lead to the mobilisation of $50-
$75 billion additional funds that would help to avert 34.7 million deaths – 
including preventable deaths of mothers, newborns, children and stillbirths 
(Chou et al., 2018). Despite the positive cases of domestic resource 
mobilisation and the overly-optimistic modelling by Chou et al. (2018), the 
total amount of additional financial resources, particularly those contributed 
by governments, mobilised under by the GFF model over the four-period 
(2015-2019) since its inception is unclear, which raises questions about its 
claims of being an innovative model for increasing resources (Usher, 2018). 
Another problematic aspect has been reported from Mozambique, wherein 
Bank-led revisions in the country’s health financing strategies planned within 
the framework of GFF funding include the introduction of user fees (MSF, 
2017; Ministrerio da Saude, 2014).  
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So far, the majority of private sector engagement in the GFF has come in the 
form of health service delivery, as reported in Cameroon, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Nigeria. However, the GFF has also attracted private 
financing through ‘performance loan buy-downs’ and ‘sustainable 
development bonds’ (World Bank, 2018; World Bank, 2019). The 
International Finance Corporation finances ‘performance loan buy-downs’, a 
grant used to buy down the interest on an IBRD loan on achievement of 
planned indicators. For instance, Guatemala has received a $10 million loan 
buy-down to service interest on $90 million in IBRD credits for child nutrition.  
Through sustainable development bonds, private investors can provide 
finance that is invested by the Bank in capital markets and in return, they 
receive interest payments and their money back at the end of a set period. 
These funds go to an IBRD pool that is made available by the GFF to middle-
income countries eligible for IBRD funding to access through loans and loan 
buy-down grants. So far, these bonds have raised CAD $1.2 billion from 
institutional and retail investors in Europe and Japan interested in social 
investments for maternal and child health. While employing private capital 
through bonds and loan-buy downs can be a novel way to increase financial 
resources for maternal and child health, these options need to be considered 
with caution (Stein, 2019). Bonds do follow priorities of where investors can 
earn the most, and not necessarily those of public health.  
Furthermore, profits generated from the bonds are lost to the private sector. If 
the government was using its own money to invest in health, it could use the 
profits for the public good. Both the bonds and loan buy-downs are only 
offered to countries eligible for IBRD lending, limiting access to resources by 
countries that do not meet this eligibility but have a high burden of maternal 
and child mortality and morbidity. Finally, involving the private sector to 
provide finance for health could be supplementary to sustainable strategies 
such as working with governments to improve and increase their general 
taxation or sin taxes (like in the cases of Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone 
and Senegal) and helping them regulate their private markets can be a more 
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sustainable financing route that would also result in country ownership to 
investments in the health sector. Another challenging aspect of the GFF is 
that it promotes the results-based financing mechanism, which has shown to 
have results that can be uncertain, expensive and ineffective (Paul et al., 
2018; Kandpal, 2016). Who stands accountable if planned health indicators 
are not achieved due to structural determinants including a weak health 
system? Will country governments have to forfeit the private capital 
investments or will community-level health workers have to pay the price 
through cuts in payments or incentives? These questions need to be 
reflected upon so that mitigation measures can be built into the GFF.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how the World Bank entered the global health 
landscape in the late 1960s and forayed into lending for maternal and child 
health (MCH) See figure 4.1 for a timeline of the key events in the World 
Bank’s involvement in maternal and child health from 1970 to 2019. I 
categorised the Bank’s involvement in MCH through its policies and 
programmes over the last five decades into five distinct phases starting form 
1960-1967, when the global population control movement expands in the 
1960s, amidst the context of eugenic legacies, which sets the stage for the 
Bank’s entry in this area. In the second phase (1968-1979), the Bank started 
lending for population control and nutrition projects in LMICS, often using 
existing MCH and nutrition programmes and to further its family planning 
goals in aid-recipient countries. In the third phase (1980-1989), the Bank 
decided to lend directly for health projects and identified MCH as one of its 
focus areas for lending; it collaborated with international agencies and played 
a key role in setting up three major global partnerships for MCH; and reforms 
that negatively affected the implementation of and access to MCH 
programmes.  
92   
Figure 4.1: Timeline of key events in the World Bank’s involvement in maternal and child health from 1970 to 2019 
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In the fourth phase (1990-1999), the Bank institutionalised a selective 
approach for MCH by promoting a package of cost-effective interventions 
through its influential World Development Report of 1993; revitalised the Safe 
Motherhood movement; and facilitated the Child Vaccine Initiative. In the fifth 
phase (2000-2019), the Bank played a founding role in three major global 
health initiatives for MCH, shifting from its traditional project-based financial 
support towards multi-donor trust funds and results-based financing.   
 
How did the Bank conceptualise maternal and child health over time? 
The World Bank’s conceptualisation of maternal and child health has evolved 
from being purely instrumental to achieve demographic goals and 
productivity to currently being intrinsic albeit along with the rationale for 
economic growth. Since 1968, under the presidency of Robert McNamara, 
HNP began funding population control and nutrition projects, which indirectly 
financed maternal and child health services. In the 1970s, maternal and child 
health had an instrumental rather than an intrinsic value at the Bank. Family 
planning services were funded with a rationale wherein pregnant women and 
mothers were viewed as conduits for reducing fertility that would control the 
population, raise living standards and ultimately contribute to economic 
growth. The Bank’s demographic agenda sharply contested individual 
reproductive rights. This demographic agenda, advanced through lending for 
population projects, viewed women rather than men as being responsible for 
reproductive behaviours, did not offer them with any choice of contraceptive 
methods and were, in many cases, coerced into sterilisation (Gupte, 2017; 
Connelly, 2005; Rao, 2004). Child health was considered important at the 
Bank as healthy children would become productive members of the country’s 
workforce, thereby increasing productivity and economic growth. When family 
planning projects failed to get acceptance from governments or in 
communities, nutrition projects were used as an uncontroversial gateway to 
increase the receptivity of mothers to advice on family planning (Sridhar, 
2016; Crane and Finkle, 1981; Berg, 1973). Thus, in these initial years, the 
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Bank viewed maternal and child health with an overriding concern with 
productivity and economic growth (Sridhar, 2011).  
 
In the 1980s, the Bank began directly funding maternal and child health 
services. It advocated a broader view of reducing maternal mortality as an 
ethical and socially just imperative (Storeng, 2010). However, towards the 
end of the 1980s, HNP specialists tried to adopt an intrinsic value for 
maternal health through the Safe Motherhood Initiative. While the Initiative 
earnestly argued for safe motherhood as an ethical, social justice and 
developmental imperative (Storeng, 2010), Bank documents also framed 
maternal mortality as impacting individuals through the loss of someone who 
would have otherwise contributed to the household through caring for 
children and family members, and the economy through productive labour 
(Herz and Measham, 1987). Thus, maternal health was still considered at the 
Bank as a vital social and economic investment rather than funding health as 
a right of the individual woman.  
In the early 1990s, however, following the International Conference on 
Population and Development, the Bank adopted the reproductive health 
approach, illustrating a shift in its thinking from population control and 
demographic targets towards individual choice and reproductive rights of the 
woman. In doing so, the Bank included in its policies and programmes not 
just mothers but all women of reproductive age, and also supported abortion 
services (wherever legal) as a reproductive right. While this new approach 
that the Bank adopted in its funded projects seemed to place an intrinsic 
value on the reproductive health of a woman, it was still grounded in fertility 
regulation. In its 1993 World Development Report, family planning services 
alone were stated as a necessary input to improve women’s health, and 
fertility control per se thus became the key to an essential health services 
package that the Bank promoted (World Bank,1993). 
Since 2000, the Bank had played a leading role in global health initiatives for 
maternal and child health. It has pulled together all its previous programme 
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elements from family planning and nutrition to maternal and child health, 
included adolescent health into this mix, and placed these within the larger 
continuum of RMNCAH-N: reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and 
adolescent health and nutrition. Through its Global Financing Facility, the 
Bank views RMNCAH-N as an entry point to achieving universal health 
coverage and health systems strengthening, as it finances multi-sectoral and 
cross-cutting interventions that go beyond health service delivery and target 
different components of the health system. Through global health initiatives 
like GAVI and the Global Financing Facility, the Bank frames maternal and 
child health as having an intrinsic value by focusing on saving lives of women 
and children. However, it continues to justify investments for this area using 
the rationale for economic growth. 
What can be said about the Bank’s financing approach for maternal and 
child health? 
Since the last decade, the Bank has also used innovative financing 
mechanisms as a strategy to maintain its influence in MCH as well as remain 
relevant and competitive in the current global health landscape. A prime 
example of its innovative financing mechanisms is results-based financing 
(RBF), wherein payments are released on the achievement of planned 
project outputs as against the traditional payments made to attain inputs. 
Even though internal Bank reviews and external assessments show that RBF 
carries risks, especially in countries with weak and fragile health systems, the 
Bank continues to promote this mechanism through the maternal and child 
health projects funded by its Global Financing Facility (GFF).  
 
Furthermore, while other innovative mechanisms like sustainable 
development bonds bring in private sector capital, these resources are 
pooled to finance credit (loans) or loan buy-downs which ultimately go back 
to the World Bank’s coffer (with the exception of grants). While the GFF has 
been technically supporting governments to increase their domestic 
resources for maternal and child health for the long term through 
mechanisms like budget reallocation, financial management and sin taxes, 
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domestic resource mobilisation needs to be the primary approach rather than 
a focus on pro-private solutions. However, if countries are supported to 
achieve complete financial self-sustenance for their health, the Bank’s role as 
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Chapter 5 Tracking the World Bank’s financial 
flows for reproductive, maternal and 
child health from 1970 to 2018 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I track the World Bank’s financial flows for reproductive, 
maternal, and child health (RMNCH) from 1970 to 2018. I will use these 
financial trends to discuss the Bank’s changing role in maternal and child 
health at the global level vis-à-vis its financial contributions, and comment on 
its evolving programmatic and financing approach for this area.  
This chapter has three parts. In the first part, I describe the global landscape 
of development assistance for RMNCH from 1990 to 2018, where the Bank 
features as a major financier. For this section, I use publically available 
financial data on the development assistance for RMNCH from 1990 to 2018 
from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2019a). Through 
an analysis of IHME data, I report how much financial resources was 
allocated for RMNCH, where it came from (i.e. major donors), and where it 
went (i.e. programmatic areas and recipient countries). I then analyse the 
RMNCH funding that was channelled through the Bank and report on similar 
themes; specifically, total financial disbursements, distribution of funds by 
donors, programmatic areas, and recipient countries.  
In the second part of the chapter, I examine the Bank’s own databases, and 
present an analysis of its financial flows for RMNCH from 1970 to 2018 
through its core budget and its extra-budgetary funding. Through its core 
budget, the Bank provides IDA and IBRD credits for health projects at the 
country level. Additionally, the Bank provides voluntary grants from its core 
budget for special health programmes executed at the regional and global 
level. For the country-level projects, I examined two databases on the World 
Bank website viz. the Project and Operations database and the Development 
Topics databases, and I included and analysed 484 RMNCH projects 
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approved from 1970 to 2018. I also examined the Bank’s annual financial 
contributions for its special health programmes, available from 1980 to 2014, 
and reported key trends related to grants for maternal and child health. The 
Bank also uses extra-budgetary funds to finance its health work. Donors, 
including bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and private foundations, 
voluntarily contribute these extra-budgetary funds, which are earmarked for 
specific regions and health priorities and held separately from the Bank’s 
core budget. These extra-budgetary funds are channelled through a lending 
mechanism known as trust funds, which have been on the rise since the 
early 1990s (Eichenauer and Knack, 2016). For this analysis of extra-
budgetary funds, I analysed two available Bank datasets with financial 
information on the three major types of trust funds. 
Consequently, through this analysis of the Bank’s core budget and extra-
budgetary funds, I report on how much financial resources have been 
allocated to RMNCH through country-level projects, special health 
programmes, and trust funds from 1970 to 2018, and where this money has 
gone i.e. programmatic areas, geographic regions, and recipient countries. 
Additionally, for the country-level projects, I also report findings on the Bank’s 
co-financing partner agencies, the interest rates and fees it charges recipient 
countries, and the proportion of repayments made by countries.   
In the third part of this chapter, I compare the Bank’s financial flows for 
RMNCH (as outlined in part two) with its total lending for the health, nutrition 
and population (HNP) sector and with its overall lending (IBRD+IDA) from 
1970 to 2018. This comparative analysis gives us a sense of the proportion 
of the Bank’s RMNCH lending to its total health sector and its overall budget, 
reflecting the significance that the Bank attaches to this health area. I have 
detailed the methods and limitations for each of these three parts of the 
financial analysis in the chapter three (Methods) of this thesis.    
I attempt to answer four key questions through this chapter: (i) What is the 
role of the World Bank in terms of financing for maternal and child health at 
the global level?; (ii) What does the Bank’s lending for maternal and child 
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health tell us about its conceptualisation of this area?; (iii) Is there a match 
between the countries that the Bank funds and the countries that actually 
have the largest burden of maternal and infant mortality?; and, (iv) What do 
these financing trends tell us about the Bank’s evolving approaches for 
financing maternal and child health?  
 
5.2 Global funding for reproductive, maternal and 
child health from 1990 to 2018: how much, where 
it comes from and where it goes 
 
In this first part of the chapter, I present the findings from the analysis of the 
development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 
(RMNCH) from 1990 to 2018 as extracted from the IHME dataset (IHME, 
2019a). Development assistance for health refers to the financial and in-kind 
contributions made by international institutions - such as bilateral aid 
agencies and private philanthropic foundations - to developing countries 
aimed at improving health outcomes (IHME, 2011). First, I report the key 
trends from the overall development assistance for RMNCH; specifically, total 
funding, major donors, programmatic areas and recipients. Second, I report 
similar trends from the total development assistance for RMNCH channelled 
through the World Bank.  
 
Overall development assistance for RMNCH from 1990 to 
2018 
 
Total development assistance  
RMNCH received 42% or $186 billion of the overall development assistance 
for health from 1990 to 2018. Of this total amount, newborn and child health 
received the major share (56%) as compared to reproductive and maternal 
health (44%). RMNCH funding has risen from 2003 onwards, with an annual 
increase of 5% since 2010.  
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Major channels  
RMNCH received funding through six major channels: (i) bilateral aid 
agencies, (ii) multilateral agencies, (iii) public-private partnerships, (iv) 
development banks, (v) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
foundations, and (vi) UN agencies. United States (U.S.) NGOs were the 
biggest channel for RMNCH with $39 billion or 21% of the total funding over 
time, while the Bank was the fifth largest channel for RMNCH funding with a 
total of $15 billion. 
Figure 5.1: Channels for development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn 
and child health, 1990-2018 (Source: IHME, 2019b) 
 
Major donors  
With $55 billion, the United States (U.S.) has been the single largest funder 
for RMNCH, representing 26% of the total development assistance for this 
health area over this 28-year period. In 2018, a total of $12.5 billion was 
allocated for RMNCH, representing 32% of the total development assistance 
for health. The U.S. continued to be the single largest funder, channelling 
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$2.9 billion (23.2%), followed by private foundations (excluding the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and corporate donations) with $1.5 billion (12%); 
the Gates Foundation with $1.31 billion (10.5%); and the United Kingdom 
(UK) with $1.28 billion (10.2%).  
Programmatic areas  
A programmatic area is essentially a theme or a type of programme that 
receives funding under a health (RMNCH) category. A review of the RMNCH 
funding across programme areas from 1990 to 2018 showed a shift in focus 
from family planning to vaccines. In the early 1990s, family planning received 
a major share of the overall RMNCH funding. In 1995, maternal health 
programmes received higher funding compared to family planning; this could 
be attributed to the influential International Conference for Population and 
Development in 1994, which promoted a shift from target driven family 
planning projects to comprehensive reproductive and maternal health efforts 
(Robinson and Ross, 2007). Post 1995, while family planning continued to 
remain a major area for RMNCH funding, health systems strengthening 
started to receive increased funding, especially towards the end of the 1990s. 
Since 2000, funding for vaccines witnessed a dramatic rise, mainly due to the 
rise of GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. In 2018, vaccines received the largest 
share of RMNCH funding ($2.8 billion or 22.5%), followed by health systems 
strengthening ($2.7 billion); maternal health programs ($1.4 billion); family 
planning ($1.3 billion) and nutrition ($1.1 billion).  
 
Geographic regions  
IHME coded the majority of the RMNCH funding (41%) under an 
‘unallocated’ geographic region, wherein it was not specified from the 
sources as to where the financial resources were allocated. Sub-Saharan 
Africa received the next highest share (20%; $42.2 billion), while $32.4 billion 
(15%) went to ‘Global’ projects. South Asia received $20.5 billion whereas 
the Latin America and Caribbean region was allocated $10.1 billion. North 
Africa and the Middle East region received $7.9 billion or 4% of the funding.  
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Major donors  
The biggest donor of RMNCH funding channelled through the Bank is the 
Bank itself. Debt repayment i.e. IDA or IBRD loans repaid by the recipient 
countries, was the largest source of development assistance for RMNCH 
channelled through the Bank (53% or $7.9 billion). Figure 5.3 presents the 
share of the total development assistance for RMNCH channelled through 
the Bank from each of the 28 sources (donors) from 1990 to 2018. The 
legend of the figure presents an ascending order of sources with the largest 
to the least share of contributions. IHME’s methodology report specifies that 
the data on the sources for Bank funding for RMNCH was obtained through 
personal correspondence with Bank operational analysts (IHME, 2019c). This 
type of information - i.e. the source of Bank lending for RMNCH - is not 
available on its own databases.  
 
Figure 5.3: Total development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn and 
child health channelled through the World Bank by sources (Source: The author has 
developed this figure based on an analysis of IHME data) 
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The Group of Seven (G7), which consists of most advanced economies in 
the world, also features as the top seven sources after the Bank’s debt 
repayments. The U.S. leads this group with a total contribution of $1.4 billion 
or 9%, followed by Japan ($1 billion, 7.2%), U.K ($739 million, 4.9%), 
Germany ($711 million, 4.7%), Canada ($586 million, 3.9%), France ($523 
million, 3.4%) and Italy (296 million, 1.9%). The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation started funding RMNCH in 2000, with a total of $94 million or 
0.6% of the overall RMNCH disbursement. China is another recent entrant, 
since 2008, with a total contribution of $54 million. Private sources reported 
less than a million for RMNCH. 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the annual RMNCH funding from 1990 to 2018 by the 
sources. In the legend of this figure, sources with the largest share of 
contributions are listed at the bottom moving towards sources with the least 
share of funding. While the share of RMNCH funding by the Bank’s debt 
repayments have generally stayed consistent, the contributions of bilateral 
donors have fluctuated over time. The highest annual contributions from the 
U.S. have been reported in 2004 ($114 million) and recently in 2017 ($158 
million). Japan has contributed an annual average of $40 million while the 
U.K. and Germany have allocated an average of $26 million each year. 
Although the share of funding by the U.K. has been rising from 2015, no 
funding has been reported by Germany in this four-year period. Canada 
increased its RMNCH funding since 2010, contributing between $30 million to 
$70 million since 2010. Norway’s total funding for RMNCH from 1990 to 2018 
was $139 million with an annual average contribution of $5 million. I further 
examined which programme areas received financial contributions by each of 
the major sources (donors). The U.S. provided the majority of the RMNCH 
funding for family planning from 1990 to 2018 ($14 million or 11% of the total 
assistance for this component), followed by Canada ($13 million). In the case 
of child nutrition, which received a total of $2.7 billion of development 
assistance, the top four donors were the U.S. ($210 million), Japan ($172 
million), U.K ($107 million), and Germany ($105 million). 
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For child vaccines, the majority of funding was reported from the Gates Foundation 
($66 million), followed by Japan ($14 million), and Germany ($13 million). Canada 
funded $81 million or 15% of the total contributions for health systems strengthening, 
making it the largest funder of this component, followed by Sweden ($65 million) and 
Australia ($23 million). While the Gates Foundation contributed $16 million for health 
systems strengthening, the U.K and U.S. allocated $14 million respectively, for this 
component.  
 
Programmatic areas  
Around 71% ($11.6 billion out of the total $15 billion) of the development assistance 
for RMNCH channelled through the Bank was categorised under the programmatic 
area of ‘Other’. Child nutrition received the next biggest share of 18% of the RMNCH 
funding ($2.7 billion), followed by maternal health ($574 million, 4%), health systems 
strengthening ($479 million, 3%), and childhood vaccines ($285 million, 2%). Family 
planning received $126 million (0.84%) while human resources got 0.47% or $70 
million of the total RMNCH funding.  
 
Recipients - geographic regions and countries  
South Asia received the largest share (30%) of the RMNCH funding channelled 
through the Bank from 1990 to 2018, totalling to $4.5 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America and the Caribbean regions were the second and third largest 
recipients in this time period with $3.8 billion (25%) and $3.1 billion (21%) 
respectively. South East Asia received a total of $784 million while North Africa and 
the Middle East region was allocated $760 million. Global projects (with no specified 
geographic regions) received $617 million was allocated to global projects.  
 
A closer look at the annual RMNCH funding by geographic regions reveals three key 
findings (see figure 5.5). First, while South Asia started as the biggest recipient for 
the Bank’s RMNCH funding, it was taken over by Sub-Saharan Africa after 2000. 
Second, Latin America and the Caribbean region, which has a comparatively lesser 
burden of maternal and child mortality than South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
received some of the largest annual RMNCH funding over the last 15 years. In 2003, 
this region received $502 million, which is the highest ever annual RMNCH funding 
for any region. Third, RMNCH funding for North Africa and the Middle East region 
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has been growing, especially since 2012, possibly driven by conflicts and 
humanitarian crises.  
 
Figure 5.5: Development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 
channelled through the World Bank by geographic regions from 1990-2018 (in USD millions) 




See figure 5.6 for the top ten country recipients with the highest overall RMNCH 
funding channelled through the Bank. India received the highest overall Bank funding 
for RMNCH, with $2.6 billion (17%), followed by Argentina ($1.2 billion), Bangladesh 
($1.1 billion), Brazil ($0.47 billion), and China ($0.44 billion). Five countries from this 
top ten list are middle-income countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia and 
Peru) while two are low-income countries with fast growing economies (India and 
Nigeria). Many of these top ten recipient countries have also received the highest 
overall development assistance for health. Nearly half (45%) of the overall 
development assistance for health for top recipients such as Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh and Nigeria, went towards RMNCH. Is there a coherence or a match 
between the top aid recipient countries and the countries that have the highest 
burden of maternal and infant mortality? Table 5.1 helps to answer this question. 
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Figure 5.6: Top ten recipient countries with highest overall DAH and development assistance 
for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health channelled through the World Bank from 




Countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan have a high number 
of maternal and infant deaths and they need financial priority to tackle this burden. 
However, Indonesia is a middle-income country while India is an emerging economy, 
and both countries can most definitely fund RMNCH programmes through their 
domestic resources rather than external funds, if they have the political will. 
Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the highest maternal and infant 
mortality rates. Yet, Nigeria, a fast growing economy, is the only country from this 
region that received a large amount of Bank funding for RMNCH. Sub-Saharan 
countries like Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, and Chad, which have some of 
the highest maternal and infant mortality rates in the world, received less than 1% of 
the overall development assistance for RMNCH funding ($12.1 million, $12.7 million, 
and $86 million, respectively). Similarly, Somalia, which has the sixth and third 
highest rates of maternal and infant mortality in the world, only received $0.1 million 
or 0.001% of the overall RMNCH funding. Finally, Latin American and middle-income 
countries like Argentina, Brazil and Peru, have comparatively lower rates of maternal 
and infant mortality, and yet, have received the highest amounts of external funding 
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In the 1970s, Bank lending was solely focused on population control and a handful of 
nutrition projects. A tenfold increase in Bank commitment and disbursement for 
RMNCH projects was observed in the next decade (the 1980s), which could be 
explained the Bank’s policy decision to start lending for stand-alone health projects 
with a focus on financing maternal and child health services, as well as the Bank’s 
Safe Motherhood Initiative in 1987. Bank lending for RMNCH projects witnessed an 
eightfold rise in the 1990s. In the year 1998, Bank commitment ($1.27 billion) was as 
much as what it committed in the previous decade from 1980 to 1989. In 2003, the 
Bank committed and disbursed its highest ever amount for RMNCH to the tune of 
$2.2 billion. In the last eight years, the Bank’s commitments declined by 10% from 
the previous decade; however, this apparent decline could be due to incomplete or 
ongoing financial reporting in the database. Over time, while the total amount of 
Bank lending for RMNCH projects increased with every passing decade, the 
proportional rise between the decades declined. 
 
Source of the Bank’s financial flows for RMNCH 
Within the Bank itself, the financial resources for country-level projects come from 
IDA, IBRD, or a blend of resources from both these units. IDA funded the majority 
(60%) of the Bank’s commitments for RMNCH projects from 1970 to 2018, while 
IBRD funded 37% (see figure 5.8). While IBRD did increase its funding between 
2000-2009 owing to loans made to middle-income countries in Latin America, it 
appears that RMNCH projects will continue to receive a bulk of their funding from 
IDA, as the majority of the burden of maternal and child mortality lies in poor 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia served by IDA. 
 
Figure 5.8: World Bank commitments for MCH projects over time by funding sources of IDA 
and IBRD   
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Organisations that co-financed RMNCH projects with the Bank 
Each of the RMNCH projects analysed in this chapter have been financed either 
entirely by the Bank or in collaboration with other partner organisations including the 
borrower country governments, bilateral aid agencies such as USAID, DFID, and 
Norwegian Agency for International Development, development banks such as 
African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank, UN agencies such as 
WHO and UNICEF, and trust funds (see table 5.3). Additionally, there were sources 
that were unidentified in the database. For this segment, I only analysed 
disbursement data, as some co-financiers only reported disbursement and not 
commitment.  
 
Two-thirds (61%) of all the RMNCH project costs at appraisal (i.e. $68 billion) from 
1970-2018, came from co-financiers despite these being Bank-led projects. 
Worldwide, borrower governments contributed the largest share (73%) of the 
disbursements by co-financiers as well as 46% of the total project costs. In South 
Asia, borrower governments were the biggest financers of RMNCH projects, 
contributing 64% ($18.4 billion), while the Bank disbursed 36% of the total project 
costs ($24.6 billion of $68.5 billion). However, in the Middle East and North Africa 
(72%, or $1.1 billion) and the Latin America and the Caribbean region (61%, or $7.4 
billion), the Bank provided the majority of the disbursements. 
 
Bilateral agencies were the third major co-financiers of the total project costs after 
borrowing governments and the World Bank, disbursing a total of $4.2 billion. The 
United Kingdom’s DFID was the leading bilateral co-financier, with a total 
disbursement of $921 million, followed by the government agencies of Netherland 
($175 million), Sweden ($124), Australia ($138 million), and Norway ($105). The next 
major shares of co-financing came from unidentified sources ($3.8 billion) and trust 
funds ($2.5 billion) such as the Global Financing Facility, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. Trust funds were most 
active in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing a total of $763 million and 
$1 billion in disbursements. UN agencies contributed less than 1% ($171 million) of 
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Figure 5.10: HNP’s commitments for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 
channelled through the World Bank from 1970-2018 by thematic areas (in USD millions) 
  
 
In the 1980s, while the Bank continued to fund population control and nutrition 
projects, it also forayed into financing stand-alone health projects and within this, it 
financed the programme areas of health systems strengthening and RMNCH 
services. Projects that funded RMNCH services emphasised the provision of family 
planning. Additionally, 12% of RMNCH projects in this decade, included cost 
recovery or user fees in their strategy, in that user fees were instituted in government 
health policy and implemented at the secondary or tertiary-level health care facilities. 
 
Three key trends emerged from the Bank’s financing for RMNCH projects in the 
1990s. First, these projects started funding infectious disease control activities, 
particularly for HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis. Second, the share for health systems 
strengthening increased to $3 billion. The early projects that financed health systems 
strengthening activities funded building of health facilities, medical equipments, 
vehicles, and training of health care workers, and in some cases, supply of 
medicines. In the later part of this decade, these projects financed the development 
of health information, procurement and management systems. Third, population 
control received its largest ever share of financial commitment - $1.78 billion -, which 
was more than that allocated to RMNCH services ($1.5 billion). Five out of 121 
projects in this decade also financed water and sanitation, education and early child 
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development. Between 2000 and 2009, health systems strengthening received the 
highest commitment with $5 billion. Commitment for infectious disease control 
activities also increased substantially to $2.9 billion. However, the share of RMNCH 
services declined slightly to $1.2 billion. Population control activities received its 
lowest ever commitment ($69 million), while child immunisation was allocated $495 
million. In the last eight years (2010-2018), ‘health systems strengthening’ continued 
to receive the majority of the Bank’s commitment ($3.8 billion), followed by RMNCH 
services ($3.6 billion). Projects that financed health system strengthening in this 
decade, implemented reforms in health financing and human resources. This period 
also recorded the highest ever commitment for nutrition-focused projects ($1.1 
billion). None of the projects in this period funded any population control activities. 
 
Recipients – geographic regions and countries 
South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean regions received the highest 
overall commitment for RMNCH with $8.9 billion and $8 billion respectively, followed 
by Sub-Saharan Africa with $7.6 billion. In terms of the overall disbursement, the 
Latin America and Caribbean region recorded the highest overall amount with $7.3 
billion followed by South Asia ($6.7 billion), Sub-Saharan Africa ($5.8 billion), East 
Asia and Pacific ($2.6 billion), Middle East and North Africa ($1.1 billion) and Europe 
and Central Asia ($800 million).  
 
Figure 5.11 presents a break-up of the Bank commitments for RMNCH for each of 
the six geographic regions by each decade. In the first decade of lending, the 
majority of the Bank commitment ($65 million; 55%) went to the East Asia and 
Pacific region, through population projects in Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. 
Between 1980 and 1989, the biggest share of Bank commitment (29%) went to the 
regions of Latin America and the Caribbean ($363 million) and South Asia ($360 
million). Brazil and Colombia received major commitments in the Latin America and 
the Caribbean region in this period, while India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were the 
major South Asian recipients. Additionally, in this decade, commitments for the 
Middle East and North Africa region dropped to $4 million from $30 million in the 
previous decade. Between 1990 and 1999, overall Bank commitments rose and 
South Asia emerged as the biggest recipient of funds ($3.1 billion; 41%) followed by 
the Sub-Saharan Africa ($1.3 billion) and East Asia and Pacific ($1.3 billion) regions. 
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Figure 5.12: World Bank commitments and disbursements for maternal and child health 




Some of the major recipient countries with the highest overall Bank funding for 
RMNCH projects (such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan) have a high 
number of maternal and infant deaths and require financial investments in this area. 
However, countries from the Latin American region including Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru have a comparatively lesser burden of maternal and infant mortality (MMEIG, 
2019; UNICEF, 2019), and yet, they received high amounts of Bank funding. 
Furthermore, middle-income Latin American recipients, as well as countries like 
China and India, have growing economies and could very well fund RMNCH 
programmes with their domestic resources rather than external funds from the Bank. 
Most importantly, several Sub-Saharan African countries (with the exception of 
Nigeria), which have some of the highest maternal and infant mortality rates in the 
world, do not receive Bank funding commensurate with their burden of disease. The 
countries in this region are also poor and have had a slow rate of repayment on their 
loans (7% of all their loans have been repaid so far). This finding raises the question 
about whether Bank funding matches with the burden of disease or the country’s 
ability to repay loans.      
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RMNCH commitment ($2.3 billion). Between 2003 and 2005 all the structural 
adjustment loan projects, except one to India in 1992, went to Latin American and 
the Caribbean countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican 
Republic and Peru. The structural adjustment and development policy loans together 
represented $3.2 billion (10.4%) of the overall RMNCH commitment. Emergency 
recovery loans were channelled in the last ten years, most of them released for 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, The 
Gambia, and Liberia. While only five projects were financed through the Program-for 
Results mechanism, the commitment for these projects was comparatively high at 
$1.1 billion. Since 2013, the Bank has been using the ‘Program-for-Results’ 
instrument for projects in Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania and Vietnam, 
channelling almost $1 billion over a span of five years. 
 
Interest and charges on Bank disbursements for RMNCH projects 
The Bank charged an overall $4 billion in interests and fees on its total lending of 
$24.4 billion for RMNCH projects (excluding grants of $219 million) (see figure 5.13). 
In its first decade of lending, interests and fees constituted 46% ($46 million) of the 
total amount disbursed ($101 million). In the next decade, these charges constituted 
29% of the total lending. Interest and charges as a percentage of the total lending 
have relatively declined in the next three decades: 24% during 1990-1999, 17% 
during 2000-2009, and 4% during 2010-2018.  
 
Figure 5.13: World Bank disbursements (without grants) and interest, charges and fees from 
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Repayments by borrower countries   
Borrowing country governments have repaid $8.6 billion (i.e. 35%) of the total Bank 
disbursements for RMNCH projects ($24.4 billion). Countries have repaid 80% of the 
Bank disbursements from 1970 to 1979.For the next decade, countries have repaid 
71% of the total Bank disbursements. Repayments by borrower countries as a 
percentage of the total disbursement reduced with each decade after: 55% during 
1990-1999, 37% during 2000-2009, and 3% during 2010-2018 (see figure 5.14). 
  
Figure 5.14: World Bank disbursements (without grants) and repayments by borrower 
governments from 1970 to 2018 (in USD million) 
 
 
Table 5.5 details repayments by geographic regions. While the Latin America and 
the Caribbean region received the highest disbursement, as well as interest and 
other charges, countries in this region also repaid 55% of their total loans. Similarly, 
countries in the regions of Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and Pacific also 
repaid half of their loans (56% and 49% respectively). South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa were charged a lower amount of interest and fees (13% and 7% of total 
disbursements) compared to other regions. Borrower countries in the South Asia 
region repaid a third of their Bank loans (29%), while countries in the Sub-Saharan 
African region paid back 7% of their loans. 


   
  125 
5.3.2 Core Budget: Special Health Programmes 
Apart from lending for country-level projects, the Bank also provided grant-based 
funding for special health programmes that were implemented at the global or 
regional level, in many cases with technical assistance from the WHO. In the 1980s, 
the Bank started the Special Grants Programme that released grants for projects in 
agriculture and health among other development areas (World Bank, 1985). In 1998, 
the Bank consolidated its grant making in a single mechanism under the 
Development Grant Facility. This Facility releases grants using the IBRD 
administrative budget, which makes it part of the Bank’s core budget (World Bank, 
2014).  
 
The Bank released grants amounting to $106.57 million for special maternal and 
child health-related programmes from 1987 to 2014 (see table 5.7). The Special 
Grants Programmes released grants worth $35.42 million, while the Development 
Grant Facility ($71.15 million) funded the rest. Information for the financial 
contributions by the Development Grant Facility is only available up to 2014.  
 
Half of the all the grant money ($50.81 million) was allocated to the Special 
Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human 
Reproduction, which is housed in the WHO. The Population and Reproductive 
Health Capacity Building Program, which was the next biggest recipient of grants 
($37.72 million), built the capacity of civil society organisations to develop and 
implement culturally appropriate interventions for population and reproductive health.  
While the annual reports of the Development Grant Facility provided the annual 
financial contributions for these special RMNCH programmes, there was no further 
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Major donors 
Information about donors was only available for the IBRD/IDA trust funds. Four of the 
seven G7 countries–UK, Germany, Canada and Italy–feature as top donors of the 
IBRD/IDA trust funds (figure 5.16). This list also features private entities including the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ($162 million; 14%) and private not-profit 
organisations ($29 million or 3%). The U.S., which is the biggest global donor for 
RMNCH, did not contribute through Bank trust funds, while other major bilateral 
donors like the U.K, Germany, France, Canada and Italy prefer this mechanism. 
 
Figure 5.16: Total financial contributions for MCH-related IBRD/IDA trust funds by donor  
 
Programmatic and geographic areas  
Child vaccines received the highest amount of financial resources from trust funds 
($656 million), followed by health systems strengthening ($390 million), RMNCH 
services ($279 million) and family planning ($131 million). South Asia received the 
majority (55%, $597 million) of the funding for IBRD/IDA trust funds, while Sub-
Saharan Africa received 2.6% or $29 million of these funds. Nearly 26% of the funds 
from IBRD/IDA trust funds and GAVI trust fund did not provide information where the 
money was allocated. This lack of information on the geographic distribution of trust 
funds is problematic in that it lacks transparency, is difficult to track and 
consequently ultimately affects accountability. 
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overall financial commitments for RMNCH as a share of the Bank’s health sector 
lending highlights the significance of this area for the Bank.  
Within the Bank, the health sector claims a relatively small proportion of its overall 
financial commitments ($57 billion or 5.4% of $1059 billion). Over time, health sector 
commitments as a proportion of the Bank’s overall lending rose from 0.6% in 1970-
1979 to 6.7% in 2010-2018. The Bank’s overall lending (IBRD+IDA) has risen from 
$57 billion in 1970-1979 to $387 billion in 2010-2018. Although health forms a minor 
share of the Bank’s total spending, it has been on the rise and so has the Bank’s 
overall IBRD and IDA commitments. If the share of Bank spending for the health 
sector grows, so does RMNCH. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
What is the role of the World Bank in terms of financing reproductive, 
maternal, newborn and child health at the global level? 
The World Bank is the fifth largest channel for development assistance for 
reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH) in the world, disbursing 
a total of $15 billion from 1990 to 2018. This is an estimate from IHME data. As per 
the Bank’s own databases, it disbursed an overall $26.1 billion from 1970 to 2018. 
The discrepancy in the estimates from these two sources can be explained by two 
reasons. First, IHME data covered a time period of 1990 to 2018, while the Bank 
data covered a longer duration (i.e. 1970 to 2018). Second, the Bank data included 
both core budget and its extra-budgetary funding, while the IHME data only included 
funding from the Bank’s core budget. Regardless of the difference in the estimates 
and methodologies used to derive them, globally, the Bank remains a major external 
financier for RMNCH. Even within the Bank, RMNCH holds a significant position in 
its health sector financing: 53% of the Bank’s total health sector lending went to 
RMNCH. Despite representing a small share of global financial lending compared to 
private capital flows (Ravallion, 2015), World Bank lending has been increasing in 
absolute terms. This means that developing countries will continue to look towards 
the World Bank for financial resources, indicating its complementarity rather than 
substitutability in the financial market and - more importantly - its relevance as a 
major financial player for RMNCH.    
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While the Bank is a major funder for RMNCH, who funds the Bank? 
IHME data showed that debt repayments from borrowing countries funded half (53%; 
$7.9 billion of $15 billion) of the Bank’s overall disbursements for RMNCH projects 
from 1990 to 2018. Borrowing countries also co-financed 46% of the overall RMNCH 
project costs while the Bank, bilateral aid and UN agencies and other development 
banks funded the rest. Borrowing countries are thus the major financiers of Bank-
funded RMNCH projects. This is directly, through their financial contributions towards 
the overall project costs, as well as indirectly, through their debt servicing to the 
Bank that is channelled towards project financing. Bilateral aid agencies were the 
second biggest source of funding for RMNCH projects channelled through the Bank. 
The U.S. was the leading bilateral donor with $1.4 billion or 9% of the overall Bank 
disbursement, followed by Japan (7%; $1.2 billion) and the U.K (5%; $739 million).  
 
This analysis also showed how donors have differing preferences for financing 
channels and programmatic priorities. For instance, major donors like the U.S. prefer 
to fund RMNCH through country-level projects, whereas donors like the U.K. and 
Norway prefer both country-level projects as well as trust funds. Moreover, the U.S. 
financial contributions for RMNCH mostly went towards selective interventions in 
family planning and nutrition, while Canada and Sweden, for example, mainly funded 
health systems strengthening programmes. 
 
What does the Bank’s lending for RMNCH over time tell us about its 
conceptualisation of this area?  
The Bank focused on population control in the first decade of its lending for RMNCH 
projects, financing physical infrastructure and service delivery for family planning. 
Following the adoption of its 1980 policy to invest in standalone health projects, the 
Bank began lending for projects that financed nutrition and RMNCH services. 
Offering maternal and child health services seemed to make family planning more 
palatable to the borrower country governments as well as the communities that the 
projects served. Towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, Bank-funded RMNCH 
projects started financing health systems strengthening activities. This early version 
of the Bank’s health system strengthening activities financed building of physical 
infrastructure, medical equipments and vehicles, training of health workers, and 
maternal and child health service delivery. Health systems strengthening also 
 132 
included health information and management systems in the late 1990s. In 2000-
2009, RMNCH projects were used as a platform to fund infectious disease control, 
particularly HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In recent decade (2010-2018), most of the 
RMNCH projects funded health systems strengthening activities, which also included 
reforms for health financing and human resources in its remit.  
 
Three insights emerge from this thematic analysis of the Bank’s country-level 
projects. First, the Bank used the maternal and child health platform to advance 
selective aspects of family planning, nutrition, and infectious disease control in the 
first three decades of its lending. While the funding for family planning and infectious 
disease control declined in the recent years, nutrition continued to get financial 
support, with its highest overall commitment of $1.1 billion reported in 2010-2018. 
Nutrition also received increased interest in the recent years by former Bank 
President Jim Kim (Taylor, 2017), and has been associated as a driver for economic 
development and thereby a key component of the Bank’s human capital project 
(Verburg, 2019). Maternal and child health will thus continue to be viewed as a 
channel that is visual enough to provoke empathy and garner support to advance 
other health interests including nutrition, health systems strengthening and universal 
health coverage.  
 
Second, the Bank has moved beyond its initial focus on demographic goals through 
family planning, and is now funding a comprehensive approach in relation to its 
emphasis on health systems strengthening. Within its health systems strengthening 
activities, the Bank has evolved from financing physical infrastructure, training of 
health workers, and service delivery, to include broader and underfunded 
components such as health information and management systems, and reforms for 
health financing and human resources. This move falls in line with the Bank’s 
renewed strategic focus on health system strengthening (World Bank, 2007).  
Third, since the 1990s, the Bank has included projects in education, water and 
sanitation, and social safety, in its databases as RMNCH projects. This classification 
could either indicate the Bank’s growing adoption of a multi-sectoral approach for 
improving maternal and child health or an internal error in project coding in its 
   
 133 
databases. The increasing number and corresponding financial commitments for 
these multi-sectoral projects over time would appear to support the former argument.  
 
Is there a match between the countries that the Bank funds and the countries 
with the highest burden of maternal and infant mortality?  
Sub-Saharan Africa and South-Asia have the highest burden of maternal and child 
deaths in the world. India and Nigeria account for nearly 20% of all the maternal and 
child deaths. India and Nigeria were also among the top ten recipients of Bank 
funding for RMNCH projects. Most of the top ten recipients were lower-middle-
income countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia) with high 
numbers of maternal and infant deaths in absolute terms. This reflects a certain level 
of alignment of resource allocation with the burden of maternal and child mortality.  
However, countries like India, Indonesia, and Nigeria are fast growing economies 
and could finance their maternal and child health programmes using domestic 
resources rather reliance on external funding from the Bank. Furthermore, this list of 
major recipients also features upper-middle income countries including Argentina, 
Brazil, China, and Peru, which have a relatively lesser burden of maternal and child 
mortality compared to Sub-Saharan African low-income countries like Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Chad, Mali and Somalia. These high-burden countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, have received less than 1% of the Bank’s overall resources for 
RMNCH. This misalignment raises the concern that Bank funding for RMNCH hinges 
on the economic status of the borrowing country and its ability to repay credits 
(concessional loans) rather than the health burden.  
Countries that need financial support to improve their RMNCH status are low-income 
nations, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have not received 
adequate financing commensurate with their maternal and child health burden. Even 
with the existing credits they have received, their repayment rates are low. 
Furthermore, grants constitute a miniscule share of the overall Bank funding to these 
high-burden countries. The Bank maintains and expands its revenues through profits 
from its primary service of lending. This finding reflects the tension of the Bank to 
stay relevant in the business of lending while also tending to the needs of low-
income countries with a high burden of maternal and child mortality and deficient 
fiscal capacity to repay loans with interest.  
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What do these financial trends tell us about the Bank’s current approach for 
financing maternal and child health? 
Traditionally, the Bank financed RMNCH through country-level projects wherein 
credits and grants were disbursed, and project outputs and in some cases, outcomes 
were monitored. Since the last two decades, the Bank has adopted two new 
financing approaches for RMNCH i.e. trust funds and results-based financing 
mechanism (also promoted through the instrument of Program for Results). 
Increasing Bank contributions through trust funds signal a move from country-level 
project based financing towards trust funds. What does this shift mean? The Bank 
funds it country-level projects through its core budget of IBRD and IDA credits, 
wherein donors replenish funds, which are allocated to borrower countries based on 
their needs. In the case of trust funds, donors voluntarily contribute grants towards 
areas that they prioritise, which may not necessarily match the needs of the recipient 
countries that get the allocated resources. This finding highlights the need for 
safeguards and checks to ensure that funds, channelled through the core budget or 
extra budgetary mechanisms, must first serve the needs of the communities in the 
borrower countries.   
 
Next, the recent rise in the number of Bank-funded RMNCH projects funded through 
‘Program for Results’ (PforR), an instrument that links disbursements with the 
achievement of results, is telling about its financing approach for this area. Since 
2013, the Bank has approved five PforR projects for RMNCH with an overall 
commitment of $1.1 billion. PforR projects also command an increasing share of the 
Bank’s overall lending; as of April 2019, there were 99 active PforR operations 
totalling $40.3 billion of Bank financing (World Bank, 2019). As compared to the two 
commonly used instruments of ‘Investment Project Financing’ and ‘Development 
Policy Financing’, the financing instrument of PforR is being lauded as an innovative 
mechanism for addressing the changing needs of the borrowing clients, as it goes 
beyond just measuring proofs of expenditures or reforms, but actually measures 
results making it attractive for both donors and client countries (Liverani, 2018; 
Sadaah, 2015).  
 
While this ‘innovative’ mechanism of results-based financing promoted through the 
PforR instrument could help the Bank stay relevant in an increasing competitive 
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lending market, it should be implemented with caution. The Bank’s own evaluation of 
results based financing for RMNCH projects (Kandpal, 2016) showed that while 
service coverage increased and quality of care improved, it did not lead to the 
planned maternal and child health outcomes. Furthermore, external evaluations 
found results based financing projects to be expensive, uncertain and ineffective. 
Finally, formulating disbursement-linked indicators requires competence, especially 
on the part of the borrowing government. The Bank’s own internal review of PforR 
(World Bank, 2015) found that governments often found this process challenging and 
required capacity building. Moreover, achieving planned results on time requires a 
certain level of competence, adherence to standards and resources. Despite prior 
agreements, borrowing governments can find it challenging to deal with structural 
issues like corruption, which can hinder implementation and affect the results. While 
immediate outputs can be monitored while the project is being implemented, 
measuring results can take time. Although, a positive finding is that recently, in 2017, 
the Bank acknowledged that more research was needed to assess the effectiveness 
of results based financing schemes; most importantly, it recognised that the impact 
of such a mechanism will ultimately depend on contextual conditions in each country 
(World Bank, 2017). 
 
Is there an alignment between the Bank’s policies and programmes and its 
financial flows for maternal and child health over the last five decades? 
In my analysis of the World Bank’s policies and programmes for maternal and child 
health (MCH) over the last five decades (chapter four) and the Bank’s financial flows 
for this area for the same period (chapter five), I found an alignment over key 
findings. First, both these sources confirmed the Bank’s initial focus on population 
control and nutrition in the 1970s. In the next decade, the Bank’s policies and 
financial flows signalled an increase in overall lending for stand-alone health projects 
that funded MCH services. The Bank’s Safe Motherhood Initiative launched in 1987 
was followed up with an increase in lending for MCH projects. Further, as the Bank 
promoted structural adjustment policies in its seminal reports in the 1980s, the 
financial dataset also showed that nearly 12% of projects in this decade included 
cost recovery through user fees; highlighting further alignment between its policies 
and practice. Since 2000, with the advent of GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, the Bank’s 
lending for immunisation projects began to rise. Finally, since 2010, Bank has 
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promoted trust funds and the mechanism of results-based financing for MCH, which 
are also clearly reflected in its increased financial flows through trust funds and 
projects under ‘Program for Results’ ($1.1 billion over a span of five years). While 
this linkage between chapters four and five demonstrate an alignment between the 
Bank’s technical policies and programmes and its funding for maternal and child 
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India is the biggest client of the World Bank. This client-lender relationship can be 
traced back to the creation of the World Bank in 1944, when the Indian delegation 
played a key role in shaping the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development and its sister organisation, the International 
Monetary Fund, in ways that would include the interests of developing countries 
(Zanini, 2001). In 1949, the Bank approved its first loan for a railway project in the 
country. Almost a decade later, in 1957, the Bank set up its first Resident Country 
Office in New Delhi (World Bank, 1957). By 1958, loans to India represented 10% of 
the Bank’s overall lending (Kraske, 1997). India’s need for long-term, low-cost, and 
flexible financing provided the Bank with a major impetus to set up the International 
Development Association in 1960 (Kapur et al., 1997). Even the concept of the 
Bank’s highly criticised structural adjustment loans stemmed from its failed 
negotiations with the Indian government in 1966 over leveraging lending to modify 
macro-economic policies (Lele and Bumb, 1995). Between 1945 and 2019, India 
was the largest recipient of Bank loans, including its lending for health projects - 
amounting to an overall $115 billion in IBRD and IDA credits (World Bank, 2015). 
Over time, this client-lender relationship has seen its share of ups and downs, and 
transformed from aid-dependence towards a cautious partnership (Kirk, 2010).  
In this chapter, I will discuss this evolution of the India-Bank relationship vis-à-vis the 
health sector and the area of maternal and child health from the origins of the Bank 
in the 1940s to the present. I present the India-Bank relationship across four 
historical phases, and in each phase, I describe the key events, including policies, 
programmes and financing. While this chapter is not a comprehensive history of the 
India-Bank relationship, it offers a background to situate the Bank within the maternal 
and child health (MCH) landscape of India. More importantly, it provides a context to 
explore and examine the Bank’s influence in MCH vis-à-vis the Reproductive and 
Child Health project.  
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This chapter discusses the India-Bank relationship through four phases: (1) 
Independent India (1947-1969), (2) Population control years (1970 – 1990), (3) 
Economic liberalisation (1991- 2004) and (4) Post National Rural Health Mission 
(2005-present). Each phase is characterised by an important political or socio-
economic event in the country. The first phase begins in 1947 when India gained 
independence from British rule and determined the future path for its public health 
system and MCH for the next few decades. This phase also marks the Bank’s entry 
in India, through its lending for development projects as well as its influence over the 
country’s economic policy. Phase two commenced in 1970 when the Bank began 
lending for population control, thereby foraying into the Indian health sector. The 
third phase starts in 1991 when the government of India embarked on an economic 
liberalisation programme based on the Bank’s structural adjustment loans, which had 
a deep impact on its health sector.  
The final phase began in 2005 when the government of India launched the National 
Rural Health Mission, a historic effort to increase the national health budget, expand 
public health infrastructure and improve MCH; the launch of this mission also marked 
a change in the India-Bank relationship. I conclude the chapter by summarising the 
Bank and the Indian government’s approach for MCH in the country, thereby setting 
the stage for the analysis of the Reproductive and Child Health project in Chapter 7. 
Here, I have synthesised data from relevant published articles, books, publically 
available reports from the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and 
publically available reports, interviews, oral histories, and financial datasets from the 
World Bank.  
Some existing scholarship has described the history of the World Bank in India 
(Prabhu, 2016; Kirk, 2010; Dash, 2000), and critically commented on the Bank’s role 
in the Indian health sector; e.g., its lending for family planning, nutrition and 
HIV/AIDS programmes (Sridhar, 2008; Qadeer 2008, 2001; Rao, 1999; Banerji, 
1994). Through this chapter, I add to this growing literature by presenting a historical 
account of the Bank’s work in MCH in India over five decades, and also argue how 
the Bank’s role in this area cannot be understood without appreciating its broader 
involvement in the economy, politics and governance, and health system of the 
country 
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6.1 Phase 1: Independent India (1947 to 1968) 
 
Maternal and child health services in independent India  
In the 20th century, prior to Indian independence, maternal and child health services 
were predominantly delivered through three routes viz. women medical missionaries 
from the U.S. and the U.K. (Harrison, 1994; Balfour and Young, 1929), charitable 
trusts by colonial philanthropists (Lal, 1994), and health facilities set up by Indian 
social reformers and philanthropists (Ramana, 2007). Despite the growing number of 
health facilities, the access to maternal and child health services continued to be 
restricted due to poverty, caste discrimination, long distances to reach urban based 
medical institutions, and the systematic discrimination of women in a patriarchal 
society (Lal, 1994). After gaining independence in 1947, the Indian government 
embarked on an ambitious programme for providing health for all its citizens, with 
primary health care at the heart of this plan, despite severe financial constraints and 
colossal dimensions of health problems (Rao, 2017; Banerji, 1994).  
The 1943 Bhore Committee Report, an authoritative document on the health system 
in independent India (Duggal, 1991), recommended an NHS-styled public funded 
health system that would provide health services for all citizens regardless of the 
ability to pay (Government of India, 1946). The Bhore Committee Report endorsed a 
three-tiered health delivery system viz. primary health centres at the village level, 
secondary health facilities at the sub-district and district level and tertiary hospitals at 
the regional level, and kept MCH at the heart of primary health centres (Duggal, 
1991). This recommended three-tiered system, which resembles the existing public 
health infrastructure in India, took the government close to ten years to build (Rao, 
2017). However, with less than 5% of the national budget invested in health, Bhore’s 
ambitious recommendations for MCH were yet to take off (Singh, 1997; Qadeer, 
1995). Instead of MCH, family planning got national and international political priority 
and the majority of the financial resources. In 1952, India set up the world’s first 
national family planning programme (Visaria and Chari, 1999).  
World Bank begins lending to India  
The World Bank officially started business with India a year after its independence, in 
1948 when it sent its first mission of experts to the country, and approved the first 
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loan of $34 million for a railways project in 1949 (World Bank, 2001). As a newly 
independent country, India decided to tread on a socialist model of development, 
wherein all of its sectors were nationalised. The first ten years of the India-Bank 
relationship was amiable, with the IBRD providing loans to India’s public sector for 
agriculture, railways, steel and power projects (Kirk, 2010). Up to June 1958, Bank 
lending to India amounted to $400 million, representing 10% of all Bank lending to 
that point (Kraske, 1997). In 1958, India was in need of capital owing to a crisis of 
foreign exchange and balance of payments, and looked towards bilateral donors and 
the World Bank for financial assistance. In response, the World Bank coordinated 
international donors including the U.K., U.S., West Germany, Canada and Japan, 
and formed the Aid India Consortium and pledged an initial assistance of $2 billion 
(Akita, 2014). The Indian administration led by Jawaharlal Nehru (first Prime Minister 
and Leader of the Indian National Congress) accepted this kind of multilateral aid 
coordination as it saw the Bank as an impartial donor and wanted to stay away from 
undue international influence owing to its colonial history (Mason and Asher, 1973). 
The U.S. played a key role in the initial years of this multilateral aid coordination to 
India (Kux, 1992). 
 
Financial crisis, aid consortium and the devaluation debacle  
The optimistic client-lender relationship began to unravel after the financial crisis of 
1958. Worried that the economic progress in India was not reaching the expected 
levels even after regular doses of aid, the Consortium members convened a meeting 
in 1963 and emphasised the need to stimulate private foreign investments, relax 
controls, liberalise the pricing system, and raise interest rates (Akita, 2014). Many of 
these asks around reducing the role of the state in the economy would have been 
non-negotiable for India at that point, as the government emphasised on public 
sector-led development. Apart from the growing financial crisis, India also struggled 
with a war (with China), droughts, and a major political setback with the death of 
Prime Minister Nehru in 1964. Amidst this climate, the Bank on the insistence of 
Consortium, sent a mission to India to examine its national economic condition and 
make policy recommendations for improvement (World Bank, 1970). The Indian 
officials were reluctant to submit to such external scrutiny, but they were informally 
persuaded by the Bank on the grounds of mobilising additional and much-needed 
financial resources from the consortium (Mason and Asher, 1973, pg.196).  
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This mission, led by economist Bernard Bell, provided two major recommendations. 
First, it pushed for a move from heavy industry towards modernising agriculture, 
increase private and foreign investment and - most importantly - the devaluation of 
the Indian rupee. Second, it argued for the mounting of a “massive, energetic and 
reorganised population control programme” (Bell, 1965, pg.10). While the Indian 
government devalued its currency (Indian rupee, Rs.) by 57% from Rs. 4.76 to Rs. 
7.50 to a U.S dollar, it abandoned the rest of the proposed reforms due to 
widespread political opposition (Mukherji, 2000). Despite the devaluation, not all of 
the promised financial resources were disbursed, which left the India-Bank 
relationship sour and strained for years to come (Kirk, 2010; Denoon, 1968). While 
the first recommendation of the Bell Report was partially implemented, the second 
one was accepted wholeheartedly (Connelly, 2006). Population control thus became 
the medium through which the Bank entered the maternal and child health landscape 
in India, albeit informally at first.  
Population control backed by international donors 
The Indian family planning programme, established in 1952, adopted the clinic-
based model of setting up clinics for those who needed such services, and 
emphasised on the rhythm method of contraception (Visaria and Chari, 1998). The 
first two health ministers of India (Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Sushila Nayar) were 
disciples of Mahatma Gandhi, and influenced by Gandhian restrictions against 
artificial means of contraception on moral grounds, they promoted the natural 
‘rhythm’ methods against modern birth control (Ensminger, 1971). This model did not 
work due to lack of consideration of individual needs, high illiteracy and mortality 
rates, nascent transport and communication networks, and poverty (Maharatna, 
2002). As a result, there was a shift towards an extension approach, wherein family 
planning committees and leaders would generate the demand for contraception in 
every village and town (Raina, 1962).  
Amidst this shift in 1950s, international agencies including the Bank, started 
influencing India’s family planning policies and programmes, which inevitably 
affected MCH (Gwatkins, 1979). USAID, Ford Foundation and Rockefeller 
Foundation employed several hundreds of staff in India and funded research 
projects, institutes, training, commodities (contraceptives and vehicles) (Connelly, 
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2006; Harkavy et al., 1968). Key consultants from these organisations penetrated 
decision making units of the Indian government including the Planning Commission 
and the Ministry of Health and advised key Indian officials (Minkler, 1977; 
Ensminger, 1958). Towards the late 1950s, Sheldon Segal (Rockefeller Foundation 
and Population Council) advised Lieutenant Colonel B.L Raina, the director 
responsible for both MCH and family planning in India (Gupta et al., 1992).  
The Bank first began prescribing for India’s population programme in 1965. On the 
insistence of the Aid India Consortium, the Bank set up a three-member committee 
consisting of Sheldon Segal (Rockefeller Foundation and Population Council), Sam 
Keeny (USAID), and Conrad Taeuber (U.S Census Bureau) in 1965 to examine 
India’s efforts in population control, which recommended that Colonel Raina divert 
his attention from MCH and give unconditional priority to family planning (IBRD, 
1965a). The Consortium also advised the Indian government to introduce a target 
and incentive-based approach for family planning across all the states (Cargill, 
1973). The Bank team insisted that “no mass program has reached its target without 
defining it in terms of quotas. The targets must be related to money and manpower 
appointed, in the field, and at work on the job for which they were intended” (IBRD, 
1965b, pg. 47). Furthermore, based on the results from a demographic study it 
funded in the 1960s along with USAID and WHO, the Bank also recommended the 
integration of family planning with MCH on the grounds that it would be more cost-
effective and efficient than providing family planning separately (Keilmann et al., 
1983). However, the implications for replicating these findings in a diverse country 
like India were not studied (Faruqee, 1983).  
The year 1966 was a critical time for Indian politics, the economy, and the health 
sector. Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi was sworn in as the Prime 
Minister in January 1966. Two months later, Gandhi flew to the U.S. and met 
President Lyndon Johnson to negotiate aid for food owing to the ongoing financial 
crisis and widespread drought and famine in the country (Reyes, 2006). Gandhi was 
given food aid on the condition that she push certain reforms, which would convince 
the Aid India Consortium (led by the U.S.) that India was serious about its economic 
growth (Ahlberg, 2007; Reyes, 2006). After returning home, Gandhi approved the 
devaluation of the Indian rupee and an invigorated population control programme in 
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the country (Conelly, 2006). The Ministry of Health was renamed the Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning (Gupta, 1992). Following the Bank’s recommendation for 
a target and incentive-based family planning approach over MCH, the Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning provided all the states Rs. 11 for every Intrauterine 
Devices (IUD) insertion, Rs. 30 per vasectomy, and Rs. 40 per tubectomy (later 
increased to Rs. 90) (Gupta, 1992; Narain, 1966). More than half (60%) of the 
national health budget was allocated for family planning. India’s family planning 
budget witnessed a mammoth jump from Rs. 30 million in 1956 to Rs. 829 million in 
1966 (Government of India, 1966). In the same year, the Indian government’s 
Mukherjee Committee handed in the final blow when it recommended family 
planning to be integrated into MCH service delivery, and for mass IUD programmes 
to be delivered through primary health centres. These political and policy 
developments meant that financial resources for MCH were deviated for family 
planning. More importantly, at the ground (village) level, frontline health workers 
were now given family planning-related performance targets and incentives, which 
took away their focus from MCH services (Vora, 2009; Mavalankar, 2008).  
By 1967, 1.8 million Indians agreed to sterilisation or IUDs (Mukherji, 1967). 
Because of the ongoing drought and famine, several poor men and women 
underwent sterilisation as the incentives however small offered financial relief. The 
drive to reduce fertility rapidly and at minimal cost made it difficult to maintain 
standards, including medical screening and sterile instruments (Connelly, 2006; 
Gupta, 1992). The insertion of IUDs led to complications in women, including 
prolonged bleeding, perforated uterus and ectopic pregnancy (Ledbetter, 1984). 
Although the Population Council, a major backer of IUD technology, received reports 
of the emerging IUD side effects from its projects in South and South East Asia, key 
officials like Alan Guttmacher believed that these side effects were less important 
than the fact that IUDs could be promoted in a mass program with few medical 
personnel (Reed 1978; Nelson and Guttmacher, 1963).  
This mindless and indiscriminate race to control the population had the most 
grievous impact on the health of women who were poor and from lower caste groups 
(Basu, 1985). Later evaluations by the National Planning Commission showed how 
the family planning programme had become coercive in some states (Planning 
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Commission, 1971). In the state of Maharashtra, officials eliminated the posts of field 
workers and educators who worked on MCH, in order to free up money for incentive 
payments for sterilisation. With the lack of incentive and provision for ethical and 
medical standards for contraceptive treatment and follow up care, coupled with rising 
untreated complications from IUD insertions and botched up sterilisations, India’s 
family planning programme fell into disgrace (Connelly, 2006). 
 
6.2 Phase 2: Population control drive (1970-1988)   
 
World Bank begins lending for population control projects  
Robert McNamara expanded targets for lending after he took over as the President 
of the World Bank in 1968. The Bank’s overall lending for India witnessed a massive 
rise during the McNamara years ($700 million by 1960 to $9 billion by 1980) (Ridker 
and Musgrove, 1999). Post 1966, lending for development projects in India 
increased without much of policy interference owing to the devaluation debacle. 
India’s ongoing population control drive and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s political 
slogan of ‘Garibi Hatao’ (reduce poverty) struck a chord with McNamara as 
population control and poverty reduction became his focus areas at the Bank 
(Kraske, 1997; Kapur et al., 1997). Gandhi soon found a supporter in McNamara, 
and loans for population control followed. In 1972, the Bank disbursed its first loan 
for population control in India (World Bank, 1973). From 1973 to 1990, the Bank 
funded a whole series of nine population control projects with a total commitment of 
$632 million and disbursement of $528 million.  
 
While the early population projects were designed to integrate population control 
activities into MCH services. In actuality they ended up emphasising sterilisation and 
expanding facilities, and gave little importance to increasing demand or improving 
the quality of services, and thus had little impact on reducing fertility rates (Ridker 
and Musgrove, 1999). The Bank’s formal lending for population control in India came 
at a time when the Indian government, hard-pressed by international donor agencies 
such USAID, Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, conducted mass 
sterilisation camps and IUD drives. Population control had diverted political priority 
and financial and human resources from MCH, and the Bank supported this 
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diversion through its consistent project funding and policy prescription through donor 
coordination (Connelly, 2006; Hvistendahl, 2005; Kraske, 1997). The Indian 
government got its biggest show of Bank support when McNamara visited New Delhi 
amidst the emergency period in 1976, and congratulated the health minister Karan 
Singh for his country’s focused efforts towards population control (World Bank, 
1976).  
 
Emergency declared in India  
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of national emergency in India as a 
response to political and economic problems facing her government, ceasing civil 
liberties from June 1975 to January 1977 (Kapoor, 2015). This two-year period also 
witnessed the most aggressive population control drive in the country with more than 
8 million sterilisations (Gwatkin, 1979). The distinctive feature of this draconian drive 
was not the novelty of the contraceptive techniques as drives for mass adoption of 
sterilisation and IUD had been ongoing in the previous decade; instead, it was the 
vigour and urgency with which this drive was carried out (Conelly, 2006). For the first 
time, officials of all government bodies were involved and mandated with quotas to 
get men and women sterilised, and failure on meeting these targets was met with 
mild to extreme disincentives including loss of food rations, salaries and even 
employment (Panandikar et al., 1978). While men and women died from botched 
and unsafe sterilisations (around 1800 death claims were reported), several people, 
especially those from the Muslim and lower caste communities died from the 
violence emerging from coercive attempts to sterilise men (Government of India, 
1978).  
By the time the emergency was lifted off and the population control drive ended, 
millions had suffered harassment by implementing government officials, thousands 
had died, Indira Gandhi was booted out of power in the 1977 national elections, and 
the family planning programme fell into complete disarray (Gwatkin, 1979). 
Vasectomies became stigmatised due to the violence incurred on men who were 
forcefully taken into sterilisation camps. As a result, the onus of sterilisation, the most 
commonly used form of contraception in India, has until today fallen on women 
(Connelly, 2006; Hvistendahl, 2005). After the new government took over in 1977, 
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family planning became such a contentious matter that the Ministry of Health and 
Family Planning was renamed the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.  
The Bank, UNFPA, the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the 
Swedish International Development Agency, among others, continued funding 
India’s population control projects throughout the emergency period in India 
(Connelly, 2006). Two decades later, Bank health specialists Ronald Ridker and 
Philip Musgrove (1999) wrote that the Bank had little influence on the direction of the 
population control programme as the Indian government’s approach was firmly 
established long before Bank involvement. They argued that the Bank was generally 
poorly positioned to suggest improvements or alternatives. However, one of my 
interviewees, a former Bank staff who worked in the India office between 1973 and 
1975, suggested otherwise: 
I was concerned about the sterilisation campaign in 1972 as we 
had financed the first population project and we were in the 
midst of preparing a second population project. It seemed to 
me that the Bank should not be preparing such a project while 
the government was adopting this extreme measure. So, I 
talked to some of my colleagues involved in the field of 
population during the supervision mission and also drafted a 
memorandum which expressed my concerns and my 
perceptions of what was going on and the risks with the 
government’s announced population policy. The population 
adviser gave a legalistic response, and said that it would be 
premature for the Bank to take a position at this stage. Another 
response was from the head of the Resident Mission, who felt 
that I was getting into ethical issues that the World Bank was all 
about economics and finance, and so he was not very 
supportive of my raising the alarm and was not about to about 
to confront the government about what was happening. 
The informant explained that while the senior staff at the Bank, including the 
President, were well aware of the coercive measures being used by the Indian 
government for population control during the 1970s, they decided not to interfere 
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with the hope that this would finally contain the burgeoning Indian population and 
keep the international donors satisfied. 
 
World Bank lending shifts towards nutrition projects  
When the population projects did not show the planned results, the Bank shifted its 
attention towards nutrition and child health. In 1980, the Bank funded the Tamil Nadu 
Integrated Nutrition Project with a loan of $32 million (World Bank, 1980), which was 
aimed at reducing child undernutrition rates through the behavioural change of 
mothers by the way of growth monitoring, supplementary feeding and nutrition 
counselling. Sridhar (2008) analysed the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project and 
argued that by focusing on growth monitoring and nutritional education for the 
mother alone, the Bank design for tacking undernutrition did not consider structural 
factors such as inadequate purchasing power and gender inequality that constricted 
individual agency. Despite these gaps and mixed results, the Bank lauded this 
project as a success and granted funding of $95 million for a second phase of this 
project in 1990 (Ridker and Musgrove, 1999).  
 
Prior to the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project, the Indian government had 
launched the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) programme in 1975 
which offered a similar package of services including supplementary nutrition, 
immunisation, and routine health check-ups for children under the age of six, 
pregnant women and lactating mothers at community based centres (Sachdev and 
Dasgupta, 2001). This nutrition programme was discontinued in 1978; but the Bank 
revived it back in 1990 with financial support, and continued to support four phases 
with a total commitment of $606 million. Over time, the Bank committed close to $1.5 
billion for all the nutrition projects in the country (HNP, 2019).  
 
UNICEF-backed child immunisation gets a head start  
Child immunisation picked up in a big way in India in the 1970s. Following the 
WHO’s policy recommendation of universal immunisation at the Alma Ata 
conference, India launched the Expanded Programme of Immunization in 1978 
(renamed the Universal Immunization Program in 1985). It provided six basic 
vaccines to all infants and the tetanus vaccine to pregnant women (Lahariya, 2014). 
Being a UNICEF-backed programme, child immunisation received increasing 
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amount of financial resources from the Indian government as well as international 
donors (Madhavi, 2005).  
 
MCH policies versus reality 
In the 1980s, the Indian government prioritised MCH in two of its major national 
policies viz. health policy of 1983 and the seventh five-year development plan of 
1985 (Government of India, 1985; 1983). In both these policies, MCH was listed as 
one of the key focus areas to be advanced through the delivery of MCH services 
along with family planning and nutrition, training of traditional midwives (dais), skilled 
child birth strengthening of referral services in obstetrics, gynaecology and 
paediatrics, providing abortion services across primary health centres, and the 
promotion of breastfeeding through information campaigns. These programmes were 
much-needed and in the right direction for tackling the high rates of maternal and 
child mortality. However, implementation of these services was weak and not 
geographically balanced, in that health facilities in urban areas were better staffed 
and equipped compared to rural counterparts. Furthermore, major funding for health 
programmes from the central government continued to be deviated towards selective 
interventions of family planning and child immunisation (Nundy, 2005). While 
globally, the Bank had started lending for stand-alone health projects in the early 
1980s, it did not move beyond population and nutrition in India. In an OED 
evaluation, Zanini (2001) wrote that the Bank was not able to establish a dialogue or 
lending programme in health and education due to the government’s resistance to 
foreign advice in these sectors. The beginning of the 1990s changed this equation 
and created conditions for the Bank’s lending for health and MCH projects in the 
country, although in a climate of structural adjustment.   
 
6.3 Phase 3: Economic liberalisation (1991 to 2004) 
 
Structural adjustment loans and economic reforms 
In 1991, India struggled with a mounting financial crisis brought on by a heavy 
dependence on foreign imports especially oil, external borrowing to finance these 
deficits, debt servicing, inadequate exchange rate adjustments (Ghosh, 2006). The 
crisis worsened with the 1990 Gulf war, after which the Government of India had to 
airlift and rehabilitate hundreds of thousands of Indian workers from the Middle East 
   
 149 
leading to a decline in remittances. Exports and foreign aid flagged as well (Cerra 
and Saxena, 2002; Joshi and Little, 1994). This period also saw domestic political 
instability with widespread communal violence brought on by a Bharatiya Janata 
Party  (BJP; the BJP and the Indian National Congress are the two major national 
parties in India) campaign to build a Hindu temple at the site of a mosque in Ayodhya 
and the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Guha, 2008). By June 
1991, the financial crisis had hit the country so hard that the government only had 
reserves that would cover two weeks of imports (Ahluwalia et al., 2002). Amidst this 
economic and political crisis, the Indian government approached the International 
Monetary Fund and Bank for loans, which were accompanied by structural reforms 
including removal of public sector exclusivity in all but six industries and investment 
caps on large corporations, abolition of industrial and import licensing, and massive 
budget cuts in social sector spending (Ghosh, 2006).  
 
This financial crisis and the subsequent structural adjustment reforms changed the 
public health landscape as well as the India-Bank relationship. First, the central 
health budget was slashed by 20% in 1992-1993; there was also a 30% cut in the 
rural drinking water budget, 40% cut in rural sanitation, and 42% cut in the national 
malaria programme budget (Banerjee, 1994). These budget cuts led to the 
deterioration of primary health care as staff, medical supplies, equipments and 
overall health service delivery were massively underfunded. Second, these macro-
economic reforms allowed national and international private investments into 
secondary and tertiary health care. This marked the beginning of the burgeoning of 
the private health care sector in India (Qadeer, 2000). After India gained 
independence in 1947, private health sector accounted for only 5-10% of total patient 
care. By 2002, the private health sector provided for 82% of outpatient visits, 58% of 
inpatient expenditure, and 40% of births in institutions (Government of India, 2002).  
 
Bank’s response in the wake of structural reforms 
Close on the heels of the 1991 economic reforms and subsequent public sector 
budget cuts, the Bank released a working paper titled ‘India: Health Sector Financing 
Coping with Adjustment Opportunities for Reform’ (World Bank, 1992), where 
structural adjustment was described as an opportunity to evaluate India’s flagging 
public health system and transform it into an efficient system with the redirection of 
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funds and programmes. The paper recommended that the Indian government 
restore its national public health budget, define an effective package of health 
services at the primary health care level, increase spending for disease control, 
introduce cost recovery in hospitals and medical education, and support hospitals in 
becoming semi-autonomous and self-financing.  
 
The Bank assisted the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in implementing 
the majority of its own recommendations from the 1992 paper in the following ways. 
It increased lending for health projects in India, specifically for MCH, disease control, 
and health systems development. In doing so, it prompted the government to 
increase its own spending in these areas by co-sponsoring these projects and of 
course, by taking on the IDA credits in the first place. Bank lending for health 
projects as a proportion of its overall assistance to India rose from 3% in 1986-1990 
to 21% in 1996-2000 (Zanini, 2001, pg.18), and this dramatic increase was a by-
product of the financial crisis and the subsequent structural reforms. When the Indian 
economy opened up for private investments, Bank lending for public sector 
development projects declined and IDA credits were diverted towards social sector 
projects including health and education, to maintain its lending targets in India 
(Zanini, 2000). The Bank justified these new health projects as a soft cushion for the 
public health system in the face of structural adjustment and budget cuts (Zanini, 
2001; World Bank, 1997).  
 
Bank co-sponsors two major programmes for maternal and child health  
First, in 1992, the Bank co-sponsored the first major national programme for MCH in 
India i.e. the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood Programme, through IDA credits of 
$214 million along with $68 million in grant money from UNICEF and $47 million 
domestic financial resources from the Indian government (World Bank, 1991). While 
the child survival component of the programme was an extension of the ongoing 
child immunisation programme, the safe motherhood component promoted 
emergency obstetric care as a key strategy for maternal mortality reduction 
(Mavalankar, 1999). Through this programme, the Bank promoted a selective 
package of MCH services including antenatal care, deliveries by trained personnel 
including traditional birth attendants, institutional deliveries, and breastfeeding, birth 
spacing, child immunisation, and management of acute respiratory infections and 
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diarrhoea (World Bank, 1991). Note the change in language: ‘family planning’ had 
become ‘birth spacing’ within project documents. Also, this selective package 
approach was driven by the Bank’s 1993 World Development Report, which 
recommended governments to focus on a selective package of cost-effective health 
interventions around MCH and infectious disease control (World Bank, 1993, pg. 6). 
While the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood Project likely contributed to improved 
child health outcomes (specifically, higher rates of immunisation coverage), the 
planned maternal health outcomes were not realised (institutional deliveries barely 
increased from 25% to 32% over the project period). Evaluations by the Bank and 
external experts reported the failure to increase childbirth facilities and overall weak 
programme implementation (World Bank, 1997; Huque et al., 1996).  
 
As the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood Project was nearing its end, in 1997, the 
Indian Government launched the Reproductive and Child Health Project (RCH). This 
was another national level programme for maternal and child health, which was 
implemented across all the states from 1997 to 2004 with an overall budget of $309 
million, of which the Bank disbursed $255 million. The first phase of this project 
(RCH-I) aimed to reduce maternal and child mortality through institutional deliveries, 
and thus, funded essential obstetric care, blood storage units, transport to birth 
facilities, access to safe abortion, and treatment of reproductive and sexually 
transmitted diseases, and also recommended the inclusion of the private sector for 
MCH service delivery (World Bank, 1997). Towards the end of RCH-I, the realisation 
that a ‘one size fits all approach’ - i.e. what works in one state may not work in 
another - was dwelled upon by Bank staff in India (World Bank, 2005).  
Perhaps, this realisation may have pushed the Bank to fund state-level health 
systems projects, where Bank staff had greater control over the project 
implementation. The Bank began funding state-level health systems development 
projects in the mid-1990s, and by 2019 it had committed $2.6 billion and disbursed a 
total of $1.3 billion for this area (HNP, 2019). Perhaps the most striking outcome of 
these state-level health projects was the introduction of user fees in public-funded 
secondary hospitals and tertiary care facilities (Prinja et al., 2012; MoHFW, 2000; 
Bir, 2000). By the end of this phase, Bank lending for health in India had managed to 
redefine family planning as reproductive and child health approach, endorse 
 152 
selective primary health care through an essential package of services for its MCH 
projects, focus on immunisation for infant mortality, and promote user fees for 
secondary and tertiary care (Qadeer, 2000).  
 
6.4 Phase 4: National Rural Health Mission (2005-2019) 
 
The Indian Government funds its first major national health programme  
After coming to power the United Progressive Alliance (formerly the Indian National 
Congress party) launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005, which 
was, in financial terms, the biggest ever national health programme designed and 
crafted in-house in the country without any donor influence (Rao, 2017; MoHFW, 
2005). The NRHM was revolutionary, as for the first time, a national programme 
aimed to increase government spending for health from 0.9% to 2-3% of the GDP. 
This Mission was designed to integrate the existing vertical programmes; it promoted 
decentralisation by giving states more control and flexibility over planning and 
financial resources; and most importantly, community health worker called ASHA 
(Accredited Social Health Activists) were recruited in every village, serving as the link 
between communities and the public health system, thereby generating demand for 
public health services.  
NRHM raised the political and financial priority for maternal and child health, more so 
for maternal health. It funded the conditional cash transfer scheme called ‘Janani 
Suraksha Yojana’, giving poor pregnant women cash incentives for giving birth in a 
health facility; ASHA’s also received performance-based financial incentives for 
referring pregnant women to the facility. Furthermore, increased funding through the 
NRHM strengthened public health infrastructure and human resources, especially at 
the primary care-level (Rao, 2017), and introduced insurances schemes for 
households below the poverty line, all of which are paid by the government and 
implemented by private insurance companies (La Forgia and Nagpal, 2012; Kuruvilla 
et al, 2006). 
 
Bank funds the second phase of the Reproductive and Child Health project 
The Bank approved funding for the second phase of the Reproductive and Child 
Health Project (RCH-II) in 2005. However, due to a corruption allegation in RCH-I, 
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the Bank President Paul Wolfowitz ordered an independent investigation that 
confirmed the charges, and then suspended loans for RCH-II and other health and 
infrastructure projects in the country (Padmanabhan, 2006), much to the ire of Indian 
government officials as well as Bank staff from the country office (Guha and Yee, 
2007; Mallaby, 2006). Although, the funds for RCH-II were released in 2006, this 
second phase of the project took shape within a controversial climate. RCH-II was 
launched in 2006 with an overall funding of $2.2 billion, more than 50% of which was 
provided by the Indian government, followed by $452 million by DFID, $375 million in 
IDA credits, and $20 million by UNFPA (World Bank, 2006). RCH-II was quite similar 
to RCH-I in terms of its objectives, in that it focused on increasing institutional 
deliveries, immunisation rates, and contraceptive prevalence (Vora et al., 2009). The 
project also implemented novel strategies including upgrading of community health 
centres into first referral units for emergency obstetric and child care services; 
making community health centres and 50% of primary healthcare centres operational 
24 hours 7 days a week for delivery services and new-born care; empowering non-
specialist Indian Medical Officers to undertake emergency obstetric procedures and 
to administer anaesthesia; and generating demand for institutional delivery through 
the implementation of the Janani Suraksha Yojana (World Bank, 2012).  
 
Bank’s current health portfolio in India 
The Bank’s health operations in India have changed over time. Unlike its previous 
mission approach where experts from Washington D.C would very briefly, prepare a 
report with recommendations, and then present these to the Indian officials to 
implement, the current team in the country office in New Delhi is more deeply 
engaged in the day-to-day operations of Bank-funded health projects (Coarasa, 
2018). The Bank has also been drifting away from MCH and focusing almost entirely 
on state-level health systems development projects, with the exception of a couple of 
national level projects for infectious disease control and nutrition. Sarkar (2016) 
analysed the Bank’s health systems development projects and reported that in this 
phase, these projects have primarily focused on budget reallocation (fiscal space 




The Bank’s move away from lending for MCH could be explained by several factors. 
First, since 2005, the Indian government has demonstrated a greater political priority 
for maternal and child health through the launch of the NRHM and the subsequent 
increase in the central budget for this area. The Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare started implementing two major conditional cash transfer schemes to 
increase institutional deliveries and ensure postnatal care viz. the Janani Suraksha 
Yojana (2006) and the Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (2011) (Government of 
India, 2019). In 2013, the Ministry also launched its RMNCH+A strategy that funds 
high-impact interventions across the life stages of reproductive, maternal, newborn, 
child and adolescent health in high priority districts (Government of India, 2013).  
Second, the corruption in RCH-I followed by the independent investigation and the 
suspension of funds soured the relationship between the Bank’s country staff and 
the Indian government officials in the Ministries of Finance and Health during the 
RCH-II. My interviewees who worked in the Bank India office confirmed this 
outcome. Third, post-2000, major players have entered the MCH landscape in India 
including the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, and 
Swedish International Development Corporation Agency, adding to the list of existing 
donors such as UNICEF and UNFPA; these donors offer grants unlike the Bank’s 
credits, and over the last two decades have established a strong foothold in selected 
states in the country (Taneja et al., 2019). 
India’s growing economic status is also affecting the way the Bank does business in 
the country, especially its health and MCH portfolio. In 2015-2016, India gave more 
aid ($1 billion) than it received ($0.2 billion) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). In a 
video interview from 2016, Former Indian Minister of Finance Arun Jaitley (2014-
2019) spoke with gratitude about the Bank’s financial assistance for poverty 
alleviation, strengthening infrastructure and fighting natural disasters - especially in 
the early years of the India-Bank relationship. Towards the end of this interview, 
Jaitley added: “We are an integral part of IDA and now contribute to the extent of 
$200 million. We were earlier the recipients and now we are donors” (World Bank, 
2016). Indian officials now present the country as a net donor rather a recipient. 
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Bank staff are cognisant of the changing perceptions of their counterparts in the 
Indian government, and this is changing the way they work with them.  
A case in point is the Global Financing Facility, which is the Bank’s major global 
financing initiative for MCH. While this Facility is now operational in 36 countries, it 
has no mark in India despite the existing burden of maternal and child mortality and 
the longstanding borrowing relationship. My interviews with Bank staff reported that 
while discussions to include India in the list of recipient countries for the Global 
Financing Facility had begun, senior government officials in the Ministry of Finance 
(which ultimately takes loan-related decisions) were offended about being treated as 
a recipient and offered small sums of money. Subsequently, negotiations fell through 
and India did not get to be a part of the GFF. A current Bank staff asserted:  
It can be hard for people at the global level to understand that 
India is different. India does not want to be treated as a 
recipient any longer. It is a huge country and if I were to 
interpret this sentiment…You would never treat China like this, 
so why give us such a treatment. We are India. We are 1.3 
billion people. We are an emerging power. 
One cannot ignore the evolving political context in India and its influence on the 
Bank’s lending decisions for the country. In 2004, the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) won the national elections on the promise of implementing pro-poor policies, 
the major one being for health, and maternal and child health in particular. The 
political party implemented its promise when it launched the National Rural Health 
Mission, increased the central government budget for MCH, and worked with the 
Bank to co-finance and implement RCH-II. The ruling United Progressive Alliance 
(formerly Indian National Congress) party lost the national elections to the Bharatiya 
Janata Party in 2014, and yet again, in 2019. Prime Minister Modi picked sanitation 
as his key social focus area and launched the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India 
Mission): a nation-wide campaign to eradicate open defecation in the country (a 
problem that plagued more than 60% of the population at the time). Soon after, the 
Bank released a $1.5 billion IBRD loan for this mission (World Bank, 2015).  
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Since 2017, India’s Planning Commission, now known as the ‘Niti Aayog’ under the 
BJP government, embarked on consultations with the World Bank, to set up public-
private partnerships (PTI, 2018). As of 2 January 2020, the Niti Aayog released a 
proposal wherein government district hospitals and the attached medical will be 
leased out to the private sector to ensure efficient service delivery. The Bank will 
play a key financing role in implementing this PPP. If this proposal is passed by the 
Parliament, then designated district hospitals will have to set aside half of its beds at 
a market price and the rest at a regulated or subsidised rate, which will generate 
resources but also push out poor households that are unable to pay (PTI, 2020). 
More importantly, policy decisions such as these need to be piloted and assessed 
along the lines of equity considerations before implementing it at scale across the 
country (Rao, 2017). During the UPA rule, the Bank funded maternal and child health 
projects in India, especially pushing service delivery at the primary health care level. 
However, under the BJP, the Bank currently has no MCH projects in its country 
portfolio, instead, it is mainly funding state-level health systems development 
projects and advancing the current government’s goals of increasing privatisation 
and PPPs in the public health sector.  
Finally, while Bank lending for health has fluctuated over time, its overall lending for 
India has been stable at best (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). India is currently 
facing an economic slowdown (Agrawal and Salam, 2019; Chakravarty, 2019), and 
has in the recent past, urged for a significant expansion of the Bank’s capital, to 
avoid a decline in its lending (Mukul, 2009). Amidst this economic climate, it seems 
like the India-Bank relationship will endure and the Bank will continue to be a 
relevant financing actor in the country, however, the approaches it will use for public 
health and maternal and child health will need to be examined.    
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how India and the Bank have grown together and have 
a longstanding relationship. India played a key role in the formation of the World 
Bank (IBRD) and provided a significant impetus to form the International 
Development Association (IDA). Not long after its independence, India emerged as 
the leading borrower of the Bank, and as of 2019, it continues to remain the largest 
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client of the Bank. Through this historical account of the India-Bank relationship, I 
have demonstrated that the involvement and influence of the World Bank in MCH in 
the country cannot be understood without an appreciation of the organisation’s 
broader involvement with the country’s economy, politics and governance, and its 
public and private health sector.  
 
Economy 
The Bank first entered India through its financial support for the newly independent 
country’s economy. In economic terms, the Bank’s relationship with India can be 
understood in three broad phases. The country’s economic position in each phase 
has shaped its tendency to respond to the Bank’s advice for the economy as well as 
for maternal and child health. In the first phase, until the 1970s, India struggled 
financially and was heavily reliant on external capital from the Bank, as well as major 
bilateral donors that were mediated by the Bank through the Aid India Consortium. In 
these early years of this relationship, by lending for infrastructure projects, 
conducting analytical work, and offering advice on economic policies, the Bank 
gained access within the Indian government circles, especially in the ministries of 
finance and planning. However, much of this foreign aid was tagged with conditions, 
primarily around economic policies and population control measures. The Bank 
along with international donors, pressured the Indian government to implement a 
target and incentive-based approach for family planning, which had far-reaching 
impacts the delivery of MCH services in the country.  
 
In the second phase, which lasted until the 1990s, the country’s balance of payments 
remained fragile and external financial crises loomed large. At this point, on one 
hand, the Bank offered the Indian government loans conditional on structural 
adjustments mainly around privatising the economy and substantial cuts in public 
sectors including health. On the other hand, it co-sponsored two major programmes 
for maternal and child health, as a buffer from the effects of budget cuts in the public 
health sector. Several studies have shown how the  Bank promoted private sector 
delivery of health services and user fees at secondary and tertiary health facilities, 
which affected the access for maternal and child health services. In the third phase, 
since the late 1990s, the Indian economy has been growing, and the government 
has increased its own domestic spending for maternal and child health. The Bank’s 
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role has now changed from being a lender to a development partner at the central 
and increasingly at the state government level. Despite its relatively low levels of 
lending for maternal and child health, the Bank continues to indirectly shape this 
area through its policy prescriptions such as public-private partnerships.  
 
Politics and governance 
In the years after independence, the Indian Congress Party, led by Indira Gandhi, 
gained the support of the World Bank as they pushed the population control agenda 
from the late 1960s until the 1980s. President McNamara’s visit to New Delhi at the 
height of the emergency period in 1976, demonstrated the soft power that India has 
over the Bank as its biggest borrower. In 1991, it was the Congress-led government 
that implemented the Bank-prescribed economic reforms of privatising major public 
sectors and cutting public health and social sector budgets. It also helped that India’s 
finance minister, Manmohan Singh, who was responsible for the economic 
liberalisation in 1991, served at the World Bank for long periods of time. Over time, 
the mandates of the political party that won the elections and formed the government 
at the central (for e.g. UPA’s focus on maternal and child health versus BJP’s focus 
on sanitation) and the state level shaped the Bank’s lending decisions as well as the 
implementation of the funded projects. 
 
Furthermore, governance issues such as corruption in the RCH project strained the 
India-Bank relationship, as senior politicians and bureaucrats threatened to cut ties 
with the Bank altogether after the suspension of loans. While the Bank did release its 
funds for RCH-II in due time, it demanded that the government ensure the required 
steps in strengthening existing governance practices in the health sector. Although 
there have been formal agreements to do so, since then, the Bank staff have found it 
challenging to engage with Indian government officials for increased lending for 
maternal and child health. This could be partly due to government officials’ 
perception of external interference in sovereign areas such as governance as well as 
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Public and Private health sector  
The Bank’s role in maternal and child health in a country must be understood in 
terms of its involvement in the public as well as the private health sector. The Bank 
first forayed into the Indian public health landscape through its policy prescriptions, 
followed by its lending, for projects in population control. First, the Bank prescribed a 
target and incentive-based approach to increase the uptake of family planning 
services. This policy measure provided the impetus for mass sterilisation and IUD 
insertion drives in the country, which had a detrimental impact on the health of many 
women - especially those who were poor, vulnerable and from lower caste groups, 
due to the side effects and inadequate operative and post-operative care. Second, it 
recommended that the Ministry of Health integrate family planning into MCH 
services. This measure diverted greater financial and human resources towards 
family planning and away from MCH. Both these measures meant that pregnant 
women and women of reproductive age received free public health services primarily 
to avail family planning, and only if they suffered from serious complications during 
pregnancy and childbirth. By the end of the 1960s, the majority of the pregnant 
women still gave birth at home and maternal mortality was at a staggering 1352 per 
100000 live births. Child health was practically ignored. Until the late 1980s, Bank 
health lending was limited to population control and nutrition projects. While 
population projects aimed at reducing fertility, nutrition projects focused on improving 
productivity, both of which would eventually lead to economic growth.  
 
Following the economic liberalisation programme in 1991, and in line with its World 
Development Report, the Bank recommended that India’s public health sector focus 
on providing an essential package of health services covering MCH and infectious 
disease control, while the secondary and tertiary health care be opened up to private 
investments. Several Bank-funded health projects in the 1990s also promoted user 
fees as a cost recovery mechanism in hospitals, a policy measure adopted by the 
Indian government in 2000. While Bank-funded public health sector projects 
provided a package of MCH services, its other health projects reduced the role of the 
state government in the healthcare provision in the country. The connection between 
the inception and meteoric growth of the private health care sector in India and the 
structural adjustment reforms in the 1990s stand out as major areas for reflection 
(Banerji, 1997). While policy makers cannot ignore the role of the vast network of the 
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private health sector for improving MCH in India, one has to also reflect on the 
consequences that unregulated private healthcare provision can have on the 
equitable availability and access for MCH services. 
 
Since 2005, the Indian government has taken greater control of its MCH 
programmes, primarily by increasing its own spending through the National Rural 
Health Mission, while the Bank’s lending for MCH in the country has gradually 
reduced over time. Currently, the majority of the Bank’s health lending in the country 
is focused on state-level health system development projects. More importantly, the 
Bank has been working closely with the Indian Planning Commission (Niti Aayog) to 
implement public-private partnerships, wherein several public district hospitals will be 
leased out to private entities for management.  
 
Through this review of the literature in this chapter, I have thus traced the evolution 
of the Bank’s focus on public sector provision of maternal and child health services in 
India from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, to its promotion of private sector 







   
 161 
Chapter 7 Tracing the design and implementation 




This chapter forms the first part of a two-part process to examine the World Bank’s 
influence at the country-level for maternal and child health. In this chapter, I describe 
the process of the design and implementation of the Reproductive and Child Health 
(RCH) Project in India, which ran in two phases i.e. Phase I from 1997 to 2004 and 
Phase II from 2006 to 2012. This first part will facilitate an understanding of why and 
how the RCH project was designed and implemented. In doing so, it will thus offer us 
insights for the second part i.e., to identify any policy outcomes for maternal and 
child health where the Bank had an influence, and to uncover the process in which 
the Bank exerted its influence over the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
to achieve these outcomes.    
 
For this chapter, I used process-tracing, which is a method that is commonly used in 
qualitative social science inquiry and involves analysis of several sources of 
information to uncover processes and examine causality (Yin, 1994). I introduce key 
agencies and actors that appear throughout the narrative of the RCH project. 
Agencies include donors viz. the World Bank, the Department for International 
Development (DfID), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); and the country-
level nodal agency for public health in India (i.e., the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW). Actors include the staff from each of these aforementioned 
agencies. I analysed three sources of data for this chapter: (1) RCH project 
documents by the World Bank and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, (2) 
Archival records from the World Bank Archives such correspondence memos, 
project proposals, and research reports, and (3) Qualitative interviews with former 
and current staff from the Bank, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, UNFPA; 
women’s health advocates; and academics. Data collection and analysis for this 
chapter have been described in detail in Chapter Three (Methods) of this thesis. 
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7.1 RCH Phase 1: 1997 to 2004  
 
Design 
The first project can be traced back to 1989 when Bank health specialist Susan Stout 
reviewed India’s family planning programme. Stout concluded that the programme 
was not reaching couples that had unmet need, health workers saw the provision of 
sterilisation services as their main job, and the emphasis on targets and permanent 
methods of sterilisation took away attention from other spacing methods and the 
provision maternal and child health services (Stout, 1989, p. 25). My interviewee, a 
former member of Bank staff, pointed out that this report was never officially 
published by the Bank due to objections from the Indian government officials, but 
that it nevertheless was read by Bank specialists working on health projects in India.  
 
Despite this report, there were no further discussion between the Bank staff and the 
Indian government, until 1992, when the Bank co-sponsored the Child Survival and 
Safe Motherhood programme (World Bank, 1992). This programme helped to fill in 
the cash gap faced by the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) 
owing to public health sector budget cuts, which in turn was driven by the 
conditionalities imposed by the structural adjustment loans from the Bank and the 
IMF (Banerjee, 1994). By 1994, there was growing evidence from local 
demographers and researchers on the ineffectiveness of the target-based system for 
decline in fertility, swelling activism from women’s health groups around the Cairo 
conference as well as receptive Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers who 
were in senior decision-making positions. Most importantly, the government of India 
wanted a loan for their tenth population project. All these factors made the officials in 
the MoHFW responsive to the Bank’s advice to review the public health sector.  
  
In October 1994, a 17-member team - including nine health and population control 
specialists from the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C, five consultants, 
and three staff from the Population Council - conducted a health sector review and 
visited four states in India (Measham and Heaver, 1996; World Bank, 1995a). A 
second team visit in February 1995 resulted in the publication of a report titled 
‘India’s family welfare program: moving to a reproductive and child health approach’ 
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with policy recommendations for the MoHFW. The key recommendation was the 
adoption of a target-free approach for family planning, wherein women were framed 
as ‘clients’ that could choose from a range of contraceptive options based on their 
own needs rather than being coerced through government targets (World Bank, 
1996). Other recommendations included provision of a range of reproductive, 
maternal and child health services such as treatment for reproductive and sexual 
tract infections, emergency obstetric care, inclusion of private providers, and an 
overall increase of the national budget for maternal and child health (Measham and 
Heaver, 1996).  
 
Bank staff from the headquarters, first circulated this report to the Ministry of Finance 
and then to the MoHFW (World Bank, 1996a). During my interviews with former 
Bank staff who were part of this mission it was reported that getting the Ministry of 
Finance’s approval on this report was a crucial step in processing the loan for the 
RCH project. Former staff from the MoHFW also reported that the Bank agreed to 
design the RCH project as a platform to implement its main recommendation of a 
target-free policy for family planning. For their cooperation with the sector review and 
approval of the RCH project, officials in the MoHFW got Bank loans for the first 
phase of the RCH project ($255 million) as well as the tenth population project ($250 
million) (Donaldson, 2002; World Bank, 1996).  
 
Soon after approval from the finance and health ministries in March 1996, the Bank 
convened a meeting in New Delhi with officials from the MoHFW and representative 
of international partner agencies including WHO, UNICEF, USAID and UNFPA 
(World Bank, 1996b,c). While the MoHFW was receptive to a paradigm shift from a 
demographic focus to the RCH approach, all the partner agencies except for 
UNICEF, provided consensus on moving ahead with this proposed approach (World 
Bank, 1996d). My interviewees from the Bank narrated how representatives from 
UNICEF felt that the best way forward was to extend the ongoing Child Survival and 
Safe Motherhood (CSSM) programme with a focus on immunisation. A former Bank 
staff articulated UNICEF’s reservation in the quote below. 
UNICEF was the leader in child health and had a good rapport 
with the Government of India. Their rationale was that talking to 
India about women and women’s empowerment will get you 
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nowhere but if you talk about the child that is everyone’s 
business and everyone has a sympathetic ear for that. So the 
best point of entry was to talk about child survival. The Bank 
had started with child survival and as an afterthought; safe 
motherhood was added to that. The time was right. The 
Government wanted to shift away from targets. I adamantly 
refused UNICEF’s direction towards child survival alone. I said, 
‘we have to go with the world trends and reproductive health, 
so you take reproductive and child health together and you get 
the RCH package. So, that battle ended up with the 
Government of India buying into our idea of reproductive and 
child health rather than an extension of CSSM-II. 
In April 1996, the Government of India adopted a target-free approach for its family 
planning programme (Government of India, 1996), and in 1997, the Board of the 
World Bank approved the first phase of the RCH project with an overall credit of 
$255 million towards the total project cost of $309 million, and the Government of 
India financed the rest of the project costs (World Bank, 1997). RCH-I aimed to 
reduce maternal and infant morbidity and mortality, and unwanted pregnancies, 
leading to the stabilisation of population growth. Despite the negotiations around 
reproductive rights and health and the need to move away from target-based family 
planning approach, note that the end goal of this project was to ultimately, stabilise 
the population in the country. 
 
RCH-I had three objectives: (1) improving management performance, (2) delivering 
an essential package of reproductive and child health services, and (3) improving 
health care access in selected disadvantaged districts. The essential package of 
RCH services included the treatment for reproductive and sexual tract infections, 
provision of contraceptive methods, antenatal care, institutional deliveries, postnatal 
check-ups, immunisation, and treatment for acquired respiratory infections and 
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Implementation  
A senior health specialist based in Washington D.C, led the RCH-I, and was 
supported by three consultants at the Bank’s country office in New Delhi. RCH-I was 
implemented by the MoHFW at three levels. At the centre-level, the MoHFW was 
responsible for monitoring policy implementation, financial management and the bulk 
procurement of drugs and equipment. The MoHFW was led by health secretaries 
who were IAS officers (civil servants or bureaucrats).  At the state-level, the state 
health department was responsible for training staff, financial management and 
monitoring of activities in their districts. At the district-level, the district health team 
implemented the planned activities and relied on the State and the Centre for 
financial and technical support (World Bank, 1997; 2005). RCH-I was a centralised 
programme in that the power to make policy, programmatic and financial decisions 
rested with MoHFW staff at the central government.  
 
This project was designed to be implemented in selected districts across all the 
states in India. MoHFW communicated with individual states to submit proposals to 
meet the planned objectives of RCH-I. The Bank advised the MoHFW to appoint up 
an ad-hoc panel of senior government officials to review RCH proposals submitted 
by the states (World Bank, 1997). A former Bank staff recounted how it was initially 
difficult to get all the states on board to submit their RCH proposals, owing to the 
varying levels of managerial and financial capacities and political will across the 
states. However, they also discussed the power of the central government over the 
states in India. 
The joint secretary called all the states and said that, ‘each 
state, please put up a proposal and explain how you are going 
to address the problem (maternal and child health)’. The central 
government will sit with the Bank and then see how to work it 
out. She personally insisted that the top man from each state 
(health secretary) should come to Delhi and make the 
presentation personally. If they did not come personally, there 
would be no money for that state. When we looked at the 
proposals, the states that were most in need had the weakest 
proposals and the weakest state had no proposal at all. They 
did not even put up a proposal neither did they bother to come. 
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She picked up the phone and blasted them saying, ‘you are 
losing this much money. Make yourself available within the next 
four hours.’ She was very fierce with them. I had to sit back and 
just watch the interaction between the central government and 
the states. 
Around RCH-I, the central government allocated 90% of the funds for health 
programmes in each state, while the states paid the remaining 10% of the costs. 
States in the country were categorised into three groups - A, B, and C - based on the 
burden of maternal and child morbidity and mortality as well as their financial and 
managerial capacities. States in Group A included Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, 
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Punjab, and were more affluent than states in 
Groups B and C, which at the time received greater central government funding.  
A former member of Bank staff reported mild dissatisfaction with the final selection of 
districts and attributed this factor for the outcomes of this project.  
So, in terms of the strategy, if I would look back at it now, I 
would say, we chose the really poor performing districts but I 
would say that it would have been better if we chose the not-so 
poor performing, middle but a little bit lower, where you know 
you can actually start showing results. Unless you can show 
results people get disappointed. People move away from the 
thought and they do not want to continue. Do not always select 
punishment situations. Select a situation where you know you 
can show a change. Select a situation where it is not really at 
the top but it is at a place where you can work, you know the 
ambience, environment, conditions are not so difficult that it 
would be like you are pulling teeth. 
Bank staff’s involvement in RCH-I was limited to overall financing, liaising with the 
MoHFW at the central level to plan and finalise activities for each state, and bi-
annual supervisory visits. The state health department with oversight from the 
MoHFW, controlled the actual implementation of these RCH activities in the selected 
districts.  
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Outcomes  
Maternal, infant, and child mortality declined from the start to the end of RCH-I 
(1997-2004) (IIPS, 1998; 2007). The maternal mortality rate dropped from 540 
deaths per 100000 live births to 301. Infant mortality rate decreased from 71 deaths 
per 1000 live births to 58, and child mortality dropped from 102 to 76. While the 
decline in mortality rates looked promising, RCH service-related indicators did not 
increase as planned (IIPS, 2007). The proportion of pregnant women that received 
the recommended three antenatal visits recorded a modest increase from 44% to 
52%. Although the percentage of institutional deliveries increased from 40% to 47%, 
the proportion of deliveries in public health facilities funded by RCH-I declined from 
24% to 18% while deliveries in private facilities rose from 9% to 21%. Postnatal visits 
declined from 14% to 12%. Full immunisation coverage barely rose by a percentage 
point from 42% to 43%. Furthermore, care seeking for children under the age of 
three years suffering from diarrhoea dropped from 65% to 58%. A positive result was 
seen in the declining incidence of polio cases from 1931 in 1998 to 133 in 2004. 
These results indicated that despite the increased funds, RCH-I did not increase the 
number of women who sought RCH services in public health facilities.   
 
In terms of contributions to the health system, RCH-I led to 60% of districts planning 
their maternal and child health activities, which was a positive result as previously 
the central government would conduct this planning. However, districts still did not 
have any fiscal autonomy to hire staff or make any required purchases, and would 
have to wait for approval from the state and central government, causing delays 
(Government of India, 2005). Furthermore, in all states, SCOVAs (standing 
committee for voluntary action) were established to track and monitor financial flows 
from the central government to the district level. Work began on computerising 
procurement systems, but it was only completed for the MoHFW at the central 
government by the time RCH-I ended (World Bank, 2005).  
 
My interviewees from the MoHFW stated that while RCH-I provided a range of health 
services for women and children, the burden of providing these services ultimately 
fell upon the inadequately and ill-equipped primary health facilities and frontline 
health workers such as the Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM). Before RCH-I, the ANM 
was incentivised to increase the numbers of women who accepted family planning 
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centre and by strengthening procurement systems, and (3) polio eradication (World 
Bank, 2006). Additionally, RCH-II aimed to reduce the disparities in the utilisation of 
RCH services geographically (i.e. in 8 high burden states) and among poor 
households. Nearly 30% of the RCH-II was dedicated to child immunisation 
programmes. 
 
Two significant events took place around the design of RCH-II. First, in April 2005, 
the government of India under the newly elected United Progressive Alliance 
(formerly the Indian National Congress), launched the National Rural Health Mission 
(Government of India, 2005). This national programme increased the domestic 
health budget and introduced several schemes to generate demand for maternal and 
child health, such as community health workers called ASHAs in every village, and 
the Janani Suraksha Yojana, a conditional cash transfer scheme for institutional 
deliveries. Most of my interviewees noted that this kind of political and financial 
support vis-à-vis the NRHM raised the profile of maternal and child health in India 
like never before. 
 
Second, in 2005, a corruption investigation in RCH-I led to the Bank management 
suspending funds for RCH-II and other health and public infrastructure projects (INT, 
2007; Volcker, 2007). While my interviewees who worked with the MoHFW refrained 
from discussing the corruption scandal, former Bank staff who held leadership 
positions in HNP at the Bank headquarters in Washington D.C and in India were 
candid about their experiences. A former Bank staff recounted his assignment in the 
country post the corruption episode. 
When I first got to India around RCH-II, there was a rocky 
relationship between the Bank and the Ministry (of Health). I 
had some of the most acrimonious meetings of my career in 
those times. That had nothing to do with the HNP staff in the 
country office. It was an independent investigation set up by a 
former Bank President. The Bank really screwed up the 
investigation and it caused a lot of animosity. 
 
Former Bank staff from the country office confirmed that the Bank management in 
Washington D.C did not consult with them about the suspension of funds, 
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highlighting the lack of communication between the different units within the Bank. 
My interviewees further explained that Bank managers in the country as well as at 
the headquarters generally knew about instances of corruption in government 
projects in India, but did not take any concrete actions. Corruption in India was a 
complex and difficult issue to address and as it would affect Bank business in that it 
would delay or stall ongoing discussions around policy agreements, programmes 
and most importantly, loan approvals. Bank funds for RCH-II were released in 2006; 
soon after, the Bank and MoHFW agreed on a Governance and Accountability 
Action Plan, which included measures to revamp the procurement system in the 
country (World Bank, 2006).   
 
Implementation 
My interviewees from the MoHFW and the Bank, spoke about four novel elements in 
RCH-II, which they felt contributed to improved project implementation as compared 
to the previous phase. First, the MoHFW, the Bank and other donors agreed to 
promote decentralisation in that state governments were given administrative and 
financial autonomy unlike in RCH-I, wherein the central government retained all the 
decision-making powers. The MoHFW and Bank staff supported state governments 
to develop project implementation plans and budgets. Additionally, state 
governments signed memorandums of understanding with the central government to 
ensure the utilisation of funds for the planned RCH activities, thereby increasing 
ownership and accountability. A former Bank staff who was closely involved in RCH-
II recounted his team’s efforts in achieving decentralisation.  
There was a conscious direction from the start about the 
lessons learned in RCH-I. In the first phase, RCH was a 
smaller project. While it involved a paradigm shift, it was 
centrally driven. There was an emphasis on line items and 
executing activities. In RCH-II, the focus shifted to 
decentralisation at the state and district level. There were 
discussions around flexibility of financial resources to the states 
and districts. We had a hands-on approach. We prepared 
manuals to help states write project proposals. 
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Second, former Bank staff claimed credit for convening donors and convincing them 
to create a flexible pool of donor resources at the central government-level, which 
could be disbursed to state governments. My interviewees from the MoHFW and 
UNFPA - as well project reports - corroborated Bank leadership for donor 
coordination and pooled donor financing (Government of India, 2012; World Bank, 
2012; DfID, 2009). The third novel aspect was the MoHFW’s joint review missions, 
which was a workshop attended by all the project partners to discuss progress and 
challenges, and share best practices across the states. The Bank convened two joint 
review missions each year of the RCH-II; the first joint review mission focused on the 
eight high focus states, while the second review invited all the remaining states.  
 
Finally, RCH-II offered flexible funding for state governments to implement 
innovations to increase the uptake of RCH services. The Janani Suraksha Yojana, a 
conditional cash transfer scheme, was one such innovation. Though this, pregnant 
women from households living below the poverty line were entitled to cash incentives 
for giving birth in health facilities. While the Bank promoted Janani Suraksha Yojana 
as it was a performance-based financing initiative, this scheme was launched by the 
MoHFW under the National Rural Health Mission. RCH-II received major boost from 
the overarching NRHM, which increased the overall national financial budget, and 
strengthened infrastructure and human resources. 
 
Outcomes 
By the end of RCH-II, the national maternal mortality rate dropped from 254 deaths 
per 100000 live births to 167, and the infant mortality rate declined from 57 deaths to 
1000 live births to 40 (Government of India, 2019). The proportion of decline in the 
maternal mortality rate by the end of RCH-I was greater, whereas the drop in the 
infant mortality rate was comparatively larger after RCH-II (see table 7.1). Maternal 
and infant mortality rates also showed sharpest declines in eight states, including 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan. These 
had the highest burden of maternal and child deaths in the country and are the 
poorest in terms of GDP (Government of India, 2001). RCH-II recorded a substantial 
increase in the uptake of three health services: institutional deliveries (39% to 79%), 
post-natal checks (40% to 62%), and full immunisation of children under 24 months 
(36% to 62%). Additionally, the highest coverage of these services was observed 
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a bit of lull with the Bank and the Ministry. It is only now that the 
government is opening up for a bigger discussion.   
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced the process of the design and implementation of both 
the phases of the RCH project. In doing so, I have introduced the major actors and 
described the changes that took places across these two phases. By the time RCH-I 
concluded in 2004, maternal and infant mortality declined and deliveries in public 
facilities saw a minimal increase. Despite the decline in mortality rates, there was no 
improvement in health service uptake, owing to ambitious planning, weak 
programme implementation and heavily centralised planning with little decision-
making autonomy at the state level.  
Compared to RCH-I which was donor-driven (particularly by the Bank), the second 
phase of this project was led by the Indian government. RCH-II achieved a greater 
decline in maternal and child mortality and institutional deliveries recorded a massive 
jump. While RCH-II showed improved health outcomes, challenges persisted, 
especially with respect to state-level planning and managerial capacities, and 
governance. This understanding of the RCH project thus sets the context to examine 









Chapter 8 Ascertaining the World Bank’s influence 
in India through the Reproductive and 
Child Health Project  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms the second part of a two-part process to examine the World 
Bank’s influence at the country-level for maternal and child health. In this chapter, I 
explore the process in which the Bank exerts its influence over the Indian Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) vis-à-vis the Reproductive and Child Health 
(RCH) Project, to achieve certain outcomes for maternal and child health. In doing 
so, I uncover this process of donor influence including the resources and 
mechanisms used by the Bank, and also ascertain the degree of the Bank’s 
influence over a domestic nodal agency. For this chapter, I use the framework of 
donor influence in health policy (as conceptualised and described in Chapter Two) to 
analyse data on the RCH project from multiple sources. This framework has four 
components: (1) outcomes, (2) resources, (3) mechanisms, and (4) contextual 
factors (see figure 8.1). 
 
Figure 8.1: Conceptual framework of donor influence in health policy    
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The starting point for this analysis was identifying what the Bank actually influenced 
i.e., what were the outcomes of the Bank’s influence. Maternal and child mortality in 
India declined after each phase of the RCH project end. While RCH-I was not able to 
increase the number of women and children utilising reproductive, maternal, and 
child health services, after RCH-II ended, a substantial increase was reported in the 
uptake of institutional deliveries (39% to 79%) and child immunisation (36% to 62%) 
(IIPS, 2017, 2007). It is impossible to trace the Bank’s precise influence over each of 
these maternal and child health mortality outcomes and service coverage indicators. 
Guided by the conceptual framework, I looked for health policy outcomes (i.e., any 
decision, plan, or action undertaken to strengthen the health system or facilitate 
programme implementation and service delivery) where the Bank had played a role 
in.  
 
I followed a two-step process to identify such policy outcomes. First, I carefully 
reviewed project implementation reports and evaluations published by the MoHFW 
and the Bank (Government of India, 2012, 2005; World Bank 2012, 2005, 1997, 
1996), and I identified six policy outcomes raised in these documents. Second, I 
verified these six policy outcomes through my interviews with staff from the Bank and 
the MoHFW. The six policy outcomes included: (1) target-free policy for family 
planning, (2) priority setting for reproductive and maternal health, (3) 
decentralisation, (4) financial monitoring system, (5) strengthened procurement 
system, and (6) increased domestic financing for reproductive, maternal, newborn 
and child health. The six policy outcomes are significant for maternal and child health 
in the country as these facilitate programme implementation and enable effective 
service delivery, which will subsequently impact health outcomes.  
 
After ascertaining the outcomes, I deductively analysed the interview data to identify 
the other components of the framework viz. resources, mechanisms, and contextual 
factors. I defined resources as any objects of value and mechanisms as any strategy 
(Pawson and Tilly, 1997) used by the Bank to exert its influence over the MoHFW to 
achieve the policy outcomes. Additionally, contextual factors are elements within a 
country that can affect the interaction between the donor and the domestic agency, 
thereby impacting the external donor’s influence. I deductively analysed the data 
using this framework, and organised the findings for each of the six policy outcomes.  
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Furthermore, I developed a sustainability index for each outcome, which informs us if 
a particular outcome is still being achieved or has been discontinued. This index has 
three stages. First, the outcome could be in an ‘ideational’ stage, where it exists as 
an idea or a concept but has not moved further to being implemented in practice 
such as through a policy or a programme. Second, the outcome could be at the 
‘implementation’ stage, where it is being practiced in some form. Third, the outcome 
could be at the ‘institutionalisation’ stage, where it has been established as a 
convention or a norm within an institution i.e., MoHFW, such that it continues to be 
implemented even after donor leaves (i.e. funding or technical support ends).  
In the following segments of the chapter, I describe the Bank’s process of influence 
for the six outcomes. For each outcome, I discuss the resources and mechanisms 
used by the Bank, followed by the degree of the Bank’s influence, and the 
sustainability of that outcome. Finally, I discuss the organisational barriers within the 
Bank and the MoHFW and the contextual factors at the country level that affected 
this process of influence.  
I conclude the chapter by summarising the key findings emerging from this country 
case study of the RCH project. Essentially, I attempt to answer five questions: (1) 
What was the World Bank’s overall influence vis-à-vis the RCH project? (2) What 
resources and mechanisms did the Bank use to exert its influence? (3) What factors 
affected this process of influence? (4) What can be said about the sustainability of 
the outcomes influenced by the Bank? (5) What does this country case study tell us 
about the ways in which the Bank conceptualised maternal and child health?  
 
8.2 Process of donor influence 
 
8.2.1 Outcome 1: Target-free policy for family planning 
Outcome 
In 1965, it was the Bank, among other international agencies, that pressurised the 
MoHFW to adopt the target-based approach for family planning in the first place 
(Visaria and Chari, 1998, p. 80). However, towards the late 1980s Bank specialists 
were moving away from targets, which was evident in Stout’s review of India’s family 
planning programme (Stout, 1989). Amidst a financial crisis and in need of low-cost 
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loans to support its family planning programme, the MoHFW agreed to a public 
health sector review by the Bank, which resulted in the recommendation of a target-
free policy for family planning in India. The government’s adoption of this policy was 
quickly followed up by two Bank loans: one for the RCH project that would implement 
this policy, and the other for a population project. 
 
Resources 
Bank staff first used knowledge-based resources, including its 1989 report by 
specialist Susan Stout to highlight the ineffectiveness of the target-based approach 
for family planning. The 1995 report recommended a target-free reproductive health 
approach. While these reports supported the Bank’s advocacy for this outcome, 
ultimately, it was the Bank’s financial resources in the form of loans for the RCH 
project and the population project that played a major role in convincing the MoHFW 
towards adopting a target-free policy.  
 
Mechanisms 
Bank staff used four mechanisms to influence this outcome: policy dialogue, local 
intermediaries, financial arrangements, and partnerships. First, Bank staff conducted 
policy dialogue through activities such as the sector review (field visits and analysis) 
and consultation meetings with senior government officials in the MoHFW over a 
period of two years (1994-1996) (Measham and Heaver, 1996; World Bank, 1995b). 
Second, Bank staff worked closely with local intermediaries; i.e. senior IAS officers in 
the MoHFW including health secretaries V.K Shunglu, J.C Pant, and Y.N Chaturvedi, 
who were receptive to change and played a leading role in passing the target-free 
policy (World Bank, 1996e,f). Former secretary J.C Pant was keen to close the loan 
deal with the Bank for the population and RCH project, since he was scheduled to 
retire and wanted to leave a legacy. Third, the Bank got a receptive MoHFW to sign 
up for the RCH project by inducing it with the financial arrangement of loans worth 
$505 million for population control and RCH (Donaldson, 2002). Fourth, Bank staff 
used their partnerships with other donors, women’s health advocates, and NGOs, 
and encouraged discussions of the target-setting system and its consequences 
within these circles. The Bank also funded the Indian NGO ‘HealthWatch’ for a study 
on unsafe abortions, which was presented to the MoHFW as evidence to advocate 
for the target-free policy and expansion of safe abortion services. 
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Degree of Influence  
The Bank had partial influence on this outcome. While the Bank used loans as a 
lever to push for this reform, it did so along the same lines that many women’s health 
advocates and local demographers had been urging and that senior government 
bureaucrats had become convinced was appropriate. So, the Bank’s arguments fell 
on fertile ground. But for them to become effective, senior Indian policy makers had 
to accept on the donor’s point of view. 
  
Sustainability of the Outcome 
Despite, being adopted by the Government of India in 1996 and included it in its 
National Population Policy in 2000, the target-free policy still remains at an 
implementation stage. This is because several state governments have formulated 
their own population policies, and only a handful of states in the country follow a 
target-free approach for family planning (Bhattacharya, 2007). A senior former official 
from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare highlighted the contextual challenges 
in implementing this policy.  
 
Some of us in the Ministry had been strongly voicing the removal of targets which 
has had such a long history in the country as you will be aware. Of course, the Bank 
came in and offered loans, but it was not easy to implement this target-free policy 
across the states. Adopting the policy is one thing, but explaining it to the states and 
then trying to get this done at the district level with little guidance was challenging. 
 




Most of my interviewees from across different organisations stated that the Bank 
influenced the RCH project through placing reproductive and maternal health on the 
national health agenda during RCH-I and maintaining this priority through RCH-II. 
Former staff from the MoHFW and the Bank reflected that in the absence of RCH-I, 
the Indian government would probably have continued its focus on child 
immunisation and family planning, with little attention to reproductive and maternal 
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health services. A former staff of the MoHFW articulated this possibility in the quote 
below: 
UNICEF wanted a continuation of immunisation services, but 
the Bank insisted on including safe motherhood components. 
You see…UNICEF was an important actor for child health, so 
we had these debates. But, the positive thing about the joint 
consultations with the Bank team was that they kept us all 
focused on maternal health. 
Similarly, a former staff of the Bank asserted: 
I think if the Bank had not been in India, then the government 
would have gone down the same line of WHO and UNICEF 
and followed child survival and immunisation route, which was 
basically the welfare of the child and the continued focus on 
family planning. The Bank can rightly take credit for that. Don’t 
get me wrong. There were many agencies that were working 
on it, but the Bank had the clout and the money to make the 
difference.  
For RCH-II, the Bank galvanised the support of donor agencies like DfID and 
UNFPA, to promote reproductive and maternal health in India. The National Rural 
Health Mission was a homegrown programme that was fully designed and funded by 
the Indian government without any donor inputs or influence. Despite the NRHM, 
former staff from the MoHFW credited RCH-II for keeping reproductive, maternal, 
and child health on ‘top of mind’ of the domestic policy makers, as illustrated in the 
quote below from a former staff from the MoHFW who was closely involved in the 
design and implementation of the NRHM:  
NRHM, if I may say so, did come from the RCH route. RCH 
helped me to understand the area of maternal and child health. 
The presence of these luminaries [at the Bank] kept RCH on the 
agenda. I mean….otherwise, it would have taken a back seat, 





Bank staff used financial, technical, and network-based resources to influence the 
priority setting for reproductive and maternal health. First, the Bank’s financial 
resources in the form of loans for RCH-I and the population project amidst ongoing 
financial crisis, made the MoHFW more acquiescent to the Bank’s discussions on 
expanding reproductive and maternal health services (Donaldson, 2002). Second, 
Bank staff used technical resources in the form of local consultants that worked with 
the MoHFW and state governments to coordinate planning and implementation of 
RCH-I (World Bank, 1996b). Third, Bank staff used its existing networks and 




First, Bank staff used policy dialogue through consultation meetings with senior 
officials in the MoHFW. Bank health specialists from Washington D.C, attended 
these consultation meetings and argued for the introduction of services for RTI and 
STIs into the existing package of services for maternal and child health services.  
Second, former Bank staff explained how they linked reproductive and maternal 
health to improved child health outcomes, and felt that this strategic framing of the 
reproductive, maternal and child health continuum facilitated the buy-in for the RCH 
project from the MoHFW. Third, the Bank had exclusive access to officials in the 
Ministry of Finance, owing to their ongoing IDA lending for other public sector 
projects. For every health project that the Bank funds, it has to first be approved by 
the Ministry of Finance, which will then officially request for a loan for the MoHFW. 
My interviewees with former staff at the Bank reported that they shared a good 
relationship with Manmohan Singh (Finance Minister during RCH-I and former Bank 
staff), which they felt was advantageous to secure an approval for the RCH project.  
 
Fourth, Bank staff used their strong relationships with local intermediaries (top-level 
officials) in the MoHFW, to engage state governments to submit proposals and 
subsequently implement the RCH project. Fifth, the Bank used financial 
arrangements such as quick and flexible disbursement of resources to enlist the 
support of state governments in implementing both the phases of the RCH project.  
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Sixth, Bank staff used their partnerships with UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, to 
advocate for the expansion of reproductive health services in the country. A former 
Bank staff in a leadership position recounted that some of these partnerships also 
provided a public relations function for the Bank: 
Whatever we did was hand in glove with WHO and UNICEF. 
Some of the things we did, it was cloaked as if it were UNICEF. 
The Indian government had to convince the naysayers who 
believed that UNICEF was doing a great job but the World Bank 
was evil. We had a wonderful partnership, a huge one, posing 
as if it were done by UNICEF, as if the Bank were barely 
involved.  
 
Degree of Influence  
The Bank had a partial influence on this outcome. While the Bank offered the much-
needed financial resources and initiated discussions for the RCH project in a window 
when the conditions in the country were ripe for change, domestic policy makers in 
the MoHFW along with local researchers, women’s health advocates, and civil 
society organisations were the main drivers for this outcome as they championed for 
prioritising reproductive and maternal health since the late 1980s, much before Bank 
lending for RCH. While acknowledging the role of the Bank, a current official in the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare gave prominence to several factors for raising 
the priority of reproductive and maternal health in the country: 
The World Bank was an important player through the RCH 
projects. They (projects) pushed the thinking within the ministry. 
But, you have to consider this long period of change in the 
country. We started with the NFHS (national level household 
surveys) that showed such high maternal mortality rates and 
raised the alarm among the government officials and 
parliamentarians. Then, we had the Congress government led 
by Dr Manmohan Singh…it took special interest in maternal and 
child health and the NRHM was created.  




Sustainability of the Outcome 
This priority for reproductive and maternal health has been institutionalised by the 
MoHFW in two ways. First, through the National Rural Health Mission in 2005, the 
MOHFW has raised the political attention and domestic financial resources for this 
area (Government of India, 2005). Second, in 2013, the MoHFW published a 
RMNCH+A strategy that funds interventions in targeted high burden districts across 
the country (Government of India, 2013).  
 
8.2.3 Outcome 3: Decentralisation for the RCH project 
 
Outcome 
One of the major challenges of RCH-I was that it was centrally driven with little 
decision-making autonomy with state governments. My interviewees reported that 
during the design process for RCH-II, the Bank along with DfID and UNFPA 
promoted decentralised planning for RCH programmes at the state and district level. 
A former Bank staff recounted the need for decentralisation as the biggest lesson 
learned from RCH-I: 
There was a conscious effort to start from the lessons learned in 
the first phase. Both the Government of India and the Bank 
thought that decentralising maternal and child health operations 
to the states, districts and communities was vital for the success 
of the project, so both the sides spent considerable time in the 
design of RCH-II to facilitate that change. 
 
Donor-led negotiations during the design of RCH-II provided a nudge to the MoHFW, 
which was already debating the introduction of this reform as recommended by the 
Planning Commission in 2001 (Government of India, 2002). In 2005, the 
government-funded National Rural Health Mission officially decentralised the public 
health planning process by offering state governments the power to develop their 
own state and district plans along with flexible funds to implement these plans 
(Government of India, 2005).  
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Resources 
Bank staff first used their existing networks to convene donors that were already 
working in different states in the country (DFID, 2009; Government of India, 2012). A 
former Bank staff who worked closely on RCH-II, felt that the collective voices of the 
donors and their support for decentralisation made a difference in the planning 
discussions with the MoHFW. Second, Bank staff used knowledge-based resources 
in the form of manuals and guidelines to help state governments in developing state 
and district implementation plans.  
 
Mechanisms 
Bank staff engaged in policy dialogue through consultation meetings with officials 
from the MoHFW and state governments, where they promoted the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the government of India and individual 
states to enhance state ownership and accountability for RCH implementation 
(World Bank, 2012). Bank staff engaged in donor coordination and used the financial 
arrangement of pooled donor funding for RCH-II, which offered flexible funds for 
state governments to make timely purchasing decisions and fund innovative 
schemes that would not have been possible within the framework of the MoHFW’s 
existing financial arrangements.  
 
Degree of influence  
The Bank had a partial influence on this outcome of decentralisation. While the Bank 
staff promoted decentralisation during the design of RCH-II, it was really the 
government that drove home the decentralisation reform through the National Rural 
Health Mission. At best, the Bank along with DfID provided a significant nudge for 
the MoHFW to implement a reform that was already being debated within 
government circles and recommended by the national planning commission much 
before RCH-II.  
 
Sustainability of the Outcome  
The National Rural Health Mission made decentralised planning as one of its key 
principles, thereby institutionalising this reform. Under this Mission, the government 
created a national program coordination committee at the central-level, the state 
health mission at the state-level and the district health mission at the district-level 
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(Government of India, 2005). These specially designated teams at the three levels, 
have the autonomy to plan and manage RCH programmes as well as the flexibility of 
financial resources to make expenditures as required.  
 
8.2.4 Outcome 4: SCOVAS - Platform for monitoring financial flows  
 
Outcome 
During the implementation of RCH-I, Bank staff supported the MoHFW in 
establishing state-level societies called SCOVAs (Standing Committees for Voluntary 
Action). These were essentially platforms equipped with an accountant and a 
statistical clerk to monitor funding flows from the central government through the 
state government to the district. RCH-I funded all except one state government to set 
up SCOVA’s at the state and district-level. A total of 118 local consultants were 
recruited to work in SCOVAs in various states.  
 
Resources 
Bank staff mainly employed their technical resources in the form of financial 
consultants who advised officials in the MoHFW and the state governments on the 
process of establishing SCOVAs, and knowledge-based resources such as manuals 
and guidelines to assist state governments in setting up these platforms.  
 
Mechanisms 
First, Bank staff used policy dialogue through consultation meetings during the 
design of RCH-I to raise the lack of any information system on funds flow in the 
public health sector and advocate for new institutions to address this intractable 
issue. Second, Bank staff used their relationships with local intermediaries in the 
MoHFW, who once convinced, drove the concept of SCOVAs into reality.  
He [senior MoHFW official] was able to make Bank lending 
additive in a way that was never done before. Prior to the 
1990s, the Planning Commission would ask the Ministry of 
Health – ‘Tell us what you are going to do and then we will find 
the money for you. Where we find the money from is none of 
your business.’ When I went to India, sometimes, states would 
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use the health money to pay for power or electric subsidies. 
They [MoHFW senior officials] created financing tools to shield 
the money for health and enable better implementation. 
 
Degree of Influence  
The Bank had substantial influence over this outcome. While the Bank introduced 
the platform of SCOVAs to monitor and track financial flows, in the RCH-I design 
period, these new institutions would not have been realised without the major drive 
from senior officials at the MoHFW, who engaged state governments to apply for 
funding to set up SCOVAs in their individual states.  
 
Sustainability of the Outcome 
SCOVAs currently stand at the implementation level in terms of sustainability. All the 
states in the country have SCOVAs, but with varied levels of implementation and 
impact. In southern Indian states, SCOVAs function well; however, in certain states 
they perform at a sub-optimal level due to lack of clarity of roles and inadequate 
number of trained and qualified staff. Most importantly, while SCOVAs help to 
monitor and track financial flows, they serve as a temporary solution to the larger 
problem of weak financial management capacity and accountability within certain 
states (Government of India, 2012). 
 
8.2.5 Outcome 5: Strengthened procurement system 
 
Outcome 
Following its internal investigation over the corruption in RCH-I, the Bank suspended 
the loan for RCH-II. This made the MoHFW acquiescent towards the Bank’s 
recommendations on strengthening procurement as a measure to tackle corruption 
(Kirk, 2010). First, Bank staff persuaded the MoHFW to employ UNOPS (United 
Nations Office or Project Services) as a central procurement agency for RCH-II. 
Second, the Bank and the MoHFW agreed on a comprehensive Governance and 
Accountability Action Plan to address the procurement deficiencies in the public 
health sector. In line with this plan, the MoHFW set up the Empowered Procurement 
Wing at the central government-level, computerising the entire procurement process 
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for increasing competition and transparency. By the end of RCH-II, thirteen states 
set up state-level procurement agencies. A former staff member of the Bank credited 
it with revamping procurement system vis-à-vis RCH-II: 
Using the web to have information given out, allowing enough 
time for vendors to participate, and the whole review 
process….we did these things and strengthened the central 
government’s procurement capacity. A separate cell 
(Empowered Procurement Wing) was set firmly established at 
the central level. Pharmaceutical procurement is one of the 
biggest areas for corruption, so that (Empowered Procurement 
Wing) was a big thing. This system wasn’t only for maternal and 
child health; it got replicated all over the public health system. 
 
A former staff from the MoHFW reaffirmed the Bank’s contribution in this outcome.  
One area that I can certainly say where the Bank led the way 
was the procurement system. Procurement definitely became 
more robust after RCH-II 
 
Resources 
Bank staff used their financial, technical, and network-based resources to influence 
this outcome. First, the Bank used its financial resources in that it suspended its 
loans, which pressurised the MoHFW to adopt the Bank’s recommendations on 
procurement. Second, the Bank’s technical experts advised the MoHFW on 
revamping its procurement system. The Bank also engaged the services of a British 
consulting firm called ‘Crown Agents’ to conduct a procurement capacity review of 
the MoHFW and Indian states, to inform the setting up of procurement agencies at 
the central and state-level (Narayana, 2015). Third, the Bank used its existing 
networks within the UN system in getting UNOPS enlisted as the MoHFW’s central 
procurement agency. A Bank evaluation report (World Bank, 2012) as well as 
interviews with former Bank staff reported that involving UNOPS to procure on behalf 
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Mechanisms 
First, Bank staff used policy dialogue through consultation meetings, where they 
employed the independent investigation report as evidence to argue for a change in 
the existing procurement system. More importantly, Bank staff used the financial 
arrangement of suspension of funds for RCH-II as well as other health and public 
infrastructure projects to induce the MoHFW to introduce a revamped procurement 
system. Subsequently, the Governance and Accountability Action Plan got listed as 
one of the major project objectives for RCH-II. A former member of Bank staff’s 
comment below elucidates the Bank’s position in this negotiation:  
The corruption situation placed the Bank in a better seat. It was 
easier to get the ministry to agree to streamline its procurement 
system and create these changes. 
 
Degree of Influence  
The Bank was the main driver for this outcome. Without the Bank’s push and 
technical assistance, the changes in procurement would not have been 
implemented. A former MoHFW staff member confirmed the Bank’s leading role for 
this outcome: 
The Bank got in some good practices. In the case of 
procurement and financial audits, that was their biggest strength 
and value addition. Perhaps, the government would have not 
invested in these systems, without the Bank.  
 
Sustainability of the Outcome 
This outcome stands at the implementation level in terms of sustainability. The 
Empowered Procurement Wing at the central government level, responsible for 
procuring a selected number of goods and services, functions well. However, at the 
decentralized level, only 13 states have established state procurement agencies and 
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Mechanisms 
Bank staff conducted policy dialogue with the MoHFW to place increased domestic 
financing on the national health agenda. Bank staff used their access to the Ministry 
of Finance to persuade the central government to borrow IDA credits for the RCH 
programme. Finally, donor coordination was used by the Bank staff to create the 
financial arrangement of flexible pool for RCH, which supplemented the overall RCH 
budget and helped to reduce duplication efforts by donors. A former staff member 
from the MoHFW reaffirmed the contribution of the Bank-led donor coordination in 
the quote below. 
Another thing that happened, which was good in a sense….the 
Bank reached out to the other development partners in the 
country. For RCH-II, it was one team, a huge team, about 40 
plus people including the ministry (of health) and all the donors. 
It was one team…where we could actually talk to all the donors 
in one place. I think that was a major part of the Bank’s 
technical support. 
 
Degree of Influence  
The Bank had a partial influence on this outcome. At best, Bank staff played a 
supporting role by convincing the government to borrow IDA credits for RCH and by 
promoting a flexible pool for donor financing. As a former Bank staff said, “India 
would have eventually done this themselves, but for maternal and child health, we 
did give them a push”. However, this overall increase in the RCH budget was 
primarily driven by the government of India, when it decided to launch the National 
Rural Health Mission, which ultimately increased the overall domestic budget for 
public health and maternal and child health. 
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Sustainability   
This outcome stands at the implementation level in terms of sustainability. 
Currently, the central government budget for RCH remains constant and the 
flexible donor pool still exists, albeit without current funding from the Bank. 
While the financing situation at the central government-level looks promising, 
the RCH budget continues to vary across states in the country. For example, 
the state of Tamil Nadu spends a higher amount for RCH per capita as 
compared to the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which have the highest 
burden of maternal and child mortality (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
2018). Institutionalising this outcome will require advocacy for all the states in 
the country to increase their domestic budgets including per capita 
expenditure for RCH programmes. 
 
8.2.7 Contextual factors  
Political 
Most of my interviewees across informant groups, expressed that the political 
situation at the centre or in the state was a make or break factor for the RCH 
project implementation. At the central government-level, the newly elected 
United Progressive Alliance (Congress) Party demonstrated political priority 
for maternal and child health through the launch of the National Rural Health 
Mission. At the state government-level, certain states such as Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala, are known historically for their welfare oriented public policies 
and strong political commitment for maternal and child health (Drèze and 
Sen, 2013). A former staff from the Bank credited the change in political 
leadership in Bihar as a major contextual factor for the improvement in the 
maternal and child health landscape of a state. 
 
Economic Status 
India’s economic status shaped its negotiating position with the Bank. During 
RCH-I, India was in a financially weak position and needed loans to keep its 
family planning and maternal and child health programmes. As a result, 
RCH-I was donor-driven, giving the Bank tremendous influence over 
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programme design. By 2005, India had become an emerging economy and 
was able to finance its own National Rural Health Mission, which subsumed 
the RCH-II. By financing 85% of the project costs of RCH-II, India was in the 
driver’s seat, in terms of decision-making around the design and 
implementation of the project. 
 
Social 
Gender affected the RCH project outcomes. The position of Indian women in 
the family and community is still weak; thus, gender norms have implications 
for women’s autonomy over their reproductive health as well as their health-
seeking behaviours. While Bank staff pushed for the novel introduction of 
services for reproductive tract infections, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
abortions across all public health facilities, they did not consider or try to 
address the social determinants that affect women’s autonomy to actually 
use these health services (Simon-Kumar, 2007). Moreover, the caste system 
is one of the biggest determinants of poor maternal and child health 
outcomes (Sanneving et al., 2013). RCH-II tried to address this contextual 
factor by targeting pregnant women from poor households (as lower castes 
households are some of the poorest in the country) for the cash incentive 
scheme for institutional deliveries. However, it did not tackle this issue on the 
service provision side, where community health workers and other medical 
staff who belong to lower castes often face caste-based discrimination by 
peers, supervisors, and clients (women and their families) from upper castes.  
 
Organisational barriers - World Bank 
My interviews highlighted four organisational challenges within the World 
Bank, which acted as barriers in implementing the RCH project and affected 
the Bank’s level of influence over the outcomes for maternal and child health 
in India. First, while Bank staff have access to top-level officials in the 
ministries of finance and health, in the case of India, this access was limited 
to the central government-level and to some extent, in a few states with 
ongoing Bank-funded health projects. Bank staff had little or no access at the 
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district and local community-level, because of which they were unable to 
oversee day-to-day project implementation or engage in mid-course 
corrections wherever required. Bank staff valued their access to and their 
accompanying influence over the central government as this entity was the 
real client responsible for repayment of Bank credits.  
 
Herein lies the second organisational challenge: i.e. the Bank staff’s 
preoccupation with monitoring the disbursement, utilisation, and repayment 
of loans, which often took away attention and resources from programmatic 
tasks. The MoHFW described the Bank’s performance in RCH-II as 
“suboptimal in terms of its traditional advisory and programme support, and 
predominantly that of a lending institution” (Government of India, 2012, p.13). 
As a former Bank staff eloquently put it, 
At the end of the day, the Bank is a bank. You know….it 
makes its money by lending, so that is always going to 
be the focus. 
 
The inherent nature of the Bank’s technical assistance proved to be the third 
organisational barrier. A former staff from MoHFW highlighted that 
implementing Bank-funded projects came with its share of long and 
sometimes time-consuming procedures and reporting that had to be 
completed in the English language, which was a challenge for certain states 
in North India. Furthermore, the Bank hired local consultants who worked 
alongside staff from the MoHFW. While consultants were used to bypass the 
government’s long delays in approval for hiring, conflicts often arose between 
these consultants and the local district-level MoHFW staff in some states. 
This was because the latter were remunerated much less despite being more 
knowledgeable about local conditions and responsible for all the field 
implementation. Moreover, the Bank maintained control over the RCH project 
from its headquarters in Washington D.C, with team leaders being based 
there and conducting bi-annual supervisory visits to India. Former staff from 
the Bank and MoHFW expressed that this long-distance style of 
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management, which is characteristic of the Bank’s technical assistance, was 
problematic for a vast country like India that has 29 states, each of which 
could be a country in itself. Former Bank staff expressed how, often times, 
they felt overwhelmed at the size of public governance in the country. 
 
Finally, the World Bank is not a monolithic agency. It is made up of multiple 
entities such as the management and the global HNP team based in 
Washington D.C, the regional and country-level HNP teams. Each of these 
units may have different priorities, which can act as a barrier in implementing 
a health project at the country level. The Bank’s response to the corruption 
investigation during RCH-II illustrated this challenge of conflicting priorities 
between the Bank’s multiple units. Bank management in Washington D.C 
were primarily concerned about governance and protecting financial 
resources from being wasted, and immediately suspended funds without 
consulting the HNP staff in India. The HNP staff in India would have 
addressed this issue in a different way, though; they were more concerned 
about maintaining their relationship with the ministries of finance and health 
as this would inevitably affect future lending as well as their own performance 
targets.  
 
Organisational barriers - Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
Five organisational barriers at the MoHFW-level emerged from the analysis 
of the interviews. First, the central MoHFW and state health departments are 
led by elected members of parliament who are advised by civil servants, i.e. 
Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers. IAS officers are thus the top-
level decision-makers when it comes to health policies and programmes in 
India. Former staff from the MoHFW (many of whom were retired IAS officers 
themselves) and the Bank complained that recurrent transfers of IAS officers, 
which is a characteristic feature of the Indian civil service, led to a loss in 
momentum and majorly affected project implementation, as articulated by a 
former MoHFW staff member below: 
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I stayed for four years in the ministry, so I could do 
something. Short tenures are common, for which the 
Bank is not responsible, we fellows are. You get some 
really good officers, you work with them, make progress, 
and then they are transferred...that was a big loss. With 
frequent change of personnel, the money goes down the 
drain. 
 
Second, former staff from the MoHFW pointed out that at the state and 
district-level, public health programmes are typically managed by medical 
doctors. However, the Indian medical education system does not train 
medical doctors in public health management, and the lack of such kind of 
training was reflected in the inefficient management of RCH project. Third, 
the majority of my interviewees spoke at length about how the success of any 
health project relied heavily on the management capacity, organisational 
culture, and leadership in the state health department. A former Bank 
employee recounted what they saw as the difference between state 
capacities:  
Tamil Nadu had good management systems and 
managers. You go to Bihar and you would find the exact 
opposite. They did not know how many midwives or 
community health workers they employed, at grassroots 
people were not paid, no one in clinics, no human being 
or medicines. If the leadership in the (state) health 
department were interested in improving maternal and 
child health, then things would move ahead; if they 
resisted change, then activities would get stalled. We 
tried… 
 
Fourth, the MoHFW has a weak central human resources system, which 
inevitably affected project implementation (Government of India, 2012). While 
the RCH project enabled the MoHFW and state governments to increase the 
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number of contractual staff, their productivity and morale were affected due 
to delay in renewal of contracts and payments, poor service conditions and 
increments, ineffective appraisal system, and lack of regular and updated 
skill-based training. Finally, weak governance and accountability in some 
states, especially in the form of corruption, was a major organisational 
barrier. A former staff from the MoHFW shared their reasoning for the 
widespread corruption within the public health sector. 
It starts with the officers being poorly paid. Some of 
them think that the way to get ahead is to not rock any 
boats. It can be difficult even if you didn’t want to 
participate in collusion because you could get 
blackballed. I think in some ways it works like the mob 
system. 
 
On being asked if the governance practices promoted by the Bank - such as 
procurement and financial monitoring - had made any difference to the 
corruption levels, many of my interviewees said that while the process of 
change had begun, it would require influential persons from within the central 
and state governments to take charge and build accountability. More 
importantly, endemic corruption was said to be symptomatic of the larger 
problem of weak stewardship by the MoHFW. Several former Bank staff 
admitted that they found it rather difficult to approach this issue of 
stewardship after the corruption investigation. This discomfort was articulated 
by a former member of Bank staff as follows: 
When I was there, it was kind of a non-starter as you 
couldn’t use the words governance or stewardship. 
These words would stand for corruption. During the 
investigation, some officials just hated us, not us, but 
what the Bank stood for. So, it was very hard for us to 
have any engagement on the theme of stewardship 
because that became the code work for corruption or 
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anti-corruption. The Bank talks a lot about it globally but 
it is not clear how to address it in a country project.  
 
8.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I traced the process of the design and implementation of the 
RCH project in India and showed how the World Bank exerted its influence 
over the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to achieve six outcomes for 
improving maternal and child health in the country. These were: (1) a target-
free policy for family planning, (2) priority for reproductive and maternal 
health, (3) decentralisation for public health programmes, (4) SCOVA 
platform for monitoring financial flows, (5) a strengthened procurement 
system, and (6) increased central funding for reproductive, maternal, and 
child health. I summarise below the six major findings emerged from this 
analysis in this chapter. 
What was the World Bank’s overall influence vis-à-vis the RCH project? 
The Bank had a partial influence on most (four out of six) of the outcomes, 
which means that the Bank supported or promoted an outcome that was 
initiated and driven by other domestic or international actors. The Bank had a 
substantial influence on one outcome i.e. SCOVA platform for monitoring 
financial flows, wherein it led the outcome but with the support of other 
actors. There was only one outcome over which the Bank had a major 
influence; i.e. a strengthened procurement system. The Bank was the main 
driver for this outcome, and on the basis of my data it does not seem feasible 
that it would have occurred without the Bank’s intervention.  
 
What resources and mechanisms did the Bank use to exert its 
influence? 
Bank staff employed four types of resources to exert its influence: financial, 
technical, knowledge and network-based. Furthermore, Bank staff used 
these resources through a range of mechanisms to influence the six 
outcomes; specifically: policy dialogue, access to the ministry of finance, 
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local intermediaries, framing, financial arrangements, donor coordination, and 
partnerships.  
Policy dialogue, mainly through consultation meetings, was the most 
commonly used mechanism. Bank staff engaged senior officials from the 
MoHFW and state governments and promoted or supported the outcomes. 
Financial arrangements were the second most commonly used mechanism 
by the Bank. These arrangements included: (i) inducement by disbursing a 
loan for a population project and getting the MoHFW to sign up to the RCH 
project, (ii) quick and flexible disbursement of financial resources for state 
governments, and (iii) negative sanction by suspension of loans for RCH-II as 
well as other health and public infrastructure projects to get the MoHFW to 
adopt governance practices.  
Bank staff also used their connections with local intermediaries in the 
MoHFW to initiate discussions around the outcomes. Given their presence in 
India since the 1950s and the longstanding borrowing relationship, Bank staff 
got a seat on the table with local intermediaries in the MoHFW, which was an 
advantage over other international and local actors. Archival records showed 
how the Bank staff from Washington D.C and the India country office were in 
regular correspondence with top-level IAS officers from the MoHFW, who 
ultimately enabled the 6 outcomes.  
 
What can be said about the sustainability of the outcomes influenced 
by the Bank?  
For any outcome to be sustainable, it has to move from an ideational 
(concept) stage to being implemented, and then finally, it must be 
institutionalised, which implies that it has to be written into the system and 
continually practiced. I showed how four outcomes are still in the 
implementation stage where they are practiced in a few and not all the Indian 
states, while two outcomes – namely, priority for RCH and decentralisation 
for RCH programmes - have become institutionalised, which means that they 
are present or practiced across all the Indian states. A key finding here is that 
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while the Bank exerted its influence over these outcomes, ultimately it can 
only do so much as it is the domestic nodal agency i.e. the MoHFW and its 
state health departments that implement and institutionalise outcomes.  
 
What factors affected this process of influence? 
The Bank and the MoHFW do not work in a silo; instead, they operate and 
take decisions within a dynamic and constantly changing environment. This 
process of donor influence is thus affected by contextual factors at the 
country-level as well as barriers at the organisation-level. In the case of 
contextual factors, consider RCH-I where the MoHFW was more receptive to 
the Bank’s recommendations and the major reason for this acquiescence 
was India’s weak economic situation and its subsequent need for steady 
cash to run its health programmes. The Bank’s loans during this window thus 
gave it tremendous influence over the design of RCH-I. In RCH-II, though, 
India was able to finance the majority of the project costs; this improved 
economic position of the Indian government appears to have reduced the 
Bank’s influence.  
 
This process of donor influence is also affected by structural barriers that 
exist within both the organisations. For Bank staff, meeting lending targets in 
a country takes precedence over programmatic goals. As a result, they pay 
more attention to financial management tasks such as engaging ministries of 
health and finance to apply for loans, and monitoring the disbursement, 
utilisation and repayment of loans. Because of its primary position as a 
lending agency, the Bank has access to the central government wherein it 
can influence policy and programme design to a certain extent. Yet, it has no 
access or influence at the district and local community-level. I found that at 
no point in the design and implementation of the RCH project did Bank staff 
conduct any participatory consultations with the beneficiaries (women, 
children, and families) or the frontline health cadre (such as ASHAs, ANMs 
and Anganwadi workers) that actually drive most of the health programmes in 
the communities. This lack of inclusion of the voice of local communities 
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could be because the Bank considers the central government of a country as 
its client rather than the actual beneficiaries of the policies or programmes 
that it tries to influence. Even if the Bank attempts to redress its own 
organisational challenges, it cannot really change the structural deficiencies 
within the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare such as the power 
imbalance between central and state governments, varying capacities across 
states, recurrent transfers of IAS officers, and weak governance and 
stewardship. 
 
What does the RCH project tell us about the Bank’s conceptualisation 
of maternal and child health? 
After the realisation that the target-based approach that it previously 
endorsed, was not effective in reducing India’s population, the Bank pursued 
the RCH project, and used it as a platform to advance population control 
albeit with a new language i.e. reproductive and child health. RCH-I was 
donor-driven, and the Bank had substantial influence over its design. While 
the RCH-I project document explicitly stated its overall objective as stabilising 
population growth (World Bank, 1997, p.1), another Bank document 
described RCH-I as a project that offered practical ways to promote family 
planning without emphasising on sterilisation targets (World Bank, 1999, p. 
7). 
 
Through the RCH-I, the Bank promoted a shift from a focus on demographic 
targets to a reproductive approach which was based on the needs of the 
client. Three issues arose with this rhetoric and subsequent practice. First, 
the client was the married woman, rather than a couple and unmarried 
women and men. Second, the client was offered narrow opportunities of 
choice; specifically, sterilisation and intrauterine device, and sparingly, the 
oral contraceptive pill. These matched the intention of providers wanting to 
limit births. Third, reproductive health services including treatment for 
reproductive tract infections and sexually transmitted diseases were provided 
without training health staff in gender sensitivity (Santhya, 2003). More 
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importantly, RCH-I lacked any consideration of the social determinants that 
affect a woman’s autonomy over her own reproductive health (Simon-Kumar, 
2007). Finally, in RCH-II, after the corruption investigation, a Bank evaluation 
raised caution to lend more money to this area in India and also proposed 
lending for immunisation instead, wherein financial resources were easier to 
control through existing procurement systems and also showed immediate 
results (World Bank, 2012, p. 25). My interview with a former Bank employee 
confirmed this caution and shift towards immunisation. Furthermore, RCH-II 
allocated around 30% of its total budget to polio operations (World Bank, 
2006).  
 
At best, the World Bank appears to have had a catalytic influence over the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. This was mainly through its financial 
resources and arrangements, especially during a window when the Indian 
government was in a weak economic position. However, if the Bank wants to 
continue to stay relevant in a country like India and actually improve health 
indicators, it will need to rethink its intervention-focused and metrics-oriented 
approach for reproductive, maternal and child health. More importantly, the 
Bank will need to redress and reform its own organisational barriers and shift 
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Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
9.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I have sought to study the influence of the World Bank in 
maternal and child health over the last five decades, starting from 1970, 
when the Bank forayed into lending for health. I studied this overarching 
research aim at two levels. First, at the global-level, I examined the Bank’s 
contributions to this area from 1970 to 2018. Second, at the country-level, I 
explored and ascertained the process and degree of the Bank’s influence in 
this area through the Reproductive and Child Health Project in India. Drawing 
on multiple sources of data including archival records, financial datasets, 
published scientific and grey literature, and qualitative interviews with thirty 
actors, I have provided an account of the World Bank’s involvement in 
maternal and child health at the global-level, and an assessment of its 
influence at country-level. To my knowledge, this doctoral research is the first 
study that offers such an examination of the World Bank’s contributions and 
limitations, and the level of its influence in the field of maternal and child 
health. I also developed a novel conceptual framework of donor influence 
and used this to appraise the World Bank’s involvement in India. In this 
chapter, I will unpack the key findings from my study and discuss its 
implications; describe the conceptual, empirical and methodological 
contributions of this thesis; outline the future avenues for research; and 
conclude with reflections on the World Bank’s relevance for maternal and 
child health. 
 
9.2 Key findings 
9.2.1 How has the World Bank’s conceptualised maternal and 
child health over time? 
Three key findings around the Bank’s conception of maternal and child health 
have emerged from this doctoral research. First, the Bank’s conceptualisation 
of maternal and child health has evolved over time. In the first two decades of 
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Bank lending for population control and nutrition, maternal and child health 
had an instrumental value as lending for this area was justified with an 
economic rationale. Women of reproductive age were viewed as conduits for 
reducing fertility, while healthy children were seen as productive members of 
a country’s workforce, and reduced fertility and improved productivity would 
ultimately lead to economic growth. However, with the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative in 1987, Bank health specialists framed maternal health as an 
ethical, social justice and developmental imperative (Storeng, 2010), albeit 
having multiplier effects for child and household health, societal productivity, 
and economic growth (Herz and Measham, 1987). In the 1990s, despite the 
Bank’s wholehearted participation in the International Conference for 
Population and Development and its subsequent espousal of the shift from 
population control towards a voluntary reproductive and child health, its 
financial flows for this decade showed the highest ever commitment for 
population control projects ($1.78 billion). This gap in rhetoric and practice 
demonstrated that the Bank’s approach for reproductive and child health was 
still grounded in fertility regulation, in that birth control was now shifted from 
the domain of family planning into the realm of individual rights and 
reproductive health. Since the 2000s, through its global health initiatives for 
MCH, the Bank aimed to save the lives of women and children, while also 
linking these goals to increased economic growth for participating countries 
(GFF, 2019; World Bank, 2007).  
Second, the Bank has moved from a selective to a comprehensive approach 
for maternal and child health. The Bank started out with a selective approach 
by focusing on population control and nutrition projects in the 1970s, which 
continued through the 1980s, through its funding for selective programmes 
such as training of traditional birth attendants and child immunisation. In the 
1990s, the Bank institutionalised this selective approach by promoting an 
essential package of interventions for reproductive, maternal and child health 
through its country-funded projects, which were cost-effective and reduced 
the highest number of DALYs (disability adjusted life years). Getting 
governments to eliminate spending on any discretionary clinical services and 
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just focusing on a cost-effective package for the poor (World Bank, 1993) 
was problematic as it ignored other health ailments that burdened women 
and children in their reproductive and pregnancy phase, such as 
tuberculosis. This selective approach also went against the agenda of health 
as a basic human right and the role of the state in the universal provision of 
health, as advocated in the Alma Ata conference in 1978 (WHO and 
UNICEF, 1978). Currently, through its global health initiatives like the Global 
Financing Facility, the Bank promotes a comprehensive approach for 
maternal and child health as demonstrated by its increased funding for 
interventions across the RMNCAH-N continuum, health systems 
strengthening, and multi-sectoral areas including education, water and 
sanitation, and gender-based violence.  
A third finding is the shift over time of the Bank’s focus on public sector 
involvement in the 1970s and mid-1980s to promoting the private sector in 
the 1990 and currently embracing the public-private partnership model, which 
has implications for the delivery of maternal and child health services. Until 
the mid-1980s, the Bank emphasised on public sector provision of maternal 
and child health services. However, after its influential publications from the 
mid-1980s onwards (World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 1987; de Ferranti, 
1985), the Bank promoted private sector involvement for health service 
provision, especially at the secondary and tertiary level. While private sector 
involvement was justified to improve the efficiency and quality of health care, 
this approach crowded out poor individuals who were not able to afford the 
direct (user fees) and indirect (loss of wages and transport) costs of health 
care. Currently, the Bank promotes public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
through Gavi and the Global Financing Facility. In PPPs, private entities 
provide public health services, bearing significant risk and management 
responsibility, and get remunerated based on performance (Leigland, 2018). 
PPPs do have benefits in that they raise financial resources for maternal and 
child health services, incentivise private sector to deliver services on time as 
they are linked with payments, and fulfill the demand for health services 
especially in areas with no public health infrastructure or capacities (World 
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Bank, 2016). However, with PPPs, costs for paying the private sector have to 
be borne by the state or the individual, and these costs could fluctuate. 
Furthermore, evaluations of Bank-led PPPs have shown how this mechanism 
can be costly for governments and can take away limited financial resources 
that could have been used to strengthen primary health care facilities 
(Webster, 2015; Marriott 2014; Ravindran, 2011). 
A promising finding is that over the years, the Bank has moved from a 
selective approach for maternal and child health programmes towards a 
more comprehensive agenda as demonstrated by the increase in its lending 
for health systems strengthening and multi-sectoral issues. Furthermore, the 
Bank has also shifted from a focus on public sector provision of maternal and 
child health services from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, to private sector 
involvement promoted by its World Development Report. The Bank currently 
promotes public-private partnerships through its global health initiatives for 
maternal and child health. 
9.2.2 What can be said about the World Bank’s influence in 
maternal and child health at the country-level in India? 
The Bank exerted its influence over the Indian Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW) vis-à-vis the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) 
Project, to implement six policy outcomes for maternal and child health. 
These were: (1) target-free policy for family planning, (2) priority for 
reproductive and maternal health, (3) decentralised planning of maternal and 
child health programmes, (4) SCOVA platform for monitoring of financial 
flows, (5) strengthened procurement system, and (6) increased financing for 
maternal and child health. In a scenario where the Bank was missing from 
the Indian landscape, would the MoHFW still have implemented these 
outcomes for maternal and child health? While it is difficult to respond to such 
a counterfactual question, through this study, I showed that at best, the 
Bank’s influence was catalytic, in that it nudged the MoHFW to implement six 
policy outcomes, many of which were already being considered within the 
government circles.  
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Overall, the Bank had a partial influence over four out of six policy outcomes, 
where it supported or promoted an outcome that was initiated and led by 
other actors. Furthermore, the Bank had a substantial influence over the 
outcome of SCOVA, a platform for monitoring financial flows from the central 
government to district level; where it led the outcome, albeit with the support 
of other actors. Finally, the Bank had a major influence over one outcome - 
strengthened procurement system, wherein it was the main driver of this 
outcome. Note that the Bank had the maximum influence (i.e. major and 
substantial) on areas like financial monitoring and procurement systems 
where it has financial and technical expertise. 
The Bank exerted its influence over the MoHFW by using four types of its 
resources (financial, technical expertise, knowledge products, and networks) 
and seven types of mechanisms for exerting influence. These were: policy 
dialogue, access to the ministry of finance, local intermediaries, framing, 
financial arrangements, donor coordination, and partnerships. As illustrated 
in the India case, the Bank’s biggest competitive advantage are its financial 
resources and arrangements and its longstanding lending relations in 
countries, which enable Bank staff with the access to local intermediaries or 
policy-makers in the central government. 
Even with these resources and mechanisms at its disposal, the Bank’s ability 
to influence a domestic nodal agency is shaped by the contextual factors in a 
country (such as politics, economy, and societal barriers) and the structural 
barriers within its own organisation as well as in the domestic agency. The 
biggest organisational impediment for the Bank is its primary goal of lending 
that drives its decisions to finance and design projects in a certain way, and 
can also take away time and attention from project design and supervision. 
Bank staff in the India country office were often preoccupied with 
coordinating loan requests from the MoHFW to meet lending targets that 
were set in Washington D.C, and monitoring the disbursement, utilisation and 
repayment of these loans, and safeguarding resources from corruption. 
Amidst the corruption scandal, the Bank’s evaluation of RCH-II expressed 
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caution to lend more money for health projects in the country and also 
proposed lending for selective interventions like child immunisation as it was 
easier to monitor the procurement and implementation of such areas (World 
Bank, 2012, p.28).  
Moreover, despite its financial muscle, technical expertise, and intellectual 
power, the Bank’s HNP staff were still a small team and the vast scale of 
public sector governance in a country like India made it challenging to control 
every aspect of the project implementation, supervision, and mid-course 
corrections. This finding underscores the need for the Bank to reconsider its 
approach for designing maternal and child health projects in big countries. 
Instead, the Bank should support district or state-level projects as against 
national-level programmes, as this will offer scope for greater engagement 
with the government’s district implementation teams and local communities, 
which is where health services ultimately get delivered.  
Most importantly, the India case study raised the issue of the complete 
absence of the voice of women and children, local communities, and frontline 
health workers in the Bank’s consultation processes during the design and 
implementation of the RCH project. The MoHFW is at fault here as well, as 
Bank-funded projects are designed and implemented through joint 
consultations between government officials from the MoHFW and Bank staff. 
It is vital that the Bank and the MoHFW consult the actual beneficiaries of 
maternal and child health services and the local and district-level service 
providers and project managers ahead of any project design, as this will 
ensure that the ground reality including local needs, barriers and facilitators is 
understood and is used to inform the project. While the government of India 
is the Bank’s client with respect to borrowing and repaying of loans, the Bank 
needs to view local communities as the more important client if it wants to 
ensure effective project implementation and impact health outcomes.  
Finally, Bank staff need to be cognisant of the reality that despite their ability 
to influence (i.e., in the form of its resources and mechanisms at disposal), 
the sustainability of the policy and subsequent health outcomes ultimately 
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lies within the remit of the domestic agency and that the structural barriers 
within this agency. Thus, Bank staff need to work closely with their 
counterparts in the domestic agency and offer technical advice to address 
structural barriers. In the case of India, such barriers include the lack of 
continuity of senior Indian Administrative Services officers (policy makers), 
weak human resource policies, and institutional capacities at the state-level.  
Finally, the analysis of the Bank-funded Reproductive and Child Health 
project at the country-level in India, showed that the Bank focused on 
technical interventions with little attention to addressing the social 
determinants of maternal and child health. Here, the Bank pursued a ‘clinic 
model’ with the assumption that once this package with services for RTI and 
STIs were provided, women would come to the health facility and avail of 
these services, thereby realising their reproductive rights. However, this 
approach failed to examine or target the social determinants at play - such as 
gender norms, poverty, caste, class, and education - that affect women’s 
autonomy over reproductive health in several LMICS with deeply patriarchal 
societies (Sanneving et al., 2013; Qadeer, 1998). Moreover, by ignoring the 
social determinants, the onus of improving reproductive and child health is 
placed entirely on the individual woman. 
 
9.2.3 What does the country case study tells us about the 
Bank’s position for maternal and child health at the 
global level? 
While the India case study provides insights around the Bank’s influence in 
maternal and child health at the country level, it also offers an opportunity to 
examine if the country-level findings reinforce or depart from what the Bank’s 
rhetoric and practice for this health area. Overall, the India case study 
confirms and reinforces most of the Bank’s technical approach and financing 
decisions for maternal and child health made globally.  
 
To begin with, the India country experience in the 1960s informed the World 
Bank’s foray in population control in the 1970s. First, in the 1960s the Bank 
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initiated policy prescriptions for population control to the government of India, 
including incentivising a target-driven approach and integrating population 
control activities into maternal and child health services. In the 1970s, the 
Bank used its experiences in India to inform its global approach, by 
mainstreaming population control into existing public health and maternal and 
child health platforms in other country level projects (1978 Malaysia loan is a 
case in point). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Bank lending in India 
focused on population control and nutrition, which reinforced what the Bank 
was doing at the global level.  
 
In the 1990s, the Bank’s projects in India reinforced two major policy 
decisions that it promoted globally. First, the Bank-funded Child Survival and 
Safe Motherhood and Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) projects 
implemented a package of essential health interventions and promoted the 
private sector for non-essential health services, just as it endorsed in its 
influential 1993 World Development Report (WDR). Furthermore, in this 
decade, the Bank espoused the shift from a target based population control 
to a voluntary reproductive and child health approach globally through its 
participation in the International Conference for Population and Development, 
and promoted the same in the RCH project in India. However, this semantic 
rhetoric for an individual, needs-based reproductive approach was not 
aligned with actual practice at the global or country level in India. Globally, in 
this decade, the Bank allocated its highest ever financial commitment for 
population control projects. Similarly, in India, Bank documents clearly stated 
that the RCH project was ultimately aimed to stabilise the country’s 
population and it offered practical ways to promote family planning without 
emphasising sterilisation targets.  
 
Since the 2000s, globally, the Bank has increased its financing for health 
systems strengthening through its maternal and child health projects. 
Financing for this thematic area has been seen in the Bank’s MCH projects in 
India as well. Finally, the India case study also reinforces the Bank’s evolving 
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financing approach for maternal and child health. Over the last five decades, 
globally and in India, the Bank has moved from lending for public sector 
provision of maternal and child health services from the 1970s until the mid-
1980s, to its promotion of private sector involvement, and its current 
espousal of public-private partnerships.  
 
9.2.4 Has the World Bank been a progressive actor for 
maternal and child health over time? 
As of my informants, a former World Bank staff, said, “At the end of the day, 
the Bank is a bank. You know….it makes its money by lending, so that is 
always going to be the focus.” This eloquent quote drives home the fact that 
the Bank has a mandate of economic growth and to achieve this, it will 
continue to use its primary tool of intervention i.e. loan financing. Almost 99% 
of the Bank’s funding for maternal and child health to low and middle income 
countries is in the forms of loans that carry interest and fees. Lending as a 
characteristic feature of the Bank has been a major constraint in its 
operations for maternal and child health. In chapter five, I have shown how 
Bank financing for MCH has been allocated to countries that not only have a 
high disease burden but also a fiscal capacity to repay loans. Lending can 
also increase the risk of debt distress among borrower governments.   
Despite this internal constraint, the World Bank has, to some extent, been a 
progressive actor for maternal and child health over the last five decades.        
It has done so in two ways. First, financially, the Bank was the fifth largest 
channel for overall development assistance for maternal and child health, 
and disbursed a total of $24.6 billion through its country-level projects from 
1970 to 2018. Half (53%) of the Bank’s health sector funding is allocated to 
maternal and child health, highlighting the significant position of this health 
area within the Bank. Through its country-level projects, the Bank has 
engaged borrower country governments and other donors to expend their 
financial resources. In so doing, it has increased net contributions to this 
area. The Bank has got country governments to invest its own domestic 
resources along with its IDA and IBRD credits (loans) and grants in RMNCH 
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programmes, thereby raising the political priority and overall country-level 
financing for this area. Additionally, the Bank has provided grants for RMNCH 
through its special health programmes and trust funds. 
 
Second, the Bank has also played a key role in advancing maternal and child 
health through its cooperation with international stakeholders such as the UN 
agencies, international donor agencies, and NGOs. It has done so through its 
partnerships including the Special Programme of Research, Development 
and Research Training in Human Reproduction, Taskforce for Child Survival, 
Child Vaccine Initiative, and the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health, and global health initiatives such as Safe Motherhood, GAVI, Health 
Results Innovation Trust Fund, and the Global Financing Facility. These 
partnerships and global health initiatives have raised the political priority for 
maternal and child health globally, and subsequently increased international 
and domestic financial resources for this health area across several high-
burden countries.  
 
However, certain internal factors have limited the World Bank’s relevance in 
the area of maternal and child health: structural adjustment policies, risks 
carried by the Bank’s trust funds and its innovative financing mechanisms, 
and the use of its normative and epistemic power to advance these 
mechanisms despite the lack of adequate evidence.  
 
First, by promoting measures such as structural adjustment programmes, 
cost-recovery, and reducing the role of the state through increasing private 
sector involvement, the Bank undermined the access to and availability of 
health services for women and children, especially from socio-economically 
vulnerable communities. Despite the Bank’s own acknowledgment of the 
negative consequences of the structural adjustment programmes (Elbadawi, 
1990; McCleary 1990), the institution maintains a neutral stance about user 
fees illustrated in its HNP strategy where it favors both user fees where 
needed as well free care at point of service (World Bank, 2007). 
 
214   
 
 
Second, the Bank’s increasingly used channel of trust funds and its 
innovative financing mechanisms including results-based financing (RBF), 
performance loan buy-downs, and sustainable development bonds, carry 
significant risks. While trust funds, like the HRITF and GFF, have increased 
overall financing for maternal and child health, their governance structures 
highlight a power imbalance that puts powerful donor states and philanthropic 
organisations in the driver’s seat to select interventions and recipient 
countries that ultimately receive funding. While RBF has been promoted as 
an effective funding mechanism and can be used for interventions that are 
easy to monitor, internal Bank and external evaluations have demonstrated 
how this mechanism can have big opportunity costs without producing 
sustainable results. Furthermore, effective implementation RBF ultimately 
depends on the country capacity and context, and can pose a significant risk 
to a borrowing country when limited public resources (through Bank credits) 
are spent on areas with less proven impact. The performance loan buy-down, 
i.e. grants to buy down interest on a Bank loan, is problematic because these 
financial resources essentially make a round trip from the World Bank in 
Washington to the borrowing country and then back to the Bank as 
repayment for old debts, thereby not really serving the interests of the 
beneficiaries in the country: women and children. Sustainable development 
bonds, which are accessible only by countries eligible for IBRD credit, really 
cater to the interests of the private sector and short-change the borrowing 
governments, as they will be driven by donor priorities of profit rather than the 
need of a particular country.  
Finally, the Bank has used its normative and epistemic power to influence 
and promote its ideas as legitimate, the most effective, and sometimes, the 
only way ahead, despite lacking concrete evidence. Through its health policy 
papers and reports (World Bank 2010, 2007, 1993, 1973), the Bank has 
couched within its economic language an instrumental and reductionist value 
for maternal and child health, such that this area is viewed as a mean to an 
end. The Bank’s health financing reports from 1985 and 1987, as well as the 
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World Development Report from 1993, promoted neoliberal frameworks 
including cost recovery through user fees and reducing the role of state 
through private sector involvement and public-private partnerships. This has 
affected the access and affordability of quality health services to women and 
children, especially those who are poor and marginalised. Finally, despite the 
weak and inconclusive evidence on results-based financing from internal 
reviews as well as external studies, the Bank continues to produce 
knowledge for this mechanism through impact evaluations and increase its 
legitimacy and credibility through annual dissemination workshops and online 
courses and toolkits for government officials from borrower countries.   
 
9.3 Contributions of this research study 
Through this thesis, I have made the following conceptual, empirical and 
methodological contributions to the global health policy literature.  
9.3.1 Conceptual  
As shown in Chapter Two, while several empirical studies have examined or 
studied in part, the influence of institutional donors on any health policy area, 
none of the articles explicitly presented a conceptual framework for donor 
influence. In this thesis, I have developed and presented a novel conceptual 
framework of donor influence at the country level. This framework draws from 
theoretical literature and empirical studies on health policy from LMICS. This 
framework has four key components i.e., (1) contextual factors (2) resources 
(3) mechanisms and (4) policy outcomes of influence. Thus, this conceptual 
framework can be used to study the process in which an external donor 
exerts its influence over a domestic agency to achieve certain health policy 
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Figure 9.1: Conceptual framework of donor influence in health policy in LMICS 
 
9.3.2 Empirical 
I used the aforementioned conceptual framework of donor influence to better 
understand the role of the World Bank in the Reproductive and Child Health 
Project in India. First, I examined data from multiple sources including project 
reports, archival records and qualitative interviews, to trace the process of 
the design and implementation of the RCH project from 1997 to 2012. 
Second, I identified six major policy outcomes emerging from the data, which 
were verified by additional published and grey literature reports. Third, I 
analysed the data using the four key components of this conceptual 
framework: (1) contextual factors (2) resources (3) mechanisms and (4) 
policy outcomes of influence. Thus, I documented the process in which the 
World Bank used resources and mechanisms to influence the Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare for six policy outcomes for maternal and child 
health.   
Apart from unpacking the process of donor influence, I also discussed the 
degree of influence that a donor can have over a domestic agency – (i) no 
influence (donor had no influence), (ii) partial influence (donor supported or 
promoted an outcome that was initiated and led by other actors), (iii) 
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substantial influence (donor led the outcome, albeit with the support of other 
actors), and (iv) major influence (donor was the main driver of the outcome). 
Furthermore, I also developed a sustainability index, which informs us if a 
particular outcome is still being implemented or has been discontinued after a 
donor leaves. 
Figure 9.2: Empirical framework of donor influence in health policy in LMICS 
 
This framework of donor influence can be applied to other LMIC settings to 
examine the process of an external donor over a domestic agency and 
indicate the degree of the donor influence, as well as the sustainability of the 
outcomes it influenced. While I studied positive policy outcomes in this case 
study, this framework can also be used to study any emerging unsatisfactory 
or detrimental policy outcomes. Finally, this framework can help researchers 
and policy-makers examine the process of donor influence as well as identify 
the contextual factors, in particular the organisational barriers, which can 
then help with effective policy and programme implementation. This 
framework can thus be used retrospectively and prospectively. 
 
9.3.3 Methodological 
Through this study, I have also demonstrated a methodological approach to 
study an international organisation in global health at two levels. First, at the 
global level, I examined the contributions and limitations of the World Bank’s 
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involvement in maternal and child health over a period of five decades by 
analysing its policies, programmes, and financing flows for this area. I 
conducted a scoping review of published and grey literature and Bank 
documents that discussed any maternal and child health-related policy, 
programme or activity funded or supported by the Bank. Similarly, I identified 
relevant archival records from the World Bank’s Archives in Washington D.C. 
I extracted and analysed the Bank’s financial flows for maternal and child 
health over the designated time period. Finally, I analysed the data under five 
chronological phases. In each phase, I discussed the Bank’s major policies 
and programmes, corresponding financial flows, justifications for the Bank’s 
involvement and the implications of the same. In doing so, I thus examined 
the major contributions as well as the limitations of the Bank’s involvement in 
this area.  
 
The twofold analysis of the Bank’s policies and programmes for maternal and 
child health (chapter four) and its financial flows for this area (chapter five) 
demonstrated alignment over key findings, thereby also illustrating 
triangulation. This methodological approach to study an international 
institution has been collaboratively developed by the Global Health 
Governance Programme at the University of Edinburgh, and has been used 
to study the World Bank’s role in tuberculosis and gender over time (Rahi et 
al., 2018; Winters et al., 2018; Mukaigawara et al., 2018). Second, through 
the conceptual framework and empirical analysis of the World Bank’s 
influence for maternal and child health at the country-level, I have provided a 
roadmap to study the process in which an international organisation 
influences another organisation to achieve outcomes for a health area. 
  
9.4 Avenues for future research   
This study offers the potential for two areas of future research. First, the 
conceptual framework of donor influence developed in this thesis can be 
used to study the World Bank’s influence on maternal and child health in 
another LMIC setting. This will help to further test and refine the framework, 
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thereby increasing its applicability and contributing to the field of health policy 
research. Such a study will first need to identify the two organisational units 
of analysis i.e. the donor (World Bank) and the domestic nodal agency in a 
country or state (province) setting. This study will also need to identify a 
donor-funded or supported programme or activity in the selected setting 
within a time frame, through which the donor’s influence can be examined. A 
mixed methods research design is recommended for this study, wherein 
multiple sources of data are consulted, such as organisational documents, 
archival records, published and grey literature, and qualitative interviews of 
stakeholders. Triangulating findings from multiple sources ensures a rigorous 
approach that ensures completeness of data and provides a more 
comprehensive picture of the results than either approach could do alone, 
thereby increasing confidence in the findings (Heale, 2013).  
While in this study, I interviewed stakeholders from the World Bank, domestic 
agency at the central government level (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare), and peripheral agencies, the future study could include stakeholder 
interviews at the state government and district level as well as in local 
communities to study the perception of donor influence of the donor agency, 
the domestic nodal agency at its different administrative levels, as well as of 
the local communities. Qualitative stakeholder interviews will help to identify 
policy outcomes of influence, which can then be verified by other sources. 
Additionally, interviews will also provide rich data on the process of influence 
(probing for resources, mechanisms, and contextual factors).  
In this study, I analysed the Bank-funded reproductive, maternal and child 
health projects executed by the HNP practice. Future research needs to 
examine the World Bank’s involvement in maternal and child health through 
other channels within the Bank. This can be done in three ways. First, a 
content analysis of all Bank-funded health projects in a selected country can 
be conducted to track the amount of money allocated to the thematic area of 
maternal and child health and trace the corresponding programmatic 
approach used. This design will allow us to gauge the Bank’s influence on 
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maternal and child health vis-à-vis the overall health lending. Second, this 
similar approach can be used to study maternal and child health efforts in 
other global practices such as education, water and sanitation, and social 
protection. Third, further research can analyse maternal and child health-
related projects, programmes, and trust funds financed by the International 
Finance Corporation. Such research can examine the role of the International 
Finance Corporation in this area; and more importantly, explore the pathways 
between private sector involvement and consequences on the access, 
affordability, and quality of maternal and child health services and 
subsequent health outcomes.  
 
9.5 Recommendations 
The World Bank is undoubtedly a major player in the global landscape for 
maternal and child health. It has contributed to shaping country-level policies 
and programmes and global health initiatives for this area, through its 
financial resources, and its cooperation with international donors and UN 
agencies. The Bank’s overall significance as a lending agency for maternal 
and child health and its role as a progressive actor for this area will continue 
given the rise in its IDA and IBRD financing over time. However, leaders 
within the institution will have to consider certain programmatic and financing 
reforms in order to stay responsive in the field of maternal and child health.  
While the Bank will keep framing maternal and child health as an economic 
case as it is primarily a financial institution that aims to help countries achieve 
economic growth, it will need to shift to a larger focus on considering 
maternal and child health for its intrinsic value first. Most of the maternal and 
child deaths occur due to preventable causes; these avoidable deaths are 
potential violations of human rights constituting social injustice. If and when 
an international financial institution like the Bank frames maternal and child 
health as a human right rather than primarily as an agent for economic 
development, other development agencies and borrowing country 
governments will follow suit. If maternal and child health is conceived 
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primarily for its intrinsic value, governments and donors will be rigorous in 
their pursuit of these goals regardless of whether this area is a trend or 
priority at the global level. Furthermore, a human rights-based approach will 
push governments and donors to aim for more than just providing access to 
and availability of health services, but also ensuring the acceptability and 
quality of such services (Kruk and Pate, 2019), and targeting social 
determinants to create an enabling environment for women and children to 
use such services. 
The Bank will need to reorient its programmatic approach for maternal and 
child health by engaging beneficiaries, local communities, frontline health 
providers and district-level health managers to include local voices and 
perspectives to inform its project design. Interventions for improving maternal 
and child health outcomes will have to address health systems strengthening 
rather than the selective approach. Moreover, interventions will have to work 
on increasing individual agency and efficacy to access health services. For 
this, the Bank will need to consider and target the social determinants of 
maternal and child health such as poverty, class (income), caste, gender, 
tribes, education, even regional differences (rural versus urban). The Bank 
can leverage its intellectual power and support country governments to 
create a local repository of knowledge on the intersection between maternal 
and child health and social determinants and pathways to address these 
factors for effective interventions. Furthermore, the Bank will have to include 
multi-sectoral convergence in their maternal and child health projects at the 
country-level. Other programmatic reforms include the need to review of the 
implementation capacity of the domestic nodal agency in a country before 
approving a project. This step can facilitate an active discussion between the 
Bank and the country government to address capacity building as well as any 
contextual barriers that could impede the implementation of the project. In big 
countries such as India, the Bank must revise its scope of assistance and 
implement state and even district level projects rather than national-level 
efforts.   
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In terms of financing reforms, the Bank will need to realign its financing for 
the low income countries that have the highest burden of maternal and child 
mortality. Given the weak evidence base and risks for the government from 
the results-based financing and public-private partnerships, the Bank should 
promote these mechanisms with caution and use it only as a supplementary 
strategy to finance maternal and child health projects where appropriate. 
Instead, it should focus on developing sustainable strategies for raising 
domestic financial resources such as budgetary reallocation and 
strengthening tax capacity while avoiding the accumulation of unsustainable 
debt. The inherent nature of the Bank in terms of its multilateral nature, it 
wide membership, professional staff, and its production of knowledge, has 
given the institution a kind of legitimacy in that it is seen as apolitical and 
credible when advising and lending to borrower governments. However, is it 
legitimate for the Bank to exert its influence in maternal and child health?  
 
As a financial partner, the Bank continues to play a significant role in this 
area globally and in India, which does make it legitimate for the Bank to exert 
influence to achieve sustainable goals such as a strengthened public health 
system, increased access, availability and affordability of maternal and child 
health. Although, as this thesis has shown, the Bank has also used its 
normative and epistemic power and its legitimacy to promote neoliberal 
frameworks and ideas (such as structural adjustment policies, results based 
financing mechanism) despite the evidence on its negative consequences or 
ineffectiveness. As argued by Shiffman (2014), what is needed is a scrutiny 
of such problematic ideas and policies when promoted without proper 
evidence and assessment by other actors involved, in particular the 
borrowing governments, as well as accountability mechanisms. 
 
At the end of the day, the World Bank is a lending institution, and maintaining 
and expanding its business and raising profits from its lending is a 
predominant motive. Neoliberal policies are still a central component of the 
World Bank agenda (Stein, 2014; Storey, 2000), and this works against the 
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social justice frameworks that are much needed for maternal and child health 
and universal health coverage. This existential tension between the Bank’s 
lending culture and its goals for improving maternal and child health is 
difficult to address. However, one way to start could be by including health in 
all of the Bank’s lending. Similar to the ‘Health in All Policies’ (WHO, 2013), 
this recommendation proposes that for every Bank-funded project, the health 
implications of decisions including unintended negative consequences on 
access to health services, must be considered and addressed. While 
ambitious, such a reform could help to strengthen health systems through all 
of the Bank’s operations and over time, support its credibility as a responsible 
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APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE  
1. Can you talk about your role at the [Institution]? 
2. How did you start working on maternal and child health projects? Can you 
think of any memorable projects or activities in this area?  
3. Can you comment on the state of government-funded maternal and child 
health services before 1990s? 
4. How did you get involved in the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH 
project? 
5. Can you talk about the design of the RCH project?  
6. How was the RCH project implemented? Can you talk about differences 
(if any) in the implementation of the two phases of the RCH project? 
7. Can you think of any challenges faced during the implementation of the 
RCH project?  
8. How would you describe the World Bank’s involvement in the project?  
9. Can you comment on the relationship between the Bank and the Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare during the RCH project? 
10. Can you think of any best practices that were introduced into the health 
system through the RCH project? What do you think was the Bank’s role 
in each of these practices? Do these practices continue to exist? 
11. Were there any limitations around the Bank’s approach for the RCH 
project?   
12. In the current period, what do you think is the role of donor institutions like 
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APPENDIX 3: STUDY INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEW 
PARTICIPANTS 
A STUDY OF THE WORLD BANK’S INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE IN 
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
Background: The World Bank is one of the largest external donors in global 
health, with a total financial contribution of $2.2 billion for health-related 
projects in the year 2015.The Bank is also a major funder for reproductive, 
maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH). The World Bank’s 
involvement in RMCH can be traced back to 1970, when it released its first 
health loan of $2 million to Jamaica for a population control project. Between 
1970 and 1980, Bank loans amounting to $401 million were released for 22 
population control projects across the world. Since its first health loan in 1970 
till the present, the World Bank has provided loans, credits, and grants to 
fund around 400 RMCH projects under its Health, Nutrition and Population 
(HNP) sector, with financial commitments amounting to nearly $21 billion. 
While the World Bank is an influential institution in the global financing 
landscape for maternal and child health, there is no comprehensive analysis 
that traces the Bank’s involvement and influence in this area over the last five 
decades since its first health loan in 1971. This doctoral study aims to fill this 
gap in the global health literature on the World Bank and maternal and child 
health, and also provide a methodological contribution on studying the 
influence of a global institution in health. This doctoral research study forms 
part of a larger Wellcome-Trust funded project on the World Bank and Global 
Health, led by Dr. Devi Sridhar at the Global Health Governance Programme, 
Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences, University of Edinburgh.  
Research aims and objectives: This study has two broad aims. First, it 
aims to construct the evolution of the Bank’s involvement in maternal and 
child health at the global level, over the last five decades. At the second 
level, this study will zoom into the country case of India and examine the 
Bank’s influence in maternal and child health policy and practice, through an 
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analysis of the Reproductive and Child Health project, implemented from 
1997 to 2012. 
Methods: The study will use a mixed-methods approach, consulting primary 
and secondary sources of data. Archived records at the World Bank and 
other relevant organizational sources will be consulted and thematically 
analysed. Qualitative interviews will be conducted with a purposively selected 
sample of key informants from the World Bank (Headquarters and India 
office), Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and relevant 
organizations. A quantitative analysis of World Bank-funded projects for 
maternal and child health (MCH) will be conducted to track financial and 
technical assistance in this area from 1970 to the present. Additionally, 
financial datasets from other relevant sources such as IHME, will be 
analysed to examine the Bank’s investments within the larger landscape for 
MCH funding. Finally, secondary sources including published articles and 
relevant grey literature reports will be thematically analysed.  
About the researcher: Genevie Fernandes is a PhD student based at the 
Global Health Governance Programme, University of Edinburgh. Prior to this 
role. She worked for 9 years as a researcher and program manager on 
maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS and tobacco control projects across 4 
states in India. Her postgraduate training is in sociology and public health, 
and her undergraduate degree is in psychology and anthropology.  
Funding agency:  The doctoral study is part of a larger research project 
titled ‘The Economic Gaze: The World Bank's Influence in Global Public 
Health’, funded by the Wellcome Trust (Principal Investigator: Professor Devi 
Sridhar).  
What about the ethical aspect of this research? 
This study has been granted an ethics approval from the Usher Research 
Ethics Group, University of Edinburgh. In the interview, I will discuss with you 
and gain your consent on the level of anonymization you require, and how 
you will be referred to in the project outputs. Any information I have about 
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you and everything you say in the interview will be kept confidential. Your 
name and contact details will be kept separately from your interview 
transcript. I will be the only researcher with access to the transcripts.  
 
If I agree to take part in this study, what will happen if I change my 
mind? 
Even if you agree to participate, you can change your mind at any time and 
withdraw from the study by writing to me at genevie.fernandes@ed.ac.uk. I 
would then delete and destroy all notes or recordings (if any) of your 
interview.  
  
Who should I speak to if I still have questions?  
If you have any questions at all about this research you can contact me 
directly at genevie.fernandes@ed.ac.uk (or on the phone: +44 7424964961 
[UK] and +91 9819047767 [India]). 
 
Who should I contact if I have a complaint? 
If you have a serious complaint about any aspect of this research study or 
researcher, please contact Professor Sarah Cunningham-Burley (Professor 
of Medical and Family Sociology / Dean of Molecular, Genetic and Population 
Health Sciences) at sarah.c.burley@ed.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 4: CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS  
 
A STUDY OF THE WORLD BANK’S 
INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE IN MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
             
CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX 5: ABSTRACT ACCEPTED FOR ORAL PRESENTATION AT A 
CONFERENCE 
The following abstract based on findings from Chapter Five (i.e., Tracking the 
World Bank’s financial flows for RMNCH) was accepted for an oral 
presentation at the International Health Conference, St Hugh's College 
Oxford, 26th – 28th June, 2019. 
 
TITLE: Tracking the World Bank’s Financing for Reproductive, Maternal, 
Newborn, and Child Health Projects from 1970 to 2017. 
  
AUTHORS: Adriel Chen, Genevie Fernandes and Devi Sridhar 
  
ABSTRACT: The World Bank is one of the largest funders for Reproductive, 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (RMNCH). We searched, coded and 
analysed 581 Bank-funded RMNCH projects from its online databases. Bank 
commitments and disbursements for RMNCH amount to a total of $29.8 
billion and $24.5 billion, comprising of 58% of its total health lending over 
time. South Asia received the largest overall commitment ($8.3 billion). 
Thematically, Bank lending for RMNCH has evolved from family planning, to 
nutrition and infectious disease control, with a renewed focus on health 
systems strengthening; while also moving from project-based financing to a 
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APPENDIX 6: PUBLISHED ARTICLE ON THE WORLD BANK AND THE 
GLOBAL FINANCING FACILITY IN THE BMJ 
Fernandes, G. and Sridhar, D. (2017). World Bank and the Global Financing 
Facility. BMJ 2017; 358, j3395.The author (Genevie Fernandes) contributed 
to this publication in the conceptualisation, data collection and analysis, and 
writing the manuscript.   
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As per the copyright policy of BMJ, the journal where the above article was 
published, authors can use their own articles for non-commercial purposes 
without asking permission from the journal (and subject only to acknowledging 
first publication in The BMJ and giving a full reference or web link, as 
appropriate) (BMJ, 2020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
